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ABSTRACT 
Planning may conveniently be regarded as the process of 
determining a future course of behaviour by an organized 
system. The analysis of government organization is greatly 
simplified if planning is distinguished from another 
concept relating to a government's control of systems in 
its environment (external systems control)» 
A simple model of the executive branch of a government 
reveals two types of components. The first is an executive 
group v;hich controls the activities of a number of sub-
organizations which may be called agencies. Agencies, 
which are the second type of component, undertake tasks on 
behalf of the government as a whole and are specialized 
by function, process or location. The executive group 
seeks to control these agencies through hierarchical 
authority, centralization of planning, resource control 
(i.e. budgets) and legislation. Each method suffer^ from 
difficulties and the inevitable result is a pluralistic 
organization which requires the development of non 
hierarchical techniques of co-ordination. 
Similar non hierarchical co-ordination techniques are used 
by most governments. They may be broadly classified as 
structural (i.e. involving reorganization) and non 
structural. The non structural methods used depend on 
the approach taken to central planning. Centralization of 
planning exists to a certain extent in all governments 
and, providing it may be maintained, is consistent with an 
increase in material efficiency and a decrease in "human" 
values in the organization. Large centralized 
organizations, however, have a potential destabilizing 
effect on their social environments and the identification 
of effective methods of non centralized planning is 
important. In a non centralized government the executive 
group will have difficulty in expressing its goals in a 
manner which is useful to its agencies, in resolving 
conflicts between goals and in dealing with change. 
The Queensland Government organization is unsophisticated 
(ii) 
in its approach to many administrative issues. It is 
interesting, however, because of its experimentation since 
about 19 70 with a non centralized concept of planning and 
its use of a Co-ordinator-General as a means of improving 
the effectiveness of such a system. The government 
includes about 550 agencies which appear generally 
technically competent but lack well developed methods of 
planning. The dominant processes by which the executive 
group exerts control are hierarchical authority and 
legislation. Central planning is not used and the budget 
is of limited value in controlling the activities of 
agencies. Because of its position in the Australian 
Federation, where the national government has sought to 
control its activities through financial dominance, it has 
often lacked the capacity to formulate meaningful plans. 
Deliberate attempts to create non centralized planning 
systems were made between 19 70 and 19 77 in relation to 
environmental and regional issues (but subsequently 
abandoned). There are areas of apparent deficiencies in 
the Queensland Government organization but conclusive 
assessment of these could only be reasonably made by the 
government itself. 
The planning systems of the Queensland Government could be 
improved (while continuing with a non centralized 
structure) through the production of corporate plans by 
the existing agencies of the government and the creation 
of a set of interlocking non statutory strategies as a 
framework for such corporate plans. Such strategies would 
create a link between government goals, agency corporate 
plans and external systems control and their review would 
provide a means of dealing with change in the government. 
A Co-ordinator-General may be considered to be a person 
capable of acting as a focus of the corporate activity 
of an organization. His role may be hierarchical (which 
involves the familiar concept of a general manager) rr non 
hierarchical. A non hierarchical Co-ordinator-General 
could only have a legitimate role in an organization where 
the executive group takes the form of a Cabinet. A 
Co-ordinator-General could, through the creation of a 
co~or< 
(iii) 
-dinated programme of works, supervise the planning 
system suggested for the Queensland Government by reviewing 
strategies and agency corporate plans and relating these 
to resource allocation. 
(iv) 
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PREFACE 
The f i e l d s of i n t e r e s t t o e n g i n e e r s h a v e w i d e n e d o v e r t h e 
p a s t t w e n t y y e a r s and t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e of e n g i n e e r s , a s 
t e c h n o l o g i s t s , c o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h m a t e r i a l goods and 
s e r v i c e s h a s b e e n c h a n g e d . The m o s t i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n s f o r 
t h i s a r e : 
(a) the growing i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s which have developed in 
man^ approach t o problems. The r e a l i s a t i o n has grown 
t h a t various d i f f e r e n t views on a problem may y i e l d a 
b e t t e r so lu t ion than any s ing le one and t h i s has given 
r i s e to the s o - c a l l e d m u l t i d i s c i p l i n a r y and i n t e r -
d i s c i p l i n a r y approaches t o problem solving in which 
engineers have often been involved; 
(b) the increased concern for n a t u r a l "environmental" 
problems. The engineer i s asked to consu l t with o thers 
about the s ide e f f e c t s of h i s a c t i o n s , and t h i s often 
c a l l e d i n t o ques t ion many t r a d i t i o n a l values which 
d i r e c t l y a f f e c t h i s work. 
In add i t ion many engineers even tua l ly i n t e r tw ine t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s with r e l a t e d p rofess ions or are promoted i n t o 
management where they are r e spons ib le for d iverse 
p ro fe s s ions . 
Pa r t of the d i f f i c u l t y of producing t h i s t h e s i s has r e s u l t e d 
from an at tempt t o adopt an i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y approach t o 
planning and co-ord ina t ion in government. The theory of 
systems suggests t h a t a system must be examined as a whole 
in order t o deal with i t p roper ly and government planning 
i s d e f i n i t e l y a sub jec t which cannot s ens ib ly be d i s s e c t e d 
on the b a s i s of t r a d i t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e s . 
In making t h i s a t tempt the author became aware of the wide 
range of d i f f e r e n t approaches which var ious d i s c i p l i n e s take 
1. This thesis covers a wide range of topic areas each of which might 
have provided a suitable subject. Concentrating on any one would 
have enabled more detailed consideration to be given to i t but might 
have produced an inferior result as the thesis would then have simply 
followed and reviewed established theories and not sought inter-
relationships between them. 
(ix) 
to what is essentially the same problem. Each professional 
group naturally takes the perspective that everything revolves 
around it and pursues it's own approach in depth sometimes 
even to the extent of losing contact with other fields. This 
is reasonable providing there are few relationships between 
the fields of study but will occasionally result in misdirected 
effort in the pursuit of irrelevant specialities. This is 
illustrated by the conclusion reached in this thesis that some 
persons are so busy deciding how planning should be carried 
out in their field that they lose sight of the organizational 
context in which planning must be set and of the constraints 
imposed by that organization. 
The task of unifying and relating ttie approaches of various 
disciplines is well worthwhile. Often it seems that 
Discipline A will know the solution to a problem concerning 
Discipline B but neither discipline will be able to 
pentrate the other to apply that knowledge. Engineers are 
V7ell equipped to attempt this because their training is 
technically complex and so should not be deterred by complex 
approaches in other fields. 
The technique which was used, and which the author would 
recommend, for preparing a paper in an interdisciplinary field 
is an iterative one. Starting with a basic perception of 
a problem, a systems-based model should be derived. After 
this, reference should be made to the various disciplines 
appearing to impact on it as a basis for incorporating each 
discipline's approach (as far as practical) into a revised 
model, this would then be used as a basis for further 
2 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and so on . 
As p a r t i a l s o l u t i o n s t o t he i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y problem t h e 
a u t h o r h a s t aken t h r e e s p e c i a l p r e c a u t i o n s . 
2. This i s a time consuming process but does reduce the l i t e ra tu re problem 
to manageable proportions. The al ternat ive would be to perform a 
comprehensive survey of the l i t e ra tu re in each discipline which would 
take several times as long as is required when a model i s defined to 
l imit the information requirement. I t also means that the author's 
knowledge of any specific discipline must be inferior to that of a 
persons with a "ground up" knowledge of the l i t e ra tu re of a discipl ine. 
(X) 
In the first place terms have been defined in a way which is 
convenient for this thesis but may not be acceptable to 
every person in every field. The creation of a common and 
recognized terminology to cover all the disciplines 
concerned with government is considered to be of critical 
importance because in its absence workers from different 
disciplines are like people talking different languages. 
This is inconvenient when it is obvious that a problem exists, 
but, too often, the differences are not even recognized. 
Because of this problem more attention has been given to 
3 
semantics than the author might have wished. 
Secondly the thesis has been written from a systems view-
point - systems being the framework of all sciences. Certain 
relevant systems concepts are outlined in Appendix B and 
familiarily with them will be assumed throughout this thesis. 
When a number of isolated theories drawn from various 
disciplines (or even from within the one discipline) are 
exam.ined together, they may all seem to be true but may also 
appear inconsistent. The construction of a proper systematic 
framework around them provides a firm base to build on, so 
that the validity of each and the relationships between them 
, 4 
can be seen. 
3. Appendix A contains a statement of all special terms used in this 
thesis. In the text certain terms have been used with other than 
these strict connotations and this has been indicated by the use of 
inverted commas. Even with this attention to definitions, the author 
is aware that it is inadequate. Very often particular disciplines 
use many special words with quite specific meanings and apologies are 
offered if such words are used inadvertantly without explanation. 
4. The absence of an accepted framework for analysing a problem results 
in approaches involving restatement of the views of past "experts" 
with little chance of rapidly building on their work. The physical 
sciences are more fortunate than the life and social sciences in 
this respect because the systems which they study are simpler and a 
logical structure can more readily be identified. (They are also not, 
in general, adaptive) . A student in such sciences will thus be exposed 
to a fairly consistent set of facts covering an entire siibject (though 
these facts will actually only be the most recent theories). The 
complexity of systems dealt with by the social sciences means that a 
student can only learn "facts" in the context of some "experts" 
opinion on how the systems involved should be viewed and this will 
not always coincide with the views of other "experts". 
(xi) 
In the a u t h o r ' s opinion i t i s the f a i l u r e of many sciences to 
take proper account of the s t r i c t concept of o rgan iza t ion 
drawn from systems theory which produces many of the i n t e r -
d i s c i p l i n a r y d i f f i c u l t i e s , and i t i s hoped t h a t t h i s t h e s i s 
proceeds pa r t of the way to r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s problem. 
F i n a l l y , considerable use has been made of appendices and 
commentary footnotes i n t o which the arguments r e l a t i n g to 
c e r t a i n mat ters have been r e l e g a t e d . U t i l i z i n g ma te r i a l 
from a number of f i e l d s to produce a c o n s i s t e n t and d i r ec t ed 
t h e s i s involves t r y ing to f i t a two or more dimensional 
argument on the s ing le dimension of a s e q u e n t i a l paper . In 
e f f e c t , t h i s approach adds a second dimension. The 
appendices contain many arguments which are r e l evan t to the 
main t e x t and should be read when f i r s t r e fe renced . 
This t h e s i s was o r i g i n a l l y intended to have p o t e n t i a l p r a c t -
i c a l app l i ca t ion in the Queensland Government and thus many 
t h e o r e t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s which could have been assumed for 
5 
the purpose of ana ly s i s have been ignored . 
Though the re a re some s igns of improvement in the s i t u a t i o n , 
any study of the Queensland Government w i l l suffer from 
an almost c r i p p l i n g shor tage of px±)lished informat ion . The 
author confesses t h a t , in some a r e a s , i t i s only by v i r t u e 
of h i s pos i t i on in the Co-ord ina to r -Genera l ' s Department t h a t 
he has been able to gain any i n d i c a t i o n of where to look for 
ava i l ab le sources . However, care has been taken not to use 
any c o n f i d e n t i a l m a t e r i a l or m a t e r i a l which would not be 
ava i l ab l e to any o the r r e s e a r c h e r . 
5. As noted by DROR (1968), p. 180 in proposing any policy the values 
important to the persons expected to support i t must be given very 
high weighting. Thus in an endeavour to apply theory to a practical 
situation many constraints have been accepted. 
Unfortunately, during the prepartion of this thesis, a change took place 
of great significance for the system of Queensland Government planning 
advanced here. During 1977 the Co-ordinator-General ceased a l l 
involvement in Regional Co-ordination and though i t is possible that 
this field could be reentered the system discussed (in Chapters 8 
and 9) is impractical because of this change. 
1-1 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
T h i s t h e s i s i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h p r o c e s s e s of p l a n n i n g and 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n i n gove rnmen t w i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e t o 
t h e Q u e e n s l a n d S t a t e Gove rnmen t . Bo th p l a n n i n g and 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n a r e e s s e n t i a l i n any g o v e r n m e n t and y e t , 
d e s p i t e t h e f r e q u e n c y w i t h w h i c h t h e y a r e d i s c u s s e d i n 
t h e l i t e r a t u r e , t h e i r p r e c i s e s i g n i f i c a n c e i s n o t 
i m m e d i a t e l y c l e a r . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e a p p r o a c h which w i l l 
be t a k e n , i s t o f i r s t d e r i v e a g e n e r a l model which w i l l 
e n a b l e them t o be c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d a s p r o c e s s e s i n 
g o v e r n m e n t b e f o r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e Q u e e n s l a n d s i t u a t i o n . 
As f a r a s t h e a u t h o r i s a w a r e , t h i s i s t h e f i r s t a t t e m p t 
wh ich h a s b e e n made t o c o n s i d e r a t h e o r e t i c a l p l a n n i n g 
s t r u c t u r e f o r t h e Q u e e n s l a n d Gove rnmen t . The l a c k o f 
e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h p l a n n i n g and a d m i n -
i s t r a t i o n i n t h a t g o v e r n m e n t shows i t a s an o r g a n i z a t i o n 
a p p a r e n t l y u n c o n s c i o u s o f and l i t t l e c o n c e r n e d w i t h i t s 
c o r p o r a t e e x i s t e n c e f * I t i s r e l a t i v e l y u n c o m p l i c a t e d and 
u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d i n i t s a p p r o a c h t o p l a n n i n g and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and many of t h e m e t h o d s w h i c h h a v e b e e n 
t r i e d i n o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s a r e unknown. The r e a s o n f o r 
t h i s i s t h e p r e v a l e n c e of a f a i r l y h i g h d e g r e e of 
c o n s e r v a t i s m i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s a p p r o a c h t o p l a n n i n g and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h i s i s n o t s t a t e d i n a d e r o g a t o r y s e n s e 
b e c a u s e t h i s may have b e e n a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e p a s t when 
t h e r e were few p r o b l e m s w h i c h r e q u i r e d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of 
c o m p l i c a t e d t e c h n i q u e s . Q u e e n s l a n d i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
r e g a r d e d a s a l a r g e , r e l a t i v e l y s p a r c e l y p o p u l a t e d r e g i o n 
w i t h few c o n g e s t e d a r e a s and a b u n d a n t n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s 
2 
w h i c h h a v e o n l y n e e d e d d e v e l o p m e n t . * U n t i l f a i r l y 
r e c e n t l y t h e r e h a v e b e e n few r e a s o n s why g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s 
h a v e b e e n u n a b l e t o c a r r y o u t t h e i r s p e c i a l i s e d t a s k s i n 
r e l a t i v e i s o l a t i o n . 
1 . Much of the avai lable mater ia l i s covered in a Bibliography 
produced by KNIGHT and ADAMS (1974) 
2 . For example, where land i s not a p a r t i c u l a r l y scarce resource i t 
i s a matter of indifference t o A i f B uses a block A wanted, 
because the adjacent block would s t i l l be ava i l ab l e . Thus 
consul ta t ion and reso lu t ion of conf l i c t ing demands only r e a l l y 
become inpor tan t where resources are l imi ted . 
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However, as with governments everywhere, the State 
Government's size and relative significance has been 
increasing and this, combined with rapid population 
growth, economic development, urbanization and 
concentration of population, is producing an ever 
increasing need for revision and rationalisation of the 
processes of government. 
In spite of its lack of sophistication, the Queensland 
Government is a social laboratory of some theoretical 
interest because of its largely unrecognised 
experimentation with a novel concept of non centralised 
planning as an alternative to the more common attempts 
to develop corporate planning systems. Its organisation 
structure is unique, as far as the author is aware, 
because of the existence of a Co-ordinator-General as a 
senior public official reporting to the Chief Executive 
of the government, having specific responsibilities for 
planning, having a role in capital resource allocation 
and serving as a focus of a good deal of inter-departmental 
activity. 
Queensland's experience during the years since 19 70 is 
relevant to any conclusions vrhich may be drawn about 
non-centralised planning but is not the final word because: 
(a) there is potential for further development of the 
basic concepts and there are other ways in which 
governments could apply the concept of a 
Co-ordinator-General (e.g. as a general manager); 
(b) there have been particular problems affecting the 
Queensland Government over this period, notably 
friction between the Liberal and National Parties 
in the Coalition government and the centralising 
activities of the Commonwealth Government between 
1972 and 1975. 
The concepts which may be developed around the role of a 
Co-ordinator-General may not only be appropriate for 
Queensland but could provide a basis for theoretically 
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advanced systems which could be copied elsewhere. ' I t has 
been stated that the Queensland planning system is based 
on a concept of co-operation and this, in effect, implies 
non centralized planning. * The development of effective 
means of non centralized planning in large organizations 
is important and this paper endeavours to show how a 
Co-ordinator-General could be used to improve the performance 
5 
of such structures. * 
This thesis has three main parts. The f irst , consisting of 
Chapters 2 to 6, is analytical and in i t a general model 
of government planning is proposed and the problems in 
central planning (leading to plurality of decision making) 
are discussed. Then the techniques of co-ordination used 
by government to overcome this problem will be identified. 
The second part (Chapter 7) is descriptive and is 
concerned with assessment of the existing structure of the 
Queensland Government and of the planning methods i t uses . 
The third and final part (Chapters 8 and 9) is prescriptive 
and discusses a model of non centralized planning by which 
i t is argued that certain of the problems inherent in 
non centralized governments could be minimized. It is 
shown that the administration of such a system could be 
facilitated through a co-ordinated programme of capital 
works. Finally, in Chapter 10, the practical relevance of 
the system is discussed. 
3. Techniques d i s c u s s e d he re a re s p e c i f i c t o Queensland b u t the 
p r i n c i p l e s invo lved could be a p p l i e d wi th s u i t a b l e modi f i ca t ion t o 
any government o r even i n l a r g e p r i v a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n s ; in 
p a r t i c u l a r in l a r g e m u l t i - n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s whose o r g a n i z a t i o n a l -
complexity r i v a l s t h a t of governments . See Chapter 8 for a 
d i s c u s s i o n of t he a p p l i c a b i l i t y of a Co-o rd ina to r -Gene ra l in a 
p r i v a t e c o r p o r a t i o n o rgan i zed on a " c a b i n e t " sys tem. 
4. "The C o - o r d i n a t o r - G e n e r a l ' s Department i s seen as an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
u n i t t o c o - o r d i n a t e aims and t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e c o - o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t 
of S t a t e Government Depar tments" , QUEENSLAND, CO-ORDINATOR-GENERAL'S 
DEPARTMENT (1971), p . 4 . 
5 . The concept of non c e n t r a l i s e d p l a n n i n g i s ejq^lained in Appendix F 
and t h e need fo r non c e n t r a l i s e d p l a n n i n g i s argued. 
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2 * PLANNING IN GOVERNMENT 
2.1 General 
This Chapter introduces the concepts of planning and of 
external systems control in government and shows the 
advantages of distinguishing them. However, in order to 
proceed as quickly as possible with the main subject matter 
of the thesis, only a brief outline is presented here and 
for a complete explanation reference to Appendices C, D 
and E is suggested. 
The nature of a government, the roles it fulfils in a 
society and the branches into which it is usually divided 
are discussed in Appendix C. A government is defined as an 
organization which exerts a degree of control over a 
society (to which other controlling organizations must defer) 
Further, it is suggested that the only significant role which 
governments perform apart from control and regulation of 
society is the provision of collective services and that most 
of the activities of a government may be categorized into 
one or both of these roles. 
The prime focus of this thesis is not on the way governments 
provide services or control systems in their environment. 
Rather it will be on the way in which the government 
organization is controlled by its leaders in the pursuit of 
these goals, with the process of planning and with methods 
of co-ordination which arise within the government 
organization itself. 
"Planning" in the executive branch of a government is a very 
complex concept. The reason is that the word is con-
ventionally used to refer to two distinct concepts. The 
first of these relates to the determination of future 
activities by an organization (in the sense of corporate 
planning) while the second relates to an organization's 
attempt to control its environment (where "planning" is used 
1, This thesis is concerned only with "good" governments; those which 
generally have the welfare of their citizens at heart. Tyrannical 
governments may not conform to such a model. 
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to refer to land use "planning", economic "planning" etc.). 
2.2 Planning 
The concept of "planning" may be c l a r i f i e d by an ana lys i s of 
the behaviour of an organized system. This i s at tempted in 
Appendix D and i t i s shown t h a t any organized system w i l l 
have a process of determining a fu ture course of behaviour . 
Processes which are s imi l a r in a systems sense are involved 
where an organiza t ion (such as a government) endeavours to 
se t up con t ro l over an e x t e r n a l system. As far as the 
organizat ion ( e . g . a government) i s concerned i t i s useful 
to reserve the word planning for i n t e r n a l processes whereby 
future behaviour i s determined and use another expression 
such as "ex te rna l systems con t ro l " for concepts such as 
economic "planning, land use "planning", s o c i a l "planning" 
e t c . The methods used for e x t e r n a l systems con t ro l by 
government, as wel l as som.e of the problems a s soc i a t ed with 
them are d iscussed in Appendix E. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n i s important to avoid confusion between these 
processes which could, for the following reasons , be a 
b a r r i e r to t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s : 
(a) to some persons "planning" may have connotat ions of 
ex tens ive governmental con t ro l of a soc ie ty and of a 
command economic system. Unless a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n i s 
made they might emotional ly r e j e c t the word as i t 
2 
r e l a t e s to the o rgan iza t ion of government i t s e l f ; 
(b) the most e f f e c t i v e planning processes are probably those 
which are i n t e g r a t e d with the a c t u a l h i e r a r c h i c a l 
3 
con t ro l s t r u c t u r e in an o r g a n i z a t i o n . Theore t i ca l 
A government should seek improved planning if i t wishes i t s organization 
to be efficient but may seek a greater or lesser control of i t s 
environment dependant on i t s political values-
Given a number of unrealistic assumptions about an organization (e.g. 
perfect rationality of decision making, frictionless and noise free 
communications, unhesitant response by the parts of the organization to 
instructions received, etc.) there would be no do\±)t about th is . 
However because of the problems of hierarchical control of a government 
organization which will be identified in the next chapter this statement 
cannot be proven. The imperfections of human organization would not 
necessarily favour process connected with external systems control 
(for example) over those connected with the hierarchical structure. 
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planning systems are often devised which are based 
around external systems control (e.g. where the agencies 
responsible for land use or economic management 
endeavour to direct activity in all parts of the 
government organization from an inferior hierarchical 
position). Processes based around external systems 
control may conflict with hierarchical planning processes 
and may reduce their effectiveness through the existence 
of duplicate and potentially inconsistent control over 
parts of the organization unless responsibility for 
control of the system in question resides in a single 
hierarchy. This does not indicate that processes based 
on external systems control should not be used in 
government. There is no doubt that the control of the 
spatial arrangement of human activities and of the 
system for producing and distributing goods have great 
importance for a society and a government could 
logically base its structure on them rather than on the 
provision of services. However, if successful 
arrangements are to be rationally defined a distinction 
between planning and external systems control should be 
made. 
Planning and external systems control are similar processes 
in that both require the existence of an organized system 
and a process of control (one internal to the government and 
one external to it). For the purpose of this thesis the 
notion of pure "planning" without the involvement of an 
organization is meaningless. 
Planning is an essential characteristic of any organized 
system and the choice which a government (or private 
organization) has is not whether it will plan, but rather 
what processes it will use and what proportion of its 
resources it will devote to planning. External systems 
control is not an essential characteristic of all organized 
systems but, by the definition of government, is a 
necessary feature in government. This is one of the 
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4 differences between governmventp and private organizations. 
Corporate planning (i.e. unified planning for an organization 
as a whole) is the best approach which can be used by a 
private corporation. The goals of such organizations can 
usually be regarded as continuing to exist and growing (both 
of which may be achieved by making profits). 
In governmentr corporate plarining by itself is not sufficient 
in part because such simple goals are not appropriate. 
Corporate planning could be attempted either at the central 
government level or at the level of individual agencies. The 
former approach suffers from difficulties in achieving central 
control and from the potentially destabilizing influence which 
a large centralized organization may have on its social 
environment while the latter would not provide for the 
5 
relationships between the activities of individual agencies. 
4. Conventionally the difference between government and private organizat-
ions would be regarded as -
(a) the existence of politically oriented decisions made by governments 
which provide constraints, unrelated to efficiency, on managers 
in government; 
(b) the involvement of politicians (e.g. Ministers) who are not 
necessarily chosen on the basis of administrative competence; 
(c) the irrelevance of market measures in decision making about 
services which are provided free. The lack of profit motive may 
lead to greater difficulty in motivating a government organization 
towards efficiency; 
(d) the insistence on a higher standard of ideals in government 
because of the need for fair operation. 
See SPANN (I960}, pp. 38-40. 
Another important difference, however, is the government's involvement 
in external systems control. A private organization can plan with 
little but rudimentary consideration of the effects of its external 
actions brought on by conscience and regulation imposed by others 
(i.e. government). The constituency to whom it is answerable consists 
mainly of its owners, employees and customers. A government 
however, accepts responsibility for the control of an external 
system and experiences difficulties if the plans reached to improve 
the success of the organization do not correspond to the requirements 
to improve the external system. 
5. The services which government provide are so comprehensive that 
overlaps are inevitable. 
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These problems will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
4 following the derivation of a simple model of government 
organization. 
2.3 Problems in the Analysis of Planning Systems 
The planning system in a government is the set of procedures 
it uses to determine its future activities. Chapters 3 to 
6 of this thesis will be concerned with typical planning 
systems used by governments (especially governments 
utilizing a cabinet and ministerial system) and the problems 
which are involved in them. 
There are two difficulties in analysing government planning 
systems. The first, which is theoretical, concerns the 
systematic framework in which governments should be analysed. 
This arises from the political and social environment of a 
government where it is possible to identify policy systems 
which are larger than, and may include, actual government 
organizations. (See Fig. 2.1). It may not be clear 
whether the policy system or the government organization 
should be the basis for analysis. If the policy system 
POLITICIANS^ 
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FIGURE 2.1 ORGANIZATION AND POLICY SYSTEMS 
A policy system might include political actors and public client 
groups and might be a natural boundary maintaining system with well 
developed homeostatic mechanisms. Policy systems could, for example, 
be identified in the fields of roads, health services, education. 
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were considered and it did not entirely contain the governirient 
organization then the model which might be constructed would 
7 
not explain behaviour originating m the organization system. 
Similarly if the formal organization is taken as the basis for 
analysis behaviour originating from the policy system V7ill not 
be explained. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
develop a model which incorporates both types of systems and 
the approach which will be taken is to focus on planning and 
co-ordination in the formal organization but to recognize 
influences which will flow from policy systems. 
The second difficulty in analysis of government planning 
systems results from the nature of the complex adaptive 
systems with which it is necessary to deal. Planning can at 
best be a process of "scientific muddling through" and a 
p 
search for optimal solutions is not really relevant. It was 
the view of the scientific school of management theorists 
and is now apparently the viv^ w of some writers on the policy 
making sciences, that this is incorrect and that scientific 
9 principles for planning do exist which only need to be applied. 
However, despite the certainty of some scientific knowledge, 
practical guidelines for government planning systems must be 
more empirical than theoretical. 
The design of processes in complex open systems is fundament-
ally different from the design of a physical structure or 
even from the design of a simple cybernetic system. Methods 
have not been devised which will enable complex adaptive 
systems to be studied to derive the types of behavioural laws 
which are possible in the physical sciences, and which are 
essential for the reliable design of a system. In the study 
7. Any agency which might be part of a policy system will amost inevitably 
have linkages with other agencies which are not part of the policy 
system. 
8. This idea was introduced by LINDBLOM (1959) 
9. See for example DROR (1968) 
10. In fact such laws are not even available to explain the behaviour of a 
single human being quite apart from explaining the behaviour of a 
system containing a number of persons. 
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of complex adaptive systems it is fairly rare to find even 
partially validated principles quite apart from property 
tested scientific laws. The reasons for this are:-
(a) the complexity and size of the systems involved prohibit 
experiments being carried out to test tlieories. Often 
they have to be tested against case studies which are 
tedious to prepare, may contain large numbers of 
extraneous variables and may give results of doubtful 
11 
statistical significance; 
(b) the systems are non additive. It is usually not possible 
to break such systems down into parts and study each in 
turn and then add their behavioural laws to derive the 
behaviour of the system. The system as a whole will 
have characteristics which its parts separately will not 
exhibit; 
(c) there is a fundamental uncertainty about the behaviour of 
the systems which is very similar in concept to the 
Heizenberg Uncertainty Principle of Physics. How can a 
researcher be sure that the very act of observing a 
complex system (particularly one containing human beings 
whose behaviour may depend on their attitudes) will not 
cause it to behave differently from the way it would have 
behaved if he had not observed it?; 
(d) the systems involved are adaptive and their characteristics 
and behaviour will alter with time so that, even if 
considerable trouble is taken to study a system this may 
tell very little or nothing about its behaviour at a 
12 later date. 
11 . The types of g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s made in the l i t e r a t u r e about o r g a n i z a t i o n s 
a re seldom based on s u f f i c i e n t s t u d i e s t o e s t a b l i s h them p r o p e r l y . See 
CROMBIE (1969), p p . 324-331. The c u r r e n t paper i s as d e f i c i e n t as 
every o t h e r i n the f i e l d i n quo t ing b e h a v i o u r a l concepts drawn from 
the l i t e r a t u r e which a re based on i n s u f f i c i e n t l y v a l i d a t e d p r i n c i p l e s . 
There i s simply no choice b u t t o do s o . 
12. Consider the d e r i v a t i o n of Keynesion economics fo l lowing the depress ion 
of the 1 9 3 0 ' s , ( s e e , for example , SHAPIRO (1974) . These t h e o r i e s 
s p e l t ou t how governments should dea l wi th a 19 30 s t y l e depress ion 
should one occur aga in b u t have n o t been consp icuous ly s u c c e s s f u l i n 
d e a l i n g wi th the economic problems of the 1970 's where t h e s t r u c t u r e 
of economic o r g a n i z a t i o n i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t because of the 
e x i s t e n c e of more c e n t r a l i z e d wage and p r i c e f i x i n g and of much 
g r e a t e r i n t e g r a t i o n of the economic system ac ros s n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s . 
See DANIEL (1977) . 
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These limitations, while making the possibility of success 
more remote than in the physical sciences, do not make the 
study of systems of government planning any less important. 
The potential payoffs which would accrue from the discovery 
of usable and valid laws concerning complex adaptive systems 
would be enormous. 
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3 . A MODEL OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 
3 . 1 G e n e r a l 
The e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h of a g o v e r n m e n t may t h e o r e t i c a l l y be 
r e g a r d e d a s a s i n g l e e n t i t y w h i c h e x e r c i s e s c o n t r o l o v e r 
and p r o v i d e s s e r v i c e s t o a s o c i e t y . I n p r a c t i c e a l a r g e 
s u p p o r t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n i s r e q u i r e d t o a s s i s t i n t h e 
e x e c u t i o n of t h e s e r o l e s and t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n may e x h i b i t 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which d i r e c t l y a f f e c t t h e way t h e p r i m a r y 
r o l e s a r e p u r s u e d . I n e f f e c t , c o n t r o l l i n g t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n 
i s a d d e d t o tJie p r i m a r y r o l e s of t h e l e a d e r s of a g o v e r n m e n t . 
P l a n n i n g i s t h e p r o c e s s of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e f u t u r e a c t i v i t i e s 
of an o r g a n i z a t i o n . I n a n a l y s i n g any p l a n n i n g s y s t e m t h e 
n a t u r e o f t h e human o r g a n i z a t i o n i n v o l v e d and t h e c o n s t r a i n t s 
which i t i m p o s e s m u s t be c o n s i d e r e d . 
I n t h i s C h a p t e r a s i m p l e model of a g o v e r n m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n 
w i l l be d e r i v e d . The o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s i s n o t t o d e l v e 
d e e p l y i n t o t h e t h e o r y of g o v e r n m e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b u t 
r a t h e r t o e n a b l e t h e s t r u c t u r e and me thods of c o n t r o l of a 
g o v e r n m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n t o be c o n s i d e r e d , and t h e me thods 
of c o - o r d i n a t i o n i n g o v e r n m e n t t o be i d e n t i f i e d and 
j u s t i f i e d . 
3.2 Some C o n v e n t i o n a l Views of Government O r g a n i z a t i o n 
Much h a s b e e n w r i t t e n a b o u t g o v e r n m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s by 
p e r s o n s c o n c e r n e d w i t h p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and w i t h 
b u r e a u c r a c y . They a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e p r o b l e m s which 
r e s u l t from t h e e x i s t e n c e of l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s and 
a t t e n t i o n h a s o f t e n b e e n f o c u s s e d on w h e t h e r , b e c a u s e o f 
t h e i r s i z e , g o v e r n m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a v e an u n d e s i r a b l e 
e f f e c t on s o c i e t y and on " b u r e a u c r a t i c " i n e f f i c i e n c y , 
r a t h e r t h a n on t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s a g o v e r n m e n t may h a v e i n 
1. Emery suggests tha t the primary i n t e r e s t of the leaders of an 
organizat ion should l i e in con t ro l l ing conditions at i t s boundary, 
and t h a t i n t e rna l considerat ions are simply a d i s t r a c t i o n . See 
EMERY (1969), p . 9. 
2. See for example, the extensive history of the study of bureaucracy 
in ALBROW (19 70) . The brief account given here is based on 
MOUZELIS (1967). An extensive bibliography was given by RIGBY (1973) 
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controlling a bureaucracy. 
The classical Marxist view V7as that the bureaucracy was the 
instrument by which the domdnant classes exercised control 
over a society. Marx also suggested that there was a 
process of alienation in bureaucracy whereby the 
organization separated itself from control by the 
dominant classes and even conflicted with their power. 
Marx also drew further conclusions about bureaucracies e.g. 
that they were characterised by incom.petence, that they are 
a closed world whose members form a type of "secret caste" 
and that they hide their true nature from their members each 
of whom believe his job is necessary. 
Weber recognised that bureaucracies could be regarded as 
3 
large organizations striving for efficiency. In order to 
gain efficiency it was necessary for an organization to do 
certain things which have undesirable effects, particularly 
in terms of constraining the freedom of an individual 
within it. Weber's ideal bureaucratic organization was 
suggested to be the most rational and efficient means of 
exercising control over human beings. Amongst other things 
it is characterised by -
(a) division of labour with specific spheres of competence 
in official duties; 
(b) a hierarchical arrangement of offices; 
(c) the establishment of rules which are applied uniformly 
to all individual cases; 
(d) selection of officials on the basis of competence 
and their operation in an impersonal and objective 
system of conduct. 
In these principles may be recognised many of the 
theoretical characteristics of efficient corporately 
controlled organizations. The more efficiently an 
organization seeks to become in strictly bureaucratic 
3. See ALBROW (1970), p . 40-45. Albrow noted t h a t Webber's concept was 
" r a t i o n a l i t y " but t h i s i s usual ly t r ans l a t ed as "efficiency" d i s p i t e 
the d i f fe ren t connotat ions. 
4 . Not a l l governments need to use s t r i c t l y bureaucra t ic s ty l e s of 
o rganiza t ion . Human groups could be envisaged as ac t ing together 
co-operat ively by bargaining, voting or other informal processes . 
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terms the more it should try to centralise its planning 
and adopt a rigin structure. This is the basis of Michels* 
"iron law of oligarchy" which suggests that large scale 
organizations are inevitably oligarchic (i.e. power is 
confined to a few persons irrespective of the ideology 
on which they are based). This means that large reasonably 
efficient organizations, democracy (or control by the 
many) is not possible. The reasons is that widespread 
participation is impossible because of the numbers involved, 
the complexity of the problems being considered and the 
possible apathy of employees. This theory suggests that 
the task of a government in controlling is organization 
should be a simple one which, as will be shown in Chapter 4, 
is not necessarily the case. 
Other issues which may be raised in terms of government 
organization include the conventional management issues 
of motivation, span of control, division of tasks, delegation 
of responsibilities, leadership, communication and the 
importance of human factors. Many of these will be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in the course of this 
chapter and the appendices associated with it. 
3.3 Components of Government Organization 
The simplest organization involving h\iman beings would be 
one in which no sub organizations consisting of more than one 
individual could be identified. Increasingly sophisticated 
organizations could consist of identifiable components which 
were themselves organizations consisting of many individuals. 
In government organizations, which are extremely complex, 
such differentiation into component organizations may be 
carried out at very many levels before the level of the 
individual is reached. 
At the first level of differentiation the executive branch 
of a government two classes of component organizations may 
be identified. The first is a control unit while the 
5. MICHELS (1959) 
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second is an agency. There can only be one control unit in 
a stable government organization and it will be referred to 
in this thesis as the executive group. A government will 
have many agencies and the authority to direct their 
activities will reside in the executive group. The formal 
executive authority of a government will usually reside in a 
single individual who can be referred to as the head of 
8 
state. This person may be the leader of the executive group. 
Agencies are in general the government departments and 
autonomous statutory and non statutory organizations which 
carry out specialized tasks on behalf of the government. 
Each agency is an organization with an identifiable 
boundary and itself contains a control unit. Agencies are 
usually capable of further internal differentiation but 
this is of limited relevance for this thesis because the 
possibility of regarding individual agencies as corporate 
entities for planning purposes is to be explored. 
A very basic model of a government organization is illustrated 
in Fig. 3.1. This is the formal structure and pattern of 
control which would be incorporated in an idealized 
government. In practice, for reasons which will be explored 
later the direct control and simple relationships shown by 
this model do not fully explain the behaviour of a government 
organization. However, if the model is expanded slightly 
6. The executive group in the Queensland Government, for example, is the 
Cabinet. Though it is referred to as a group it could in a simple 
presidential system consist of only one individual. 
7. The means whereby such authority is obtained will not be of concern 
here though it is very important in practice. The difference between 
a dictator and a president in a democratic government is based only on 
the process by which they hold their authority and the types of checks 
to which they are subject. It will be assumed here that the authority 
of a control group is based on a democratic process in a legal frame-
work. 
8. Alternately he might not be a member of the executive group at all in 
which case the position would be non political. Such a head of state 
would usually have a nominal role, in the sense of acting only on the 
advice of the executive group, and as far as a government organization 
itself is concerned can be ignored. The role may only be non political 
if there is no overt competition to undertake it. For example it could 
be assigned hereditarily to a royal family or by appointment of a 
person regarded as non political (e.g. the vice regal system in 
Australian governments). 
9. In this model each organization or sub organization is regarded as 
(continued on next page) 
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FIGURE 3.1 
DETAIL OF AGENCY D 
BASIC MODEL OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 
to take account of the degree of autonomy from the execut ive 
group which various agencies may enjoy, the model becomes 
su rp r i s ing ly useful in l a t e r chapters in examining the 
problems of d i r e c t c e n t r a l con t ro l of a government 
organiza t ion and the dimensions of interagency co-ord ina t ion 
This expansion i s i l l u s t r a t e d by Fig . 3 .2 . In fac t there i s 
EXECUTIVE GROUP 
4-
ir 
^ 
DIRECTLY CONTROLLED 
AGENCIES 
FIGURE 3.2 EXTENDED MODEL 
INDIRECT 
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I i 
^ •+ 
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9. (continued from previous page) . 
a control unit plus a "body". This is consistent with the model of an 
organized system discussed in Appendix B yet enables the hierarchical 
structure of a formal organization to be shown. In general this 
model does not limit the control and communication between these 
components so the informal organization and non hierarchical processes 
are easily mapped as horizontal transactions between and within 
agencies. 
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no clear cut distinction betweei directly controlled and 
autonomous agencies but rather a continious variation between 
the theoretical extremes. The implications of agencies having 
a degree of real autonomy from the executive group is consid- . 
ered further in Chapter 4. 
3.4 The Executive Group 
Politics 
The Executive Group contains the nominally "political" 
components of a government executive. Politics may be 
considered to be the competition for dominance in a society. 
Since a government is the dominant control and regulation 
system in a society those who seek to be its leaders are, 
by definition, politicians and must face up to the 
requirements of this competition. 
This gives rise to a constraint which is not necessarily 
consistent with effective government planning. The way in 
which a government is organized is not usually the deciding 
factor in gaining electoral support and if inefficiences 
resulting from poor structure or organization are hidden within 
a government there may be little incentive for them to be 
dealt with. Support will flow from a favourable public image, 
from an efficient political party "machine", from offering 
benefits to voters and in the crudest form from bribery and 
patronage. If the requirements for effective planning 
limit a politician in his pursuit of electoral support this 
could lay upon the entire government organization a severe 
conflict of interests. While, idealistically, politicians 
should only be concerned with the public good, with rational 
decision making and planning, this may not make much sense 
to the politician in terms of simple survival which is very ' 
12 likely to be one of his fundamental goals. 
The usual response by governments to this problem is to 
10. This i s by no means the only possible definition of po l i t i cs but i s 
convenient and generally consistent with most definitions of the term. 
1 1 . DROR (1958), p . 246 . 
12. In a democratic system there is no method known to the author for 
measuring government performance which would be better than electoral 
success, so this problem is insoluble. 
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clearly separate tlie politicians, who are allowed to particip-
ate in political competition, from career administrators^ 
who are supposed to be unaffected by i t . Career 
administrators do not in general form part of the executive 
group. In order to make this system work the politicians 
theoretically deal with "policy" while the career 
administrators handle "administration" through the unem.oticnal 
13 
and logical execution of whatever policies they are given. 
Thus, in Westminister style systems, the ministers have traditionally 
been seen to be totally responsible for the activities of 
14 the agencies they control both individually and collectively. 
Perspective of Thesis 
The executive group is concerned with directing the activities 
of the government organization and, in this thesis, emphasis 
will be placed on the problem which they face. Much has 
been written about the problem.s facing professional "planners" 
and career administrators on the assumption that they have 
some a priori rights and responsibilities. The difficulties 
identified are often the organization structure in which they 
operate and political constraints. Their requirements are 
however not as important as the problems facing the executive 
group because the latter are the ones who are supposed to be 
•V.1 1 5 responsible. 
13. No such c l e a r cu t d i s t i n c t i o n can r e a l l y be made bu t the i d e a works 
w e l l i n p r a c t i c e . See PARKER (1960) . P u b l i c s e r v a n t s i n e v i t a b l y have 
an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n de te rmin ing the p o l i c i e s of a government b u t , 
d e s p i t e t h i s , t h e i r n e u t r a l i t y and anonymity has g e n e r a l l y been 
ma in ta ined i n A u s t r a l i a . 
14. Because of t h i s m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y they were expec ted t o r e s i g n 
i f any th ing went s e r i o u s l y wrong i n t h e i r m i n i s t r y . However, wi th 
the growing r e a l i z a t i o n of the r o l e of c a r e e r a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n 
de te rmin ing p o l i c i e s , the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of m i n i s t e r s tends t o be 
r e d e f i n e d as e x p l a i n i n g the problems which occur and r e s o l v i n g them. 
I t would be unusual fo r a m i n i s t e r i n A u s t r a l i a t o r e s i g n now for o t h e r 
than p e r s o n a l f a i l u r e . 
15. This i s a s i g n i f i c a n t assumption because of t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n 
of whether p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n s a re s e t up to enable the p o l i t i c a l 
government t o c a r r y out t h e i r p o l i c i e s o r whether they should be 
des igned so t h a t a s o c i e t y can cont inue t o funct ion s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
i n s p i t e of i t s government. I f the l a t t e r were the case the i n a b i l i t y 
of an e x e c u t i v e group t o c o n t r o l i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n would n o t be of 
s e r i o u s conce rn . 
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Structures 
At least three structures are possible within the executive 
group of a government. These are a cabinet of ministers 
system, a presidential system and a general manager system. 
The presidential system as shown in Figure 3.3 is, in its 
basic form, the simplest approach. The executive group 
essentially has only one member, usually a president, to 
whom the heads of all agencies are responsible. A 
presidential system may include consultative group of 
advisers to the president who may themselves (as in a minister-
ial system) be the directors of one or more agencies and may 
be political appointees. The consultative group might not 
be necessary to the president for the exercise of his formal 
authority. In a presidential system, centralized control 
may be limited by the capacity of the president to absorb 
the variety of information with which he is confronted. 
EXECUTIVE GROUP 
AGENCIES 
FIGURE 3. 3 ALTERNATE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS 
16. Though th i s s t ruc tu re i s re fe r red to as a p re s iden t i a l system the 
person occupying the key pos i t ion might not be ca l led a p res iden t . 
For example, a simple monarchy system could take t h i s form as could 
a system involving a "d i c t a to r " . Furthermore in a government which 
had a pres ident the s t ruc tu re might not be t h a t of t h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l 
system. A pres iden t might be head of s t a t e but day to day control 
of the government organizat ion could be ca r r i ed out by a cabinet of 
m i n i s t e r s . 
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A m i n i s t e r i a l system (see Figure 3.4) involves a number of 
p o l i t i c i a n s c a l l e d m i n i s t e r s , each d i r e c t l y superv is ing one or 
more of the government's agenc ies . This method of i n t e r n a l 
s p e c i a l i z a t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y extends the capaci ty of a small 
group to supervize a large o r g a n i z a t i o n . Some, or a l l , 
min is te rs would be members of a cab ine t which i s a committee 
j o i n t l y exe rc i s ing the h i g h e s t decis ion making a u t h o r i t y . 
A m i n i s t e r i a l system i s used in the Queensland Government. 
I t bu i lds i n t o the governm.entfe s t r u c t u r e a p l u r a l i t y of 
decision making and hence a need for co-ord ina t ion a t very 
high l e v e l s . This system o r i g i n a t e d in t r a d i t i o n a l 
governments where the a c t i v i t i e s of various m i n i s t r i e s did 
not r e a l l y i n t e r a c t . 
<^ 
MINISTERS 
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EXECUTIVE 
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FIGURE 3.4 MINISTERIAL SYSTEM 
Fina l ly a government could employ a "general manager" to 
d i r e c t the opera t ion of a l l branches of the government (see 
Figure 3 . 5 ) . Under t h i s approach the p o l i t i c a l members in the 
execut ive group would form a "board of d i r e c t o r s " who would 
approve pol icy on mat te rs d i r e c t e d to them by the general 
manager. As far as the author i s aware t h i s approach i s not • 
used by any a c t u a l government, though the move towards 
corporate o rgan iza t ion in l oca l government in Great B r i t a i n 
17 can be seen to be s i m i l a r . A genera l manager would be 
expected to produce c e n t r a l co-ord ina t ion as good as in the 
17. The usual procedure for corporate management involves the appointment 
of a town manager responsible for controlling al l branches of the 
local authority which naturally disrupts traditional relationships 
between council committee chairman (cf. ministers) and the departments 
of the local authority. See, for example, HENDER (1972). 
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presidential model, but the problem of political status 
18 probably explains why it is not used in practice. 
The structure of the executive group naturally has important 
implications for the methods of co-ordination and control 
which can be used by a government. In this thesis only 
governments based on a ministerial system will be considered 
in detail. The role of Co-ordinator-General in a 
ministerial government is in some ways equivalent to that of 
general manager and would be irrelevant in a government 
where the executive branch was directed by a president or 
where an actual general manager was involved. 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
.EXECUTI^/E 
GROUP 
AGENCIES 
FIGURE 3.5 GENERAL MANAGER SYSTEM 
3.5 Agencies and Task S p e c i a l i z a t i o n 
The l a r g e s t p a r t of a government o r g a n i z a t i o n c o n s i s t s of 
the group of o r g a n i z a t i o n s g e n e r a l l y r e f e r r e d t o as agenc ies -
Agencies a r e e s t a b l i s h e d t o c a r r y o u t s p e c i f i c s p e c i a l i z e d 
19 t a s k s on b e h a l f of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n as a who le . In t h e 
fo l l owing i t w i l l be shown t h a t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of a g e n c i e s 
18. NICOLSON (1975) argued for the adoption of such an approach on the 
grounds t ha t i t would introduce a cen t ra l i n t e l l i gence in to 
government adminis t ra t ion . 
19. A task , in t h i s context , i s an a c t i v i t y undertaken by an 
organizat ion in connection with importing an input , processing 
i t or exporting an output . 
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on the basis of the tasks in which they specialize provides 
a clear picture of the structure of and some of the problems 
20 
associated with government organization. ' There is an 
extensive discussion on specialization in the literature 
and the following is an adaption of the standard approaches. 21 
By regarding a whole government as a system, it m.ay be 
recognized that it will receive inputs, perform processes 
22 
on them and produce outputs. (See Figure 3.6.) 
INPUTS OUTPUTS 
-gfr-
FIGURE 3.6 GOVERNMENT AS A SYSTEM 
20. Because it may be related to very simple system concepts, a taxonomy 
based on task specialization in more fundamental than classifications 
of agencies based on common characteristics (such as type of leader, 
source of funds etc.) or on degree of autonomy. (See WETTEiHALL 
(1968)). In fact there is no real basis for a clear cut distinction 
between agencies because they form a continuum where different 
types blend into on another. 
21. A review of the standard approaches is given by DEANE (1963) and by 
SPANN (1973) . 
22. The inputs received and the outputs produced may take many forms 
but these may, at the simplest level, be reduced to matter, energy 
and information. The processes which may be carried out include 
transformations of one type to another and change of their location. 
For example a government could import money (matter with information 
representing buying power), workers (matter containing information) 
and cement (matter). The money could be used to buy gravel and 
sand (matter) - an input and an output transaction. The cement, 
sand and gravel could be used to make concrete and then formed 
into a footpath (structured matter - containing negative entropy 
i.e. information) as the final output. 
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From t h i s a number of i ndependen t b u t no t n e c e s s a r i l y 
mu tua l ly e x c l u s i v e d imensions of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n in a gove rn -
ment may be i d e n t i f i e d . Agencies may s p e c i a l i z e in t he 
r e c e i p t of i n p u t s , i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n of s p e c i f i c o u t p u t s o r 
in some i n t e r n a l p r o c e s s . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e s e d imensions 
t a s k s could be s p e c i a l i z e d e i t h e r i n space o r i n t i m e . 
S p e c i a l i z a t i o n in t ime i s t r i v i a l f o r most purposes though 
i t would, for example , be r e p r e s e n t e d by the succeed ing 
waves of an a t t a c k i n g army. 
S p a t i a l S p e c i a l i z a t i o n 
S p a t i a l s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , however, i s a t l e a s t as i m p o r t a n t as 
the d imensions which r e l a t e t o t h e i n p u t s , o u t p u t s and 
p r o c e s s e s of a sys tem. I t s main advantage i s t h a t i t e n a b l e s 
the development of an e x p e r t i s e in d e a l i n g w i th t h e problem.s 
of a p a r t i c u l a r a r e a . 
Input S p e c i a l i z a t i o n 
Inpu t s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i s n o t a wide ly used mode of 
s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i n government and i s t hus no t an i m p o r t a n t 
one . However i t cou ld be used and would be a p p r o p r i a t e 
where a government was concerned wi th t h e way in which 
s p e c i f i c i n p u t s were t r e a t e d . For example an agency 
concerned mainly w i t h t a x a t i o n would be an i n p u t s p e c i a l i s t 
b u t fo r most o t h e r t y p e s of i n p u t s ( e . g . g r a v e l , paper) 
23 
s p e c i a l i z a t i o n by i n p u t would be p u r p o s e l e s s . 
P rocess S p e c i a l i z a t i o n 
A p r o c e s s s p e c i a l i s t agency would be one which had r e s p o n s -
i b i l i t y fo r a p r o c e s s c a r r i e d o u t e n t i r e l y w i t h i n a govern-
ment w i t h o u t d i r e c t r e l a t i o n e i t h e r t o i n p u t s o r t o o u t p u t s 
24 
of t h e government as a whole . The r a t i o n a l e fo r such 
23. An agency r e s p o n s i b l e fo r procurement of s u p p l i e s on beha l f of the 
whole government could perhaps be regarded as an i n p u t s p e c i a l i s t 
( e . g . S t a t e S t o r e s Board i n t he Queensland Government) b u t f u r t h e r 
thought shows t h a t i t would be a p r o c e s s s p e c i a l i s t ( s p e c i a l i z i n g i n 
the p r o c e s s of procurement of many types of i n p u t s ) as compared wi th 
an i n p u t s p e c i a l i s t which would dea l only wi th a s i n g l e i n p u t . 
24. I t i s appa ren t t h a t any agency t a k e s i n p u t s and produces o u t p u t s . In 
the case of a p r o c e s s s p e c i a l i s t t h e r e w i l l no t be o u t p u t s by t he 
government as a whole b u t r a t h e r i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t s t o be used 
by o t h e r s in the p rodu c t i on of f i n a l o u t p u t s . 
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agencies is that they would be able to make more effective 
use of specialized skills and equipment than would other 
agencies. A public works department which undertook all 
construction works on behalf of the government would be an 
example of a process specialist agency, though others could 
include specialists in typing, accounting, staff management, 
data processing, collection of statistics, mapping, draftj.ng, 
printing, provision of accommodation, laundry work and so on. 
The advantage of a process specialist is that the process is 
performed well but the disadvantage is that the linkages 
between that process and other tasks connected with actual 
government outputs may be poor. Other specialist agencies 
would have to rely on the service provided by the process 
specialist and while it will be closely oriented towards the 
needs of its clients when it is first created, a process 
specialist will probably develop needs of its own and may 
regard these as more important than the interests of its 
clients. If this occurs, client agencies may find it 
necessary to establish parallel services of the same type 
as those provided by the process specialist. 
Output Specialization 
An agency which specialized in outputs would produce all out-
puts on a particular type on behalf of the governm.ent. This 
will be referred to in this thesis as a functional specialist, 
where a function of government is defined as a set of related 
^ 4- 25 outputs. 
25. A concept of function similar to this was proposed by NAGEL (1956). 
He considered that fvmctions are those outputs which make for 
adaptation and adjustment by a given system while disfxanctions were 
those which lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system. 
Such a definition of function is not necessarily universally accepted. 
Functions may be considered to be goal oriented processes within a 
system. See, for example, LITTERER (1973), p. 40. This was the 
usage adopted by the Haldane Committee which proposed that govern-
ment agencies be based on purpose rather than on the basis of clientele. 
See GREAT BRITAIN, COMMAND PAPER 9230 (1918). 
Functionalism, a widely used approach in sociology and anthropology, 
identifies functions with the role an element fulfils in the overall 
culture, e.g. different processes may be used to achieve the 
"function" of transmission of wealth after the death of an individual. 
See KAST and ROSENZWEIG (1970), p.113. 
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The advantage of functional specialization is that it pro-
duces agencies which are oriented towards the aim of govern-
ment (i.e. its final outputs) rather than towards the means 
by which they are achieved. 
The actual definition of government functions is by no m.eans 
a simple matter because there are many reasonable ways in 
which outputs could be grouped. 
Government outputs are always related to at least one system 
in the government's environment. Community services will, 
for example, usually be an element of such a system (e.g. 
part of a public health system, or education system) while 
external system controls may be inputs to a system designed 
to regulate it. One method for producing a functional 
grouping would be on the basis of the system towards which 
the output related (e.g. all outputs related to the p\iblic 
health system could be classified as health and provided by 
a Health Department). There is, however, no v/ay in v;hich the 
real world may be divided into a set of discrete systems 
since most elements form part of more than one system. Thus 
such a method of classification could not be unique and, in 
practice, functional groupings are usually defined either on 
the basis of convention or convenience. Because all govern-
ments have to deal v;ith a basically similar set of systems a 
sufficient degree of consistency in functional groupings can 
be observed for fairly standard sets of functions to be 
defined and used as the basis for comparison of the activities 
of different governments. 
Functional groupings may be defined in other ways than on the 
basis of the system to which an output relates. It could 
be based on collecting together all outputs connected with a 
specific client group (i.e. all persons with a defined 
2 7 
characteristic such as orphans, invalids, etc.). Such a 
26. However, one difficulty in the use of a functional classification to 
analyse the expenditures of a government is that hypothetical functions 
such as "general administration" have to be introduced to cover the 
activities of agencies which are not functional specialists. 
27. Specialization by clientele is usually regarded as a major category 
in its own right but, in fact, is only one way of grouping outputs. 
Thus it is regarded here as one type of functional specialization. 
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classification of outputs would necessarily produce duplica-
tion of outputs since it would be most unlikely that all 
outputs v7ould be required by only one client group. 
Geographic area could also be used as a logical method of 
grouping outputs. It will, however, be convenient to regard 
a function of government as any logical grouping of outputs 
except with regard to area, because spatial specialization 
can be regarded as an important category in its own righu. 
3.6 Model Agencies 
Of the various dimensions of specialization which have been 
identified, the uncommon case of specialization by input 
and the trivial case of specialization by time may be 
ignored. Three independent dimensions of specialization 
may then be identified - namely function, process and 
location. (See Figure 3.7.) 
6^ "^  
($> 
4 
2; 
o 
H 
U 
PROCESS 
FIGURE 3. 7 DIMENSIONS OF SPECIALIZATION 
If these are applied to the agencies of a government, three 
"pure" agency types may be defined, namely the functional 
"department", the process "department" and the "local 
authority". (See Figure 3.8.). "Department" is used 
here to indicate an agency whose jurisdiction covers the 
entire spatial area with which the government deals. This 
includes both the conventional departments (i.e. ministerial 
departments) and the more or less autonomous statutory 
authorities which are the alternative to the ministerial 
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d e p a r t m e n t f o r m . 
PROCESS SPECIALIST 
"DEPARTMENT" 
FUINICTION SPECIALIST 
"DEPARTMENT" 
PROCESS 
SPATIAL SPECIALIST 
(LOCAL AUTHORITY) 
SPACE 
FIGURE 3.8 MODEL AGENCIES 
A f u n c t i o n a l "depa r tmen t " would d e a l w i th a l l p r o c e s s e s con-
n e c t e d w i th t h a t f u n c t i o n i n t h e e n t i r e a r e a of t h e gove rn -
m e n t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n , w h i l e t h e p r o c e s s "depar tmen t" would 
u n d e r t a k e t h e p r o c e s s in which i t s p e c i a l i z e d i r r e s p e c t i v e 
of t h e o u t p u t wi th which i t was connec ted and the l o c a t i o n . 
A " l o c a l a u t h o r i t y " would be an agency which c a r r i e d o u t a l l 
f u n c t i o n s and p r o c e s s e s w i t h i n an a r e a l e s s than t h e e n t i r e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e government . 
I t i s i m p o s s i b l e fo r two i d e a l i z e d a g e n c i e s of d i f f e r e n t 
t y p e s t o e x i s t i n a government because they would i n e v i t a b l y 
o v e r l a p and one would be unab le t o have i t s r e q u i r e d 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . The a c t u a l a g e n c i e s of a government w i l l n o t 
be t h e pu re t y p e s which have been d e s c r i b e d h e r e b u t w i l l 
p r o b a b l y i n c o r p o r a t e a l l t h r e e d imens ions of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n 
2 8 though one w i l l be dominant . The space occup ied by an 
28. In describing the Queensland Government in Chapter 7 i t wil l be seen 
that agencies approximating to functional and process special is ts 
may be identif ied. Local authorit ies also exist dealing with a wide 
range of functions in a limited area but i t wil l be found to be con-
venient to identify a larger class of local bodies (of which the 
local authority i s one) which each deal with one or more functions 
or processes in a limited area. 
3-28 
agency on t h e f u n c t i o n , p r o c e s s , l o c a t i o n d i a g r a m may be 
d i s c o n t i n u o u s and may o v e r l a p t h a t o c c u p i e d by o t h e r 
a g e n c i e s . 
S p e c i a l i s t a g e n c i e s of e a c h t y p e h a v e i m p o r t a n t r o l e s i n 
a g o v e r n m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n and i f a g o v e r n m e n t were t o t a l l y 
d e f i c i e n t i n any o n e , s u b s t a n t i a l p r o b l e m s wou ld be e x p e c t e d . 
3 .7 I m p o r t a n c e of t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n S t r u c t u r e 
The s i m p l e s t way of c o n s i d e r i n g t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e i n 
a gove rnmen t i s a s a s t a t i c s t r u c t u r e by i d e n t i f y i n g t h e 
a g e n c i e s of wh ich i t c o n s i s t s and t h e t a s k s i n which t h e y 
s p e c i a l i z e w h i l e i g n o r i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n a g e n c i e s . 
Even t h i s s t a t i c model shows t h a t t h e governm.ent o r g a n i z a t i o n 
s t r u c t u r e can be i m p o r t a n t i n d e t e r m i n i n g g o v e r n m e n t 
b e h a v i o u r . 
Once an agency i s c r e a t e d i t a t t a i n s an i d e n t i t y and a 
v a l i d i t y o f i t s own. I t may n o t t h e n be d e p e n d e n t on any 
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s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l o c c u p y i n g a p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n . 
F u r t h e r m o r e i t w i l l s t r i v e t o a c h i e v e wha t i t p e r c e i v e s t o 
be i t s " g o a l s " , and i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n i t s e x i s t e n c e , w i l l 
t r y t o p r o v e t h a t t h e s e g o a l s a r e w o r t h y of b e i n g s o u g h t . 
V a l u e s b e n e f i c i a l t o an a g e n c y ' s i n t e r e s t s w i l l be g i v e n 
g r e a t e r w e i g h t t h a n w i l l be g i v e n t o non b e n e f i c i a l v a l u e s . 
Whi le i t i s p o s s i b l e t o p r o d u c e d e c i s i o n s by an a g e n c y 
which do n o t conform t o i t s a p p a r e n t i n t e r e s t ( e . g . by t h e 
me thods of non s t r u c t u r a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n w h i c h a r e d i s c u s s e d 
i n C h a p t e r 5) i t i s f a r s i m p l e r and more s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r a 
g o v e r n m e n t t o e x p l o i t t h e n a t u r a l s e l f i n t e r e s t of i t s 
29. Role t h e o r i e s sugges t t h a t when a person l eaves an o r g a n i z a t i o n the 
new occupant of h i s p o s i t i o n w i l l t end t o behave much as h i s 
p r e d e c e s s o r ( i . e . t he r o l e p e r s i s t s ) . His behaviour depends a t 
l e a s t i n p a r t on the r e l a t i o n s h i p s wi th which the o r g a n i z a t i o n 
d i c t a t e s t h a t he be i n v o l v e d . See LITTERER (1973), p . 11 . 
30. For example i f an agency i s e s t a b l i s h e d t o b u i l d roads i t w i l l 
b e l i e v e t h a t the i n c r e a s e d a l l o c a t i o n of funds for roads i s more 
impor t an t than o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 
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agencies rather than continuously endeavour to suppress them. 
Thus it is extremely important that a government ensure that 
the formal arrangement of its agencies is such that they 
would be naturally oriented towards its goals. It should 
be reasonable to assume that, in any given government, the 
self interest of its agencies should, as a first approximation, 
reflect its goals. 
The types of agencies which are created do not completely 
define the structure of the government organization. It 
is necessary also to examine the arrangement of agencies with 
respect to each other and the way in which they are linked 
together to form the government organization as a whole. 
These linkages will be defined by the flows (usually of 
information) between formal agencies. Such flows will 
occur: 
(a) because of the need to establish a general hierarchical 
pattern of control; 
(b) because of the need for agencies whose tasks relate 
to communicate about those tasks; 
|c) to serve the informal needs of the persons employed 
by the governmiont (e.g. an "old boy" network could be 
created). 
These linkages will also have an important impact on the way 
a government organization operates. They will control the 
flow of information available for making decisions and will 
influence the way in which coalitions are formed in support-
ing or opposing specific policies. 
Thus, in all its aspects, the organization structure should 
be important to the executive group in a government. This 
does not imply that factors apart from the organization 
structure are unimportant or that all organizational 
behaviour can be explained without reference to factors other 
than structure. The outcome of government activity will 
also be influenced by the basic policies adopted by the 
executive group, by the technology and equipment available 
to it and by the competence of the people it employs. 
However, given a particular set of policies the factor 
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which a government can influence which will have the greatest 
impact on its results is its organization structure. 
In the study of government, it is very important to be 
concerned with the structure and with the processes by which 
decisions are reached. Improvement in material productivity 
can usually only be achieved by reorganization or the use of 
new equipment. Similarly in prom.oting effective goverrmient, 
it is primarily from research into the structure of the 
organization and the general methods used that substantial 
improvements may be expected. 
Achieving a proper orientation between government goals and 
organization structure miay, however, be difficult because 
an established structure will tend to persist and be 
difficult to modify fundamentally in the short term. This 
results from the natural homeostatic responses of the 
agencies involved (e.g. as noted above each agency will try 
to prove that its goals are worthy of being sought) and from 
the reinforcement of linkages within agencies and the 
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supp re s s ion of l i n k a g e s between them. 
3.8 D e s i r a b l e C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n Government O r g a n i z a t i o n 
The s t r u c t u r e used has i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s for t h e 
performance of a government o r g a n i z a t i o n because i t w i l l 
a f f e c t t he way i n which s p e c i f i c i s s u e s a r e d e a l t w i t h . 
However i t i s n o t p o s s i b l e t o d e f i n e a s imple s e t of 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which cou ld be r e g a r d e d as " i d e a l " which 
should be adopted by a l l governments . 
The r e a s o n s f o r t h i s a r e : 
(a) There i s c o n t i n u o u s v a r i a t i o n i n t h e r e a l world w i th 
which a government d e a l s . Thus what a p p e a r s t o be 
optimum a t one t ime may n o t be optimum v/hen t h e s i t u a t i o n 
c h a n g e s . 
31. In an organization, such as a government, certain sub-systems will appear 
to have a natural basis for their existence. These will be sub-systems 
within which there are many relationships but across whose boundaries 
these are re la t ively few. The existence of a defined organization 
within a government will tend to reinforce i t s internal linkages and 
suppress those across i t s boundaries. 
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(b) There will be conflicts between the requirements of 
various government functions because of the impossibility 
of producing a unique definition of functions. Thus 
an organizational structure which is created to emphasize 
one function or set of functions may conflict with 
others. 
(c) The methods of specialization outlined in Chapter 3.5 
are not mutually exclusive. For example, spatial 
specialization conflicts with the functional division 
of activities because activities can be carried on, 
either by function over a whole range of sub-areas, or 
within one sub-area over a whole range of functions. 
The former approach tends to integrate governmental 
activities on a functional basis {i.e. activities will 
tend to be consistent over the government's whole spatial 
area) while the latter will lead to their integration on 
a spatial basis (i.e. activities related to various 
functions will be consistent within the sub-area) 
assuming that consistency of action within an agency 
is more likely than between agencies. 
(d) The characteristics which might be desired in a 
government organization are inconsistent. One possible 
view might be that a government organization should be 
efficient, honest, simple to understand, easily controlled 
by the executive group and internally consistent (i.e. 
. co-ordinate). Further an organization might be sought 
which was not unstable and did not inhibit the governments 
response to legitimate interests in the community. 
However, even such a simple set of characteristics could 
not be accepted unless they were in conformity with the 
goals of the government under consideration. 
The inconsistencies associated with these "desirable" charact- . 
eristics of a government organization will be discussed below. 
Another reason that the definition of an "ideal" government 
organization is not possible is that there is no such thing 
as a perfect government agency. 
32. The divergence between spatial and function interests is discussed 
in a slightly different context in UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC COMMISSION 
FOR EUROPE (1967). For general discussion see SIMON (1957), pp. 28-35. 
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A "perfect" government agency m.ight be one v.'nich could operate 
independently (i.e. where all linkages can be internalised). 
In practice, because of the interconnection which exists 
between all areas of government action, there can never be 
such a perfect agency. Actual agencies in a government 
will probably be those which, in the recent or distant past, 
actua].ly internalised the most important linkages. 
Recognising that there is no "perfect" agency and that an 
organization structure can never be found which internalises 
all linkages, the organization structure which a government 
should seek would be one which, in its opinion, internalised 
the most commonly required (and important) linkages in terms 
of its goals. Internalising important linkages decreases 
the need for inter-agency co-ordination and a good 
organization structure will be characterised by a fairly 
low need for formal co-ordination. However it will not be 
zero and may not even be the minimum achievable because 
factors other than inter-agency co-ordination will influence 
a government's approach to the design of its organization. 
Perhaps the paraeto optimum for government organization is 
where no task can be better organized without adversely 
affecting some other. 
The characteristics which were suggested above as possible 
measures of an "ideal" government organization will no^ -; be 
discussed to show that some of the requirements conflict. 
Stability 
Stability implies that unstable behaviour should be inhibited. 
Any organization will be stable because homeostatic mechanisms 
are required for its continued existence but certain types of 
structures (especially non-centralized ones) are more stable 
that others.-^-^ Stability is naturally the most important 
requirement for a government organization because without it 
the government might not exist at all. Only once it is 
achieved can higher level factors be sought. 
33. See Appendix F, 
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Adaptability 
There should be mechanisms whereby change is facilitated 
when it is required. This implies that new requirements 
can be learned and that reorganization to meet them is 
possible, 
However, in every situation where there are apparent problems 
in a government organization it may not be necessary or 
desirable to seek reorganization. In the pursuit of any 
one function or process it v/ill usually be optimal to 
internalise in a single agency most of the linkages between 
the specialised tasks which are involved. Linkages which 
cut across the boundary of the agency in relation to some 
other function or process will suffer from relatively greater 
communication and control problems and this will be an 
obvious source of problems. There is an almost inevitable 
tendency for persons interested in any specific matter to 
look for reorganization to internalise these problem 
34 linkages (See Figure 3.9.) 
AGENCY 3 
AGENCY 1 
AGENCY 2 
X 
1 LINKED TASKS 
PROBLEM 
^LINKAGES 
PROBLEM 
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m 
Y\ 
AGENCY 4 
OLD STRUCTURE NEW STRUCTURE 
FIGURE 3.9 REORGANIZATION AND "RESHUFFLE SYNDROME" 
3 4 . Fo r a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n a s p e c i f i c c a s e . 
See AUSTRALIA,.COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT POLICY ( 1 9 7 4 ) . 
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However t h e n o t i o n t h a t i m p r o v e m e n t s may r e s u l t from c o n -
c e n t r a t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r some p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m i s t o o 
o f t e n f a l l a c i o u s . A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c w h i c h may be o b s e r v e d 
i n e f f i c i e n c y s e e k i n g g o v e r n m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n may be c a l l e d 
t h e " r e s h u f f l e s y n d r o m e " . T h e r e may be a c o n t i n u o u s 
a t t e m p t t o r e s h u f f l e t h e g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s and a r r angem.en t s 
by i n c r e m e n t a l c h a n g e s i n an a t t e m p t t o f i n e - t u n e t h e g o v e r n -
ment s t r u c t u r e . T h i s w i l l r e s u l t b o t h from t h e c a u s e s 
o u t l i n e d above and from p o l i t i c a l c o n t e s t s where one l e a d e r 
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may g a m o r l o s e pov/er w i t h r e s p e c t t o o t h e r s . 
Change t o a g o v e r n m e n t ' s s t r u c t u r e i s d e s i r a b l e i n r e s p o n s e 
t o l o n g t e r m e n v i r o n m e n t a l a l t e r a t i o n s , b u t r e s h u f f l e s i n 
r e s p o n s e t o s h o r t t e r m c h a n g e s a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y b e n e f i c i a l . 
I n c o n s i d e r i n g any change t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of a g o v e r n m e n t 
t h e " o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t " s h o u l d b e compared w i t h t h e e x p e c t e d 
b e n e f i t . The o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t i s t h e e x p e c t e d d i s b e n e f i t 
r e s u l t i n g from b r e a k i n g of e s t a b l i s h e d l i n k a g e s (and t h e 
i n h i b i t i o n o f o t h e r f e a s i b l e l i n k a g e s ) which i s n e c e s s i t a t e d 
by t h e new o r g a n i z a t i o n a l g r o u p i n g . T h i s o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t 
W i l l v e r y s e l d o m be z e r o . Where t h e r e i s a t e n d e n c y f o r 
r e s h u f f l e t o o c c u r o t h e r c o - o r d i n a t i v e p r o c e d u r e s t h a n 
r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d . 
E f f i c i e n c y 
In s o f a r a s g o v e r n m e n t s e e k s t o p r o v i d e s e r v i c e s f o r a 
s o c i e t y , e f f i c i e n c y i s d e s i r a b l e . E f f i c i e n c y may be t a k e n 
t o r e f e r t o t h e p r o d u c t i o n of maximum o u t p u t s p e r u n i t of 
35. In f a c t , i n a m i n i s t e r i a l sys tem, the d i v i s i o n of agenc ies i n t o 
m i n i s t r i e s w i l l be i n f l u e n c e d by p e r s o n a l i t y i s s u e s in the smal l 
group of pe r sons who c o n s t i t u t e t he e x e c u t i v e group. However, 
even though d e c i s i o n s may be made on the a l l o c a t i o n of agenc ies on 
t he b a s i s of s h o r t term expediency , the e f f e c t of t h i s w i l l no t 
be too s e v e r e . R e l a t i o n s h i p s between agenc ies w i t h i n a m i n i s t r y 
can only be m a r g i n a l l y b e t t e r than between agenc ies under s e p a r a t e 
m i n i s t e r s . In g e n e r a l , i f a s p e c i f i c agency e x i s t s i t w i l l have 
a s i m i l a r r o l e i r r e s p e c t i v e of where i t i s . l o c a t e d . The 
importance of i t s e f f e c t s may, however, depend on the s t r e n g t h 
and s e n i o r i t y , of the m i n i s t e r t o whom i t i s r e s p o n s i b l e . 
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i n p u t a f t e r a d e c i s i o n h a s b e e n made on wha t t o p r o d u c e . ^ 
In t e r m s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e , e f f i c i e n c y i n a g i v e n 
t a s k i s u s u a l l y synonomous w i t h a g r e a t e r d e g r e e o f 
s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and w i t h a s e a r c h f o r e c o n o m i e s of s c a l e . 
T h i s i s n o t c o m p l e t e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t 
a gove rnmen t o r g a n i z a t i o n be a d a p t a b l e . A d a p t a b i l i t y w i l l 
be i n h i b i t e d whe re p a r t s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a r e d e p e n d e n t on 
t h e c o n t i n u a n c e of a s p e c i f i c p r o b l e m o r f u n c t i o n . B e c a u s e 
of t h i s , e x t r e m e l y s p e c i a l i z e d a g e n c i e s may be i n f e r i o r t o 
t h o s e w i t h more g e n e r a l t a s k s . An agency w i t h o n l y a v e r y 
na r row r o l e may h a v e no o p p o r t u n i t y t o a d a p t when i t s t a s k 
becomes u n n e c e s s a r y o r f u n d a m e n t a l l y changed and t h i s may 
l e a d i t i n t o u n n e c e s s a r i l y s t r o n g r e s i s t a n c e t o c h a n g e . 
R e s p o n s i v e n e s s and E q u i t a b i l i t y 
R e s p o n s i v e n e s s t o t h e v i e w s of t h e s o c i e t y i n wh ich a g o v e r n -
ment e x i s t s i s w i d e l y r e g a r d e d a s d e s i r a b l e , n o t o n l y f o r 
a l t r u i s t i c r e a s o n s b u t a l s o b e c a u s e i t i s l i k e l y t o a v e r t 
t h r e a t s t o t h e g o v e r n m e n t from e x t e r n a l g r o u p s . I n 
a d d i t i o n i t i s u s u a l l y s u p p o s e d t h a t a g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d 
t r e a t a l l p e r s o n s and g r o u p s e q u a l l y . The l a t t e r a r g u m e n t 
i s , i n p a r t , t h e o r i g i n of t h e c o n c e p t t h a t , i n a b u r e a u c r a c y , 
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r u l e s a r e p r e s u m e d t o be a p p l i e d w i t h c o m p l e t e i m p a r t i a l i t y . 
36. The sea rch for e f f i c i e n c y i n government has long been the main 
emphasis of r e f o r m e r s . I t i s very d i f f i c u l t , however, t o f ind 
adequate measures of e f f i c i e n c y because , whi le i n p u t s can be 
measured i n money t e rms , o u t p u t s a re no t o f t en conver ted i n t o t h i s 
medium. Thus p r o f i t cannot be a measure of e f f i c i e n c y and to show 
how e f f i c i e n c y may be improved i t i s necessa ry t o s tudy an o p e r a t i o n 
i n v o l v i n g p rede te rmined i n p u t s and o u t p u t s and f ind t h a t method 
which produces the r e q u i r e d o u t p u t s wi th minimum i n p u t s . 
37. A l l pe r sons who f a l l i n t o a def ined group ( e . g . pens ioner s ) a re 
presumed t o be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y . However t h e r e i s a d e f i n i t e e q u i t y 
i s s u e i n the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e because i t 
w i l l imply t h a t people o r s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s a re d iv ided i n t o a 
c e r t a i n s e t of g roups . The e x i s t e n c e of an agency t o promote 
or damage the i n t e r e s t s of a s p e c i f i c group may be seen t o be 
i n e q u i t a b l e by a person who d i s a g r e e s wi th the government ' s g o a l s . 
For example, f a i l u r e t o p r o p e r l y r e p r e s e n t some group in a govern-
ment ( e . g . women) may be seen to be i n e q u i t a b l e o r a f u n c t i o n a l l y 
s t r u c t u r e d government may appear n o t t o t r e a t e q u i t a b l y between 
f u n c t i o n a l and s p a t i a l i n t e r e s t s . 
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The debate in the l i t e r a t u r e concerning government responsive-
ness revolves around such i s sues as e l e c t o r a l systems, open 
or s e c r e t i v e government, pub l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n and so on. 
Two d i f f e r e n t methods for seeking responsiveness may be 
i d e n t i f i e d . The f i r s t of these i s top-down responsiveness 
whereby i t i s assumed t h a t the execut ive group, on the bas i s 
of i t s e l e c t o r a l system ( i f i t has one) , adequately 
represents the soc ie ty so t h a t once i t i s e lec ted whatever 
3 8 i t decides should be accepted. The second approach i s 
bottom-up responsiveness where lower l eve l agencies of the 
government in t h e i r contac t v;ith the publ ic are expected to 
absorb publ ic opinion as a guide to t h e i r behaviour. 
Bottom-up approaches include methods which ac tua l ly allow 
persons to p a r t i c i p a t e in dec is ion making and those which 
simply seek t h e i r views without giving them any r e a l power. 
The mechanisms used to achieve bottom-up responsiveness 
include the fol lowing: 
(a) Market mechanisms. By p r i c i n g a product a user may 
f ree ly determine h i s requirement for i t . 
(b) Opinion Surveys. The opinion of a sample of the 
populat ion may be assumed to r e f l e c t the view of the 
major i ty . Voting in a referendum i s a s p e c i a l , formal 
and comprehensive method of opinion survey. 
(c) Publ ic I n q u i r i e s . J u d i c i a l or q u a s i - j u d i c i a l i n q u i r i e s 
may be held where the arguments for or aga ins t a 
s p e c i f i c mat ter may be formally debated by i n t e r e s t e d 
p a r t i e s . 
38. This i s p robab ly the most impor tan t method of ach iev ing r e spons ivenes s . 
See HUGHES (1977) . There i s however some doubt about the 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s of pe r sons s e l e c t e d by an e l e c t o r a l system no 
m a t t e r how good i t i s . EMERY (1976) has argued t h a t the 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n an e l e c t o r a l c o n t e s t r e q u i r e s t h a t a person pursue 
a l i f e course fundamental ly d i f f e r e n t from those of the r e s t of t he 
group he i s meant t o r e p r e s e n t . Thus random s e l e c t i o n , r a t h e r 
than e l e c t i o n , w i l l produce a more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e group. This 
concept i s more a p p l i c a b l e t o co-opted pe r sons involved in 
government than t o the e x e c u t i v e group i t s e l f . 
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(d) Co-option. This r e f e r s to "the absorpt ion of new 
elements i n t o the l eadersh ip or pol icy determining 
39 
s t r u c t u r e of an o rgan iza t i on" . Persons may be co-
opted i n t o the dec is ion making s t r u c t u r e by formal 
processes (e .g . the e l e c t i o n of a l oca l government 
council) or by ad hoc methods (e .g . M i n i s t e r i a l s e l e c t i o n 
of members of an advisory committee). 
The major impl ica t ion of the processes sought to achieve 
responsiveness i s t h a t i f top-down methods are favoured, then 
a r e l a t i v e l y t i g h t l y con t ro l l ed c e n t r a l i z e d organiza t ion 
s t r u c t u r e i s to be p r e f e r r e d . If bottom-up methods were to 
predominate a lower degree of c e n t r a l con t ro l would be appropr ia te 
As explained in the next chapter t h i s w i l l d i s t o r t d i r e c t con t ro l 
of an organiza t ion by i t s l e a d e r s . 
When govermaent s t r u c t u r e i s defined the c o n s t r a i n t s i t imposes 
w i l l neces sa r i l y l i m i t c e r t a i n types of responses and ensure 
some inequ i ty . No arrangement can s u i t a l l i n t e r e s t s and 
value judgements are requi red as to the types of responses . 
to be f a c i l i t a t e d . 
Simplic i ty 
The s t r u c t u r e of the o rgan iza t ion and the processes involved 
should not be such t h a t the log ic on which i t i s based must be 
understood by a l l of the persons involved. Furtheirmore i t 
should not r equ i re t h a t people behave in an unnatura l manner 
by, for example, assuming highly a l t r u i s t i c behaviour. 
The s o p h i s t i c a t i o n which may be b u i l t i n t o a government 
organiza t ion which remains simple as far as i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s 
are concerned depends on t h e i r general l eve l of knowledge of 
o rgan i za t i ona l s k i l l s . 
39. SELZNICK (194 3) saw co-option as a means of averting threats to 
the stability or existence of an organization where the legitimacy 
of i t s authority to control a certain issue is called into 
question. I t may be a response to a specific centre of power 
outside the government. In this thesis, however, i t will simply 
be used to denote any method of incorporating outside elements 
into the decision making structure. 
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Controlability and Co-ordination 
The government organization should be readily controlled 
by the executive group. It should also be co-ordinate 
in the sense that inconsistent actions by individual 
agencies should be minimized. 
In Appeixdix D the concept of co-ordination in an organized 
system was introduced and it was suggested that in an 
organization based on a hierarchical structure, the dominant 
processes by v;hich co-ordination is achieved are connected 
with this hierarchy but that if this is imperfect then 
non hierarchical processes were also possible. 
The hierarchical processes of control and co-ordination 
which may be used by the executive group will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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4. METHODS OF CENTRALIZED CONTROL IN GOVERNMENT 
4.1 General 
A government organization could be completely co-ordinated if 
it were controlled from a single point. The executive group 
endeavours to exert such control but, for many reasons, this 
is imperfect, and other processes of co-ordination are 
required. The purpose of tnis chapter is to outline the 
processes of control which are used by the executive group 
and to identify their limitations. This will be fairly 
brief and supporting appendices F, G and H should be read 
in conjunction. 
The simplest theoretical method of control which the 
executive group could use would be to directly issue in-
structions to all agencies concerning every aspect of their 
activities. Even if these instructions were always 
accepted, complete control by this method could not be 
achieved because of the size and complexity of the organiz-
ation involved. There are so many matters on which 
decisions are required that it is beyond the capacity of the 
executive group to process the information required for 
decision making. Thus either decision making must be 
delegated to other positions in the organization or the 
executive group must increase its own capacity to process the 
data required for decision making. 
The relative emphasis given to these alternatives determines 
the centrality of the government. A centralized government 
will emphasize increasing the effective decision making 
capacity of the executive group while a non centralized 
government will emphasize delegation and, as a consequence, 
will need to rely to a greater extent on non hierarchical 
process of co-ordination. 
The meaning of centralization and its advantages and 
disadvantages are discussed in Appendix F. There is no 
provable optimum level for centralization. Partial 
centralization of planning is required because it is an 
effective method of co-ordination, while decentralization 
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enables the organization to more effectively match the 
variety of the real world, prevents the development of some 
of the less desirable aspects of "bureaucracy", and prevents 
large scale organizations from having a destabilizing 
influence on their social and economic environments. (Appendix F) 
4.2 Centralized Hierarchical Control 
In practice, a government will be partially non centralized 
if agencies exist with a degree of genuine autonomy. If 
these are ignored for the moment, two processes may be 
identified by v\7hich central control could be exerted. The 
first of these would simply involve using the hierarchical 
chain of command in the organization while the seond would 
require the creation of one or more special agencies attached 
to the executive group whose only role was to process data 
to aid them in decision making. 
Simple Hierarchical Control 
The simplest approach is that the executive group delegates 
responsibility for deciding relatively minor matters to 
lower levels in the hierarchy. All important decisions 
could be passed up the hierarchy to the executive group and 
the latter could define the policies which would guide lower 
level decision making. In this manner the executive group 
could theoretically maintain almost complete control over 
all relevant action in its organization. However this v/ill 
not be completely successful because of two limitations on 
the effectiveness of simple hierarchical control. 
The first is that a government organization will experience 
many management problems. Appendix G contains an account of 
some of these which are particularly relevant* 
The second difficulty with simple hierarchical control is 
that the executive group will be faced with competition 
from other sources for the control of its organization. 
This could arise from: 
1. A policy may be considered to be a predetermined response for use 
in a decision situation which is expected to occur frequently. 
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(a) internal democratization; 
(b) public involvement; 
2 
(c) the informal o rgan iza t ion . 
The concept of i n t e r n a l democrat iza t ion i s t h a t the mass of 
employees involved in an o rgan iza t ion should have a say in i t s 
management. This i s a powerful force tending t o undermine 
formal au thor i ty in a h i e r a r c h i c a l system and s i g n i f i c a n t 
movements in t h i s d i r e c t i o n have occurred through the 
a c t i v i t i e s of organized unions and by d e l i b e r a t e choice in 
some p r iva t e firms in ce r t a in European count r ies ( espec ia l ly 
3 Germany and Scandinavia) . I n t e r n a l democrat izat ion i s 
much more d i f f i c u l t in government where the execut ive group 
i s d i r e c t l y e l ec t ed by the e n t i r e community and so has a 
democratic b a s i s for i t s a u t h o r i t y , though, even t h e r e , the 
issue IS becoming important . 
Open government and publ ic involvement are a fu r ther 
challenge to the a b i l i t y of a government to cont ro l i t s 
5 o rgan iza t ion . The use of these techniques w i l l a f f ec t 
i n t e r n a l decis ion making processes because they put p ressures 
on decis ion makers which would not e x i s t in t h e i r absence. 
Quite apa r t from formal publ ic involvement there are numerous 
pressure groups in soc ie ty with whom a government must 
compete for con t ro l of i t s o rgan i za t i on . 
2. The t o t a l s t r u c t u r e of a human o r g a n i z a t i o n i s no t de sc r ibed by i t s 
formal s t r u c t u r e . There a re many l i n k a g e s and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
which e x i s t t o s e rve t h e s o c i a l needs of the people i n the o r g a n i z -
a t i o n and t o overcome p r a c t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s of the formal o r g a n i z -
a t i o n in t he p u r s u i t of i t s g o a l s . These l i n k a g e s w i l l be 
r e s p o n s i b l e for some o r g a n i z a t i o n a l behaviour which w i l l c o n f l i c t 
wi th the r equ i r emen t s of a u t h o r i t a t i v e h i e r a r c h i c a l c o n t r o l . 
3 . Unions a r e u s u a l l y based on t r a d e o r job s p e c i a l i z a t i o n r a t h e r than 
on the o r g a n i z a t i o n by which they a r e employed. Thus i n t e r n a l d e -
m o c r a t i z a t i o n through t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s i s a very complex i s s u e 
because the formal l e a d e r s of an o r g a n i z a t i o n a r e no t only competing 
fo r c o n t r o l wi th t h e i r own employees b u t wi th an e n t i r e l y s e p a r a t e 
s o c i a l g roup . 
4 . Worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s more s u i t a b l e i n autonomous s t a t u t o r y bod ie s 
o p e r a t i n g as b u s i n e s s e s than i n m i n i s t e r i a l depa r tmen t s . See 
SARKER (1973) . 
5 . See DILL (1975) . 
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No value judgement is made about the desirability of these 
influences but they do act against the use of hierarchical 
authority to control an organization. However, since simple 
authoritative hierarchical control is very difficult anyway, 
they will tend to make a government organization more 
responsible through reflecting in its decision processes the 
desires of two important constituent groups, namely 
employees and the public. 
Central Agencies 
The capacity of the executive group to control its organization 
by simple hierarchical methods is limited, thus centralized 
planning for the government as a v/hole would require the 
creation of a special agency attached to the executive 
group in which the formulation of plans for all of the govern-
ment's agencies could be concentrated. 
Such an agency would be a central planning authority and its 
involvement in a government organization would lead to a 
structure as shown in Figure 4.1. 
CENTRAL PLANNING AGENCY 
O PLANNING 
LIAISON 
SECTION 
e 
\ 
• 
\ 
X 
e 
N 
, 
DIRECTLY CONTROLLED 
DEPARTMENTS 
AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES 
FIGURE 4.1 CENTRAL PLANNING 
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The difficulties associated with this approach are: 
(a) There may be problems in relating a planning authority 
to the executive group in such a way that the power 
of the former did not conflict with the political 
interests of the latter; 
(b) The role of a planning agency might be resented and 
undeinnined by other agencies unless very strongly 
supported by the executive group. It could be 
frustrated by non co-operation and by failure to 
supply information; 
(c) Large amounts of information would have to be processed 
which would require internal specialization within the 
planning authority. Thus it would tend to create an 
internal structure paralleling the government's 
agencies and this would produce difficulties in co-
ordination. 
The creation of completely centralized corporate planning for 
an entire government by the use of a central planning agency 
would be extremely demanding and there is considerable doubt 
that it could be achieved. It would require, for example, 
that the executive group always act as a unit and that all 
information reaching it be processed through the planning 
authority. This would be inconsistent with individual 
ministerial responsibility. 
However, less demanding approaches could be used. For 
example, the planning authority could exist in less critical 
position if it were simply involved with aiding the pro-
duction of plans for longer term activities by government 
agencies or if it served as a priority review group. These 
would naturally not produce completely centralised planning 
and non hierarchical processes of co-ordination would be 
required. 
6. The logic of a priority review group is that there be attached to the 
executive group a small body able to give an independent review of 
plans. However as noted by HELMER (1975) such a group has limited 
• capacity to introduce a central intelligence into government. If 
it focusses on short term issues it will contribute little while if 
it attempts to deal with long term matters it will be unable to 
influence day to day decisions. 
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Another less demanding approach by which the decision making 
capacity of the executive group could be enhanced is through 
the control of the resources available to agencies. This 
is usually done through a budget by which money is allocated. 
Budgeting is discussed in general terms in Appendix H. 
The main limitations on the use of budgets to control a 
government organization are -
(a) It only applies to those parts of a government which 
obtain finance from, centrally allocated funds; 
(b) It is necessarily indirect and can never be considered 
to give complete control; 
(c) It may be sabotaged by the inef f.-i ciency of an agency 
to which funds are allocated. S-.abstantial resources 
might produce few practical results; 
(d) Where annual budgeting is used actual decisions may 
be made very far in advance of the budget stage and 
the budget is only a means of balancing money sources 
and virtually committed needs. In particular where 
wages and salaries are seen as committed line items 
rather than as elements of a programme, large 
percentages of government resources are fixed; 
(e) The conflicting needs for budgets set out in Appendix 
H may make the proper achievement of any of them 
di.fficult. Thus, for example, a budget which put a 
great emphasis on auditing and accountability might 
be of no real use at all for any other purpose. 
(f) As for a central planning agency a budgeting agency may 
be difficult to integrate with the government as a 
whole. The control of the budget may not give to 
the executive group as much capacity to control its 
organization as it gives to the individuals employed 
by the budget agency. 
4.3 Hierarchical Control of Autonomous Agencies 
Even where a government had no agencies which were not 
directly subject to its hierarchical control, such control 
is an imperfect means of ensuring co-ordination. For a 
number of reasons some agencies are usually created by a 
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government with a high, degree of real autonomy. The executive 
group would not exert day to day control over these but would 
rely mainly on indirect 'controls through definition of their 
powers and jurisdiction and possibly by specifying the 
membership of the agency. 
The reasons for creating autonomous agencies are usually -
(a) A belief that government business undertakings require 
flexibility in order to compete and trade effectively 
in the market place. Such business undertakings are 
usually functional or process specialists; 
(b) To promote responsiveness by co-option of the leaders 
of the autonomous agency. For example, this could 
apply to a spatial specialist such as a local authority 
where the controlling council is elected locally or to 
an agricultural marketing authority where growers 
representatives were on the board of directors; 
(c) To neutralize a contentious political issue by 
demonstrating that it is outside the direct control of. 
the government executive, e.g. the creation of an 
independent literature censorship board. 
In a Westminister system the powers and jurisdiction of 
autonomous agencies are defined by legislation under the 
control of the legislative branch of government. But if the 
executive group is not drawn from and generally in control 
of the legislative branch, the executive group's ability to 
7 
influence autonomous agencies may be quite small. However, 
if the executive group is usually able to ensure the passage 
of legislation then this becomes a useful method of control of 
autonomous agencies. 
In isolation legislation will simply set the general rules 
within which autonomous agencies will operate. This implies 
that there is general control of ends and outcomes but not 
7. NIGRO (.1970) notes that in the United States where the executive does 
not dominate the legislative branch the executive itself must 
continually resist control from the legislature. 
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of means to tnose ends. This idea has parallels with the 
concept of management by objectives (where ends are set. but 
o 
determination of the means of achieving them are delegated). 
This will significantly restrict the possible activity of 
that agency but without specifically affecting any 
particular decision. 
This may be an effective means of control with the advantage 
that the senior administrators and employees in the agency 
will feel minimum restrictions on their actions. However, 
it has the disadvantage that, because control is not specific 
to any given decision, the government may occasionally feel 
that an incorrect decision has been made and the autonomy 
of the government's statutory bodies may be a source of 
conflict. This could lead to undermining of that autonomy. 
Another disadvantage of autonomy is that such an agency may 
have more difficulty in communicating with the executive 
group than an agency which was not autonomous. Thus 
where the roles of autonomous and directly controlled, 
agencies overlap to any extent, the latter will usually 
be able to dominate the former because of their shorter 
channel of communication to the executive group. This is 
illustrated by the usual dominance of ministerial depart-
ments over autonomous spatial specialists. 
Under some circumstances formal law may be an important 
source of control of even the ministerial departments of a 
government. This would apply where there was a clear 
separation between the executive group and its staff and 
fairly independent functional agencies or where the leaders 
of the executive were not drawn from and generally in control 
of the legislature. In the latter case, legislation, 
rather than other less formal methods, would be used to define 
and adjust the boundaries of jurisdiction between agencies. 
8. An account of management by objectives is given in ODIORNE (1969). 
9. In many European Countries (e.g. France) public administration has 
been seen in terms of administrative law probably because of the 
"Tradition that the highest posts of general administrative 
responsibility should be (attained) through the Law Faculties 
alone" MACKENZIE (1967), p.60. 
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Legislation could, of course, be used to set up controls 
through central planning or budgeting over these "autonomous" 
bodies in which case the coriQ-nents in the earlier part of this 
Chapter apply* 
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5 . CO-ORDINATION IN GOVERNMENT 
5.1 The Concept of Formal Non Hierarchical Co-ordination 
Central control by the executive group in a government is a 
necessarily imperfect means of ensuring complete unity of 
action. The purpose of this chapter is to describe other 
processes which exist to inhibit non co-ordinate action by 
a government's agencies. 
Co-ordination may be defined as a process of ensuring unity 
of action between the parts of an organized system. Such 
processes may in general be either hierarchical or non 
hierarchical. In a government organization the hierarchical 
processes relate to tiie methods whereby i t is centrally 
directed while the non hierarchical processes are those which 
do not relate to an actual line of authority. Hierarchical 
methods have already been considered and the following 
discussion will be limited to those which are non hierarchical. 
Non hierarchical interagency co-ordination may be envisaged 
in the same dimensions as specialization in government. I t 
involves processes which cut across the boundaries of agencies 
along the dimensions of function, process and space because 
specialized agencies will exist which fragment responsibility 
for specific functions, processes and geographic areas. 
Lindblom identifies two types of co-ordination. The first is 
central co-ordination where "decision makers adapt to one 
another on instruction from a central decision maker" and the 
other is "mutual adjustment between partisans" in which no 
central mind or decision maker exercises any co-ordinating 
responsibility.^ I t is generally possible to equate 
1. See Appendix D. 
2 . DELION (1970) on whose work much of the fo l lowing i s based , de f ines 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n as only those p roces se s which do n o t o r i g i n a t e i n a 
formal l i n e of a u t h o r i t y . 
3 . LINDBLOM (1965) , p . 2 5 . His concept of c o - o r d i n a t i o n i s l i m i t e d t o 
t h a t between human b e i n g s . One of h i s d e f i n i t i o n s of c o - o r d i n a t i o n i s 
"A s e t of i n t e r - d e p e n d a n t d e c i s i o n s i s c o - o r d i n a t e d i f each dec i s ion 
i s adapted t o the o t h e r s i n such a way t h a t fo r each a d j u s t e d d e c i s i o n , 
t he ad jus tment i s thought t o be b e t t e r t h a t no adjustment i n the eyes 
of a t l e a s t one d e c i s i o n maker" i b i d , p . 24. His concept of p a r t i s a n s 
i s t h a t they a r e persons who make d e c i s i o n s c a l c u l a t e d t o se rve t h e i r 
own goa l s n o t goa l s presumably sha red by o t h e r dec i s i on makers wi th 
whom they a re i n t e r d e p e n d a n t . i b i d , p . 29 . 
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hierarchical processes of co-ordination with central co-
ordination and non hierarchical processes with partisan mutual 
adjustment. However, as noted by Lindblom, "in many cases 
what appears to be a case of central co-ordination is in fact 
4 
a case of partisan mutual adjustment". Thus hierarchical 
processes may include mutua.l adjustment though this process 
is far more likely V7here autonomous delegated powers are 
involved. Partisan mutual adjustment may be identified as a 
form of incremental decision making where more than one decision 
maker is involved. 
Lindblom further identifies two distinct classes of mutual 
adjustment. The first is adaptive whereby a person adapts 
to a decision made by another without expecting any response 
from them while the second is manipulative in that the 
decision maker expects a response from another party involved 
in his decision. He further categorizes adaptive co-ordination 
by the extent to which the decision maker is concerned with 
7 
the effect his decision has on otJiers . In manipulative co-
ordination distinctions are drawn between negotiations 
(including bargaining which involves conditional threats and 
promises, and partisan discussion), compensation (where the 
required response is obtained by offer of benefit), 
reciprocity (where obligations are established or called upon), 
authoritative prescription (where one person has authority over 
another), unconditional manipulation (where the benefits and 
disbenefits which another faces in making a free decision are 
changed) and prior decision (where one party uses his previous 
decision to force another to adjust rather than remaining non 
co-ordinate). 
4. i b i d , p . 3 . 
5 . Lindblom d e s c r i b e s t h i s as d i s j o i n t e d i nc remen ta l i sm . ( i b i d , p . 143) .• 
Each d e c i s i o n maker t a k e s h i s e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n as f i xed , and cons ide r s 
only a sma l l number of i nc remen ta l changes t o i t and once an a d j u s t -
ment i s made i t becomes tlie b a s i s for f u r t h e r ad jus tmen t s . 
6 . i b i d , p p . 33-34. 
7. There i s no p o i n t i n i n t r o d u c i n g he re Lindblom's d e t a i l e d terminology 
t o d e s c r i b e t h e s e types of c o - o r d i n a t i o n . 
8. Spann s u g g e s t s an a d d i t i o n a l method of mutual adjus tment which i s 
r e l e v a n t i n government. This i s "d iv id ing the market" which i nvo lves 
" r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t i n g groups have each an a r e a of 
competence t h a t w i l l n o t be invaded by the o t h e r s " . See SPANN (19 73) 
p . 79. 
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These methods of adjustment may take place in e i t h e r formal 
or informal s i t u a t i o n s of which only the former w i l l be 
discussed he r e . Informal spontaneous adjustments take place 
between ind iv idua l s and organ iza t ions whenever they come i n t o 
con tac t . The formal methods however, are those which could 
be d e l i b e r a t e l y used by the government to improve co-ord ina t ion 
Formal non h i e r a r c h i c a l co-ord ina t ion would be i r r e l e v a n t in 
a pe r fec t o rgan iza t ion i n which t o t a l unity of ac t ion was 
guaranteed by h i e r a r c h i c a l p rocesses . I t was a lso of l i t t l e 
relevance i n a " t r a d i t i o n a l " government where a l l agencies 
operate independent ly, without formal l inkages and v/ithout 
s i g n i f i c a n t involvement in e x t e r n a l systems c o n t r o l . Under 
such circumstances e t h i c s , market forces , p o l i t i c a l co-
ordinat ion by Cabinets and ad hoc arrangements o r i en ted 
towards the so lu t ion of s p e c i f i c problems were a l l t h a t was 
requi red . 
However, i n modern governments, given the degree of i n t e r -
connection which e x i s t s between t a s k s , formal interagency 
9 
co-ordinat ion i s an important sub jec t for s tudy. 
5.2 Requirements for Co-ordination 
A need for co-ord ina t ion may usual ly be recognized where the re 
i s a problem which r e s u l t s from the breakdown in an 
e s t ab l i shed system. Such breakdowns may be voluntary (in 
which case c o n f l i c t i s the r e s u l t ) or involuntary and may 
o r i g i n a t e in the problems i d e n t i f i e d in Chapter 4 in c e n t r a l 
cont ro l of a government. 
A l o t of work on t h i s s u b j e c t , t o which t h i s t h e s i s owes a g r e a t d e a l , 
has been done a t the I n s t i t u t e for o p e r a t i o n a l Research i n Coventry 
t o which a f a i r l y e a r l y r e f e r e n c e i s FRIEND, POWER and YEWLETT (1973) . 
In 1977 the I n s t i t u t e commenced p u b l i c a t i o n of a p e r i o d i c a l "Linkage" 
which i s devoted p u r e l y t o i n t e r co rpo ra t e c o - o r d i n a t i o n . In t h i s 
FRIEND (1977) s u g g e s t s t h a t two e q u a l l y v a l i d p e r s p e c t i v e s may be t aken 
of t he problem of c o - o r d i n a t i o n in government. They a r e the top down 
and bot tom up views which sugges t r e s p e c t i v e l y , t h a t c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
p r o c e s s e s i n government could be c e n t r a l l y c o n t r o l l e d or t h a t they could 
be based on non c e n t r a l i z e d a c t i v i t i e s . The emphasis given by F r i end 
and o t h e r s a t the I n s t i t u t e i s towards the bottom up p e r s p e c t i v e and 
the problems of l o c a l government. This i s probably because of Great 
B r i t i a n ' s u n i t a r y system of government where departments a t t a c h e d t o 
the e x e c u t i v e group a re very remote from l o c a l i s s u e s . This t h e s i s 
however emphases the problems as seen from c e n t r a l p e r s p e c t i v e b u t none 
the l e s s t h e i s s u e of non h i e r a r c h i c a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n p r o c e s s e s i s 
i m p o r t a n t . 
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In g e n e r a l the h i e r a r c h i c a l p r o c e s s e s of c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
ope ra t e through the c o n t r o l of a s e r i e s of r e l a t e d 
a c t i v i t i e s . P rocedures and r o u t i n e s fo r h a n d l i n g complex t a s k s 
may be s e t up and a r rangements made for feed ing back up the 
h i e r a r c h y for r e s o l u t i o n a t h i g h e r l e v e l s any i s s u e s which do 
not f i t the e s t a b l i s h e d r o u t i n e . This i s s u c c e s s f u l where 
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s a re s t a b l e and p r e d i c t a b l e b u t may break 
down i n t o a r e q u i r e m e n t for ad hoc s o l u t i o n s v/here too many 
s p e c i a l cases a r i s e . 
Non c o - o r d i n a t i o n , o r t h e need for c o - o r d i n a t i o n , may be 
measured by t h e degree of c o n f l i c t w i t h i n a government and 
the amount of a v o i d a b l e d u p l i c a t i o n . Not a l l d u p l i c a t i o n 
of a c t i v i t i e s can be c o n s i d e r e d t o be avo idab l e b e c a u s e , f o r 
example, f u n c t i o n a l l y s p e c i a l i z e d agenc i e s may d u p l i c a t e 
p r o c e s s e s , p r o c e s s s p e c i a l i z e d agenc i e s may d u p l i c a t e 
func t ions and s p a t i a l l y s p e c i a l i z e d agenc ie s may d u p l i c a t e 
both f u n c t i o n s and p r o c e s s . Fur thermore a c e r t a i n amount of 
d u p l i c a t i o n i s r e q u i r e d t o ensu re t he redundancy r e q u i r e d t o 
minimize e r r o r s i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Avoidable d u p l i c a t i o n 
would occur only where i t can be e l i m i n a t e d w i t h o u t l o s i n g 
t h a t a r rangement of i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n which a government 
b e l i e v e s b e s t s e r v e s t o ach ieve i t s g o a l s . This w i l l occur 
where two or more agenc i e s occupy the same p l a c e on a 
f u n c t i o n , p r o c e s s , space d iagram. 
The need fo r c o - o r d i n a t i o n may be i n c r e a s e d by fragmLentation 
of the government e x e c u t i v e group ( e . g . where t h e r e a r e a 
l a rge number of M i n i s t e r s ) and by poor des ign of t he o v e r a l l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e , 
5 .3 C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Methods 
There i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c approach which o r g a n i z a t i o n s t a k e 
10. The s implest p r a c t i c a l index of non co-ordination i s the existence of 
s t a t e s of c r i s e s in which there i s a c lear lack of mutual adjustment 
between d i f f e ren t agencies . 
11. An organizat ion in which tasks are shared between s\±.units w i l l be 
e r ro r a t tenuat ing (e .g . a group where a l l members have a spec i f ic 
role of t h e i r own and a general role of supporting any member who i s 
absent or i n d i f f i c u l t i e s with h i s job) while an organization (such 
as a t r a d i t i o n a l army) which handles the fa i lu re of subunits by 
simple replacement of the en t i r e un i t w i l l tend to amplify e r r o r s . 
See EMERY (1976) and a lso DROR (196 8), p . 211. 
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] 2 to a co-ordination problem. ' As the cause is a failure of 
the established system to deal with a problem the simplest 
assumption to make is that somebody is doing something wrong 
and thus they first try to make the system work. If this 
fails, the next simplest approach is to treat the problem as a 
special case and set up a new piece of machinery to handle i t . 
With some problems this is also unsatisfactory and i t will be 
found necessary to change the structure of the entire system to 
eradicate i t . This is a logical progression of responses and, 
though i t may sometimes be seen immediately that reorganization 
is required, if the intervening procedures are first tried, 
many unnecessary reorganizations and disruptive changes will be 
avoided. This is the basis for a classification of the 
methods of non hierarchical co-ordination as either structural 
or non structural techniques. A non structural method is 
one which involves no reorganization of the government 
organi zation. 
5.4 Non Structural Methods 
Non structural methods are usually relevant where a problem 
is temporary or where inconsistent requirements produce a need 
for arrangements which never really solve a problem but 
merely continuously attack i t . For example, the need to have 
a means of quickly mobilizing government agencies in the 
event of a disaster requires a type of control which is 
inconsistent with the normal management of these agencies. 
Thus a co-ordinating office for disasters may be established 
as the nucleus of an alternate organization structure which 
may be brought into operation when required. 
The non structural methods of co-ordination used in government 
may be classified in various ways none of which are completely 
satisfactory because they are not independant of one another. 
For example, methods which are centrally operated might be 
13 distinguished from those which are not. Alternately, 
1 2 . See SPANN (19 7 3 ) , p . 79 . 
13 . C e n t r a l l y o p e r a t e d t echn iques would be those under taken or promoted 
by the Chief Execu t ive o r any s e n i o r member of the government 
e x e c u t i v e group o r through one of the agenc ies r e s p o n s i b l e t o them. 
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techniques which involve special groups or agencies within 
the government could be identified and distinguished from 
others which are purely procedural. Most, but not al l , 
centrally inspired methods involve a special agency while, 
again, most procedural methods are not actually operated 
centrally though they may have been originally centrally 
inspired. In tlie absence of a completely satisfactory method 
of classification that proposed by Delion will be used in so 
far as i t is applicable. 
As will be explained below, the methods of co-ordination which 
may be used depend on the actual structure of the government 
at the highest level and in particular on the approach which 
is taken to central planning. 
Role of the Chief Executive and His Ministry 
The activities of the Chief Executive and of staff groups 
attached to his Ministry are the most important source of 
co-ordination in most governments. This is logical, because, 
where matters do not obviously conform to the role of any 
specific ministry or agency they will be raised through to the 
Chief Executive for responsibility to be allocated. 
In particular where the Chief Executive is recognized to be the 
senior member of the executive group and thus to have a 
responsibility for political co-ordination, he tends to form 
a senior Ministry to carry out the central staff roles. Where 
the Chief Executive is one of equals as regards the other 
members of the executive group, co-ordination tends to 
be not arranged through him but rather through a central 
staff attached to the executive group. Small central staff 
14. Delion has proposed a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of t echn iques of c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
as fo l lows : 
(a) through the Chief Execut ive of a government and h i s m i n i s t r y ; 
(b) through a u t h o r i t i e s r e s p o n s i b l e fo r f inance and g e n e r a l economic 
mat te r s ; 
(c) r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n and r e o r g a n i z a t i o n ; 
(d) through i n t e r a g e n c y o r g a n i z a t i o n s ; 
(e) through a v a r i e t y of s p e c i a l t e c h n i q u e s . 
See DELION (1970) . I t i s on the b a s i s of h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the 
methods of c o - o r d i n a t i o n t h a t most of the examples d e s c r i b e d i n t h i s 
c h a p t e r have been compiled. His work i s on the b a s i s of compar i t ive 
s tudy of methods used by n a t i o n a l governments i n a l a r g e number of 
c o u n t r i e s . The q u e s t i o n of s p a t i a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n was ignored . 
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agencies and groups charged with stimulating and co-ordinating 
government activity in relation to defined priority tasks may 
be established for many reasons. They might for example, be 
concerned with short term issues or with long term ones such 
as promoting scientific research and the application of 
technology or with the development of a problem region. 
One of the most important central staff activities revolves 
15 
aroand the secretariat of the Cabinet. This group may be 
involved in preparing for i ts meetings as well as acting as 
its memory (e.g. by recording decisions) and in some cases 
might have an important role in reviewing political matters. 
In part this role is located in the Premier's Office in 
Queensland. 
Inderdepartmental committees at the Ministerial level chaired 
by the chief executive or another senior minister are common 
in some governments (but rare in Queensland). These committees 
are mainly concerned with political co-ordination, but this 
may be very important to the Government organization, 
particularly if they are supported by other lower level 
co-ordinating committees and agencies. 
Responsibility for the co-ordination of legislation (which role 
may be identified in the Parliamentary Draftsman in Queensland) 
is usually attached to the Chief Executive. If the entire 
system of administration is based on the legal definition of 
competence of various agencies, the task of checking legislation 
is vital. This is not crit ical in the Queensland Government 
because the resolution of interagency conflicts seldom revolves 
around legislative definitions of jurisdiction. 
General advisers to the Chief Executive may have an important 
role in preparing Government decisions and for stimulating 
co-ordinated activity in their particular fields. Providing 
15. The importance of a Cabinet i n c o - o r d i n a t i o n can be gauged by the 
r e p o r t e d dramat ic improvement to c o - o r d i n a t i o n in Delaware which 
r e s u l t e d from t h a t S t a t e ' s adopt ion of a Cabinet system of government. 
See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS (1970), pp . 15-16. 
The use of such committees might appear d e t r a c t from the c o - o r d i n a t i n g 
r o l e of the Chief E x e c u t i v e . However, t h i s i s n o t the case because he 
must s t i l l r e s o l v e d i f f e r e n c e s of opin ion w i t h i n such a commit tee. 
16 
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the Chief Executive with specialized advisers without con-
f].icting with the role of the other agencies in a government 
may be difficult. A solution, which is often found, is to 
include a few well qualified advisers in his staff. In cases 
where the Chief Executive has control of a central planning 
agency i t may supply such advisers. 
The process of staff management in the departments of the 
goverrjnent is frequently concentrated (e.g. in the Public 
Seivice Board in Queensland). The uniform management of the 
public service and uniformity of public servants as a group has 
an important co-ordinating effect. Uniform management and 
conditions of service, combined with a ready ability to trans-
fer between agencies, will aid considerably in adjustments 
which have career implications for those involved. In addition 
where public servants are readily able to identify with others 
and have few social barriers between them communication 
17 between agencies is facilitated. Another role which a Public 
Service Board can be expected to adopt in. some situations is to 
analyse the government's organization structure. Thus i t 
might be concerned v;ith attacking co-ordination problems as they 
arise by promoting reorganization. 
Central s tat is t ical services are sometimes attached to the 
Chief Executive. The uniform collection and distribution of 
data has a co-ordinating effect because of the necessity to 
agree on the type and format of data to be collected. This 
arrangement is not used in Queensland where the Bureau of 
Statistics is a Commonwealth administered agency which nominally 
serves both governments, but is not attached to the Premier. 
A co-ordinating office for emergencies also tends to be attached 
to the Chief Executive. The State Counter Disaster Organizat-
ion in Queensland is chaired by the Co-ordinator-General, 
though the organization comes under the jurisdiction of the 
Minister for Police. 
General staff co-ordinating agencies such as those identified 
17. There are of course l imi ts to the uniformity of management between 
various government agencies because of the range of tasks undertaken 
which inevi tab ly require d i f fe ren t approaches. 
18, See SPANN (1973), p . 142. This role i s well developed in the New 
South Wales State Government. 
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above t e n d t o be s u c c e s s f u l i f a t t a c h e d t o t h e C h i e f E x e c u t i v e 
I n many g o v e r n m e n t s t h e y have been a t t a c h e d t o o t h e r M i n i s t e r s 
and a l m o s t i n v a r i a b l y a r e t h e n much l e s s s u c c e s s f u l . 
Role o f F i n a n c e and P l a n n i n g A u t h o r i t i e s 
The M i n i s t e r and a g e n c i e s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r f i n a n c e a l s o h a v e an 
i m p o r t a n t c o - o r d i n a t i n g r o l e . The manner i n which t h i s i s 
done depends on t h e way t h i s t a s k i s r e l a t e d t o c e r t a i n o t h e r s 
w i t h i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t . T h r e e i n t e r r e l a t e d t a s k s may be 
19 i d e n t i f i e d , n a m e l y : 
(a) c e n t r a l p l a n n i n g i . e . c o r p o r a t e p l a n n i n g f o r t h e 
g o v e r n m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n ; 
(b) f i n a n c e i . e . b u d g e t i n g , h a n d l i n g p u b l i c m o n i e s , d e a l i n g 
on money m a r k e t s , e s t a b l i s h i n g g o v e r n m e n t c r e d i t , e t c ; 
(c) c o n t r o l of g e n e r a l e c o n o m i c a f f a i r s i . e . p r i c e s , 
employmen t , t r a d e , e t c . 
Only t h e s e c o n d t y p e of t a s k i s i d e n t i f i a b l e i n any agency i n 
t h e Q u e e n s l a n d Government ( i . e . i n t h e T r e a s u r y ) . I n g e n e r a l , 
however , a number o f d i f f e r e n t a r r a n g e m e n t s may e x i s t . 
Where a c e n t r a l p l a n n i n g a g e n c y e x i s t s , t h e p l a n i t p r o d u c e s 
w i l l be u s e d as t h e f o r e m o s t means o f c o - o r d i n a t i o n and 
c o - o r d i n a t i n g r o l e o f t h e T r e a s u r e r m i n i m i z e d , b e c a u s e f i n a n c -
20 i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n m u s t conform t o i t . 
I n t h e a b s e n c e o f a c e n t r a l p l a n n i n g agency a number o f 
d i f f e r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n f i n a n c e and g e n e r a l economic 
21 
a f f a i r s may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d . 
F i r s t l y t h e r e may be no s e p a r a t e M i n i s t r y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r 
19, DELION (19 70) was concerned primari ly with co-ordination in respect 
to economic a f fa i r s and h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i on included a fourth group 
responsible for sec to ra l economic af fa i rs which in s o c i a l i s t countries 
could operate some pa r t of the economic system. For present purposes, 
however, t h i s group can be regarded as composed of normal operat ional 
agencies. 
20. Governments do not tend to combine cent ra l planning with f inancia l 
ma t t e r s . The reason for t h i s probably i s tha t the defensive responses 
needed to l imi t expenditure do not f a c i l i t a t e pos i t ive act ion. 
IL. DELION (1970) concluded tha t the actual arrangement used by a govern-
ment was not v i t a l l y important. They would be ef fec t ive i f they 
worked together well and exchanged information amongst themselves. 
However, i f r e l a t ionsh ips were bad then even the most r a t i o n a l formal 
l inkages would not h e l p . 
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g e n e r a l economic m a t t e r s and i t s r o l e may be d i s t r i b u t e d 
amongst o t h e r f u n c t i o n a l and p r o c e s s s p e c i a l i s t a g e n c i e s . 
This i s done i n governments which have l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n 
economic a f f a i r s p e r se ( e . g . Queensland) and i s most c o l l e c t -
i v i s t c o u n t r i e s where i t i s i n t e n d e d t o emphasize the c e n t r a l 
p l ann ing agency and g ive i t a p o s i t i o n of g r e a t e r power. In 
t h i s case i t i s very d i f f i c u l t t o g e t c o - o r d i n a t e d s o l u t i o n s 
to g e n e r a l economic problems ( u n l e s s t h e r e i s very s t r i c t 
compliance wi th a c e n t r a l p l a n n i n g agency ) . 
Secondly , t h e r e may be two s e p a r a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , one for 
f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s and one for economic a f f a i r s . This 
s p e c i a l i s a t i o n l e a d s t o a ba l ance between f i n a n c i a l and 
economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , b u t c o - o r d i n a t i o n betv;een them may 
be very d i f f i c u l t u n l e s s they a r e ab le t o work c l o s e l y 
t o g e t h e r . 
T h i r d l y , t h e r e may be a f r agmen ta t ion i n the f i n a n c i a l 
func t ions w i th more than one o r g a n i z a t i o n i nvo lved i r r e s p e c t i v e 
of t he e x i s t a n c e of a g e n e r a l economic group ( e . g . i n the 
U.S.A. t h e r e used t o be a Bureau of the Budget , a Treasury 
Department and a F e d e r a l Reserve System Boa rd ) . This type of 
management makes p o l i c y c o - o r d i n a t i o n amongst them d i f f i c u l t 
b u t does l e a d t o we igh t b e i n g given t o each p o i n t of view. 
F i n a l l y t h e r e may be only a s i n g l e M i n i s t r y r e s p o n s i b l e for 
both f inance and t h e economy. As f a r as f inance and economic 
m a t t e r s a r e concerned t h i s a r rangement may be i d e a l because i t 
c o n c e n t r a t e s the s p e c i a l i s t s , minimizes the problem of co -
o r d i n a t i o n and i s i n keep ing wi th the p r i n c i p l e t h a t f inance 
should be l i n k e d wi th the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the job to be done. 
However, i t has t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e t h a t budge t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
l eads t o d e f e n s i v e r e f l e x e s which i n h i b i t the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s 
c o - o r d i n a t i n g r o l e , and such a M i n i s t r y cou ld have so much 
power t h a t o t h e r M i n i s t r i e s may f e e l t h r e a t e n e d and 
r e f u s e t o c o - o p e r a t e w i th i t . Where the T r e a s u r e r ' s 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n r o l e i s t o be i m p o r t a n t he w i l l u s u a l l y be t h e 
22 deputy of t he Chief E x e c u t i v e . 
22. In many A u s t r a l i a n S t a t e s the T r e a s u r e r ' s r o l e i s ext remely impor t an t 
because i t i s combined wi th t h a t of Chief E x e c u t i v e . Such a r r a n g e -
m.ents a re no t u s u a l except in sub n a t i o n a l governments and can 
probably be t r a c e d t o t he dominant importance of f e d e r a l funding m 
S t a t e budgets- The Chief Execut ive i s r e s p o n s i b l e for i n t e rgove rnmen ta l 
r e l a t i o n s and i n t he se t h e dominant i s s u e i s f i nance . 
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As f a r as c o - o r d i n a t i o n by a T r e a s u r e r who i s no t a l s o the Chief 
Execut ive i s concerned the budge t i s of most i m p o r t a n c e . 
Budget ing was d i s c u s s e d as a means of c o n t r o l l i n g governm.ent 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n Chapte r 4 and Appendix H, b u t even where i t 
i s n o t r e l i e d upon as an i m p o r t a n t method of c o n t r o l i t i s 
impor t an t fo r c o - o r d i n a t i o n because of i t s comprehensive 
n a t u r e and because a few peop le who can keep i n touch wi th one 
23 
ano the r can review a l l t h e a c t i v i t i e s of the Government. 
However, t h e r e a r e many l i m i t a t i o n s on budge t ing which reduce 
i t s c o - o r d i n a t i n g i n f l u e n c e , u n l e s s the budget i s embedded i n a 
whole range of o t h e r t e c h n i q u e s by which i t i s l i n k e d to the 
p lanning p r o c e s s e s . For example, t r a d i t i o n a l i tem of 
e x p e n d i t u r e budge t s do n o t b r i n g r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s t o g e t h e r . 
Much p u b l i c f inance may be p re -commi t t ed , so t h a t b u d g e t i n g 
( p a r t i c u l a r l y annual budge t ing) t ends t o be more a m a t t e r of 
s t r i k i n g a b a l a n c e than of c o - o r d i n a t i o n . The p r e p a r a t i o n of 
a budget i s normal ly too l a t e a s t a g e t o ach ieve c o - o r d i n a t i o n , 
because of t h e lack of t ime t o b r i n g about changes t o overcome 
any i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s o b s e r v e d . The T r e a s u r e r may n o t have 
s u f f i c i e n t a u t h o r i t y over o t h e r M i n i s t e r s and, as h i s pr imary 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y may be the n e g a t i v e one of p r o t e c t i n g the s i z e 
of the b u d g e t , he may be unable t o t ake a p o s i t i v e r o l e i n 
a ch i ev ing c o - o r d i n a t i o n . F i n a l l y , i t may be very d i f f i c u l t t o 
r e l a t e long term problems t o the s h o r t term t a sk of p r e p a r i n g 
the b u d g e t . Techniques whereby the c o - o r d i n a t i n g r e l e v a n c e of 
the budget may be improved a re d i s c u s s e d l a t e r i n t h i s c h a p t e r . 
Another way i n which the T r e a s u r e r may have a c o - o r d i n a t i v e 
i n f l u e n c e i s by invo lvement i n promot ing s t r u c t u r a l reform 
w i t h i n t h e government as a who le . In t h i s , however, h i s r o l e 
i s u s u a l l y l e s s i n f l u e n t i a l than t h e Chief E x e c u t i v e . 
I n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s 
In a l l governments t h e r e a re o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e s p o n s i b l e fo r 
checking the a c t i v i t i e s of o t h e r s ( e . g . i n s p e c t o r a t e s and 
23, I t i s n o t e s s e n t i a l i n government t h a t a budget be c e n t r a l l y p r epa red 
and e f f e c t i v e c o - o r d i n a t i o n w i t h i n s p e c i f i c s e c t o r s may r e s u l t from 
d e l e g a t i n g f u l l f i n a n c i a l a u t h o r i t y t o t h a t s e c t o r . Problems w i l l be 
expec t ed i f t h e r e a r e major i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s e c t o r s o r i f 
t h e r e a re many autonomous s e c t o r s . 
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audi t a g e n c i e s ) . By observing seve ra l agencies in turn they 
may de tec t i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s in approach. Their co-ord ina t ing 
role w i l l only be meaningful i f they are able to carry out the 
t echn ica l ly complex ro le of ac tua l ly understanding what agencies 
are t ry ing to do and have s u f f i c i e n t au thor i ty to have t h e i r 
work followed through a t sen io r governjnent l e v e l . They may 
have a very s t rong co-ord ina t ing e f f ec t i f they are made 
responsible for checking compliance v^ith a c e n t r a l plan ( i f 
. ^ . 24 
one e x i s t s ) . 
Committees a t the admin i s t r a t ive leve l are used by every 
government. There are many concepts of committees having 
d i f f e ren t r o l e s and purposes. Committees are a f a s t e r means 
of ge t t i ng a co-ord ina ted decis ion than i s correspondence and 
have the informal b e n e f i t s of br inging toge ther persons whose 
work may be r e l a t e d but they have many disadvantages i f they 
are not wel l managed. They may continue to e x i s t when t h e i r 
work should be completed, they are slow in producing ac t ion and 
they may tend to inc rease in number and take up an inc reas ing 
port ion of the time of sen io r publ ic o f f i c i a l s . The most 
important requirements for a successful committee are a.compet-
ent unbiassed chairman and a good s e c r e t a r i a t to prepare for 
i t s meetings and given t h e s e , a committee may be a very powerful 
^- ^- 25 means of co -o rd ina t ion . 
Special task agencies outs ide the normal admin i s t ra t ive system 
may be used to promote a co-ordinated policy on some s p e c i a l 
mat ter . By giving a problem to one group on a f u l l time bas i s 
there w i l l be a personal i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with i t and 
t h i s may lead to good co-ord ina t ion wi th in the f i e l d . At a 
smaller sca le a l i a i s o n o f f i ce r or p ro j ec t manager may f u l f i l 
a s imi l a r r o l e . ^ ^ The ex t en t to which t h i s technique can be 
used i s l im i t ed because i f such agencies become too big or top 
24. A l t e r n a t i v e l y where a c e n t r a l p l ann ing agency e x i s t s t h i s i n s p e c t i o n 
and a u d i t i n g r o l e may be under taken by i t . 
25 . Another requ i rement which w i l l improve the re levance of a committee 
i s t h a t i t s members have a s e n i o r s t a t u s w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n they 
r e p r e s e n t and a re thus ab le t o e n t e r i n commitments. 
2 6 . LITTERER (1973), p p . 4 5 5 - 4 5 7 . 
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numerous they may g e n e r a t e more d i f f i c u l t i e s than they r e s o l v e . 
R e l a t e d t o t h i s i s the c o - o r d i n a t i n g r o l e of the o r d i n a r y 
agenc i e s of a government . Each agency t ends to c o - o r d i n a t e a l l 
o t h e r s i n r e l a t i o n t o i t s main s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . Thus, fo r 
example, a f u n c t i o n a l l y s p e c i a l i s t depar tment may a c t t o co-
o r d i n a t e i t s func t ion and a l o c a l a u t h o r i t y could endeavour t o 
promote c o - o r d i n a t e a c t i o n amongst a l l o t h e r agenc i e s i n i t s 
a r e a . The achievement of such c o - o r d i n a t i o n w i l l depend on 
t h e i r power i n r e l a t i o n to the o t h e r agenc i e s i n v o l v e d . The 
c o - o r d i n a t i n g r o l e of o r d i n a r y agenc i e s may be i n c r e a s e d 
through formal c o n s u l t a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s ( e . g . perhaps those 
r e q u i r e d by e n v i r o n m e n t a l impact s t a t e m e n t s ) and by i n t e r n a l 
s u b - c o n t r a c t i n g where one agency might ask ano the r t o do the 
work r e q u i r e d as p a r t of an o v e r a l l p r o j e c t which f e l l i n t o 
the l a t t e r a g e n c y ' s f i e l d of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . In Queensland, 
for example, e x t e n s i v e review of l o c a l body p r o j e c t p r o p o s a l s 
i s under t aken by r e l e v a n t S t a t e depar tments under the C a p i t a l 
Works Programming a r rangements (See Appendix L ) . 
S p e c i a l Techniques 
A number of s p e c i a l p r o c e d u r e s which tend t o overcome the 
need for c o - o r d i n a t i o n through s p e c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s and 
ar rangements may be i d e n t i f i e d . The d i s s e m i n a t i o n of 
i n f o r m a t i o n , fo r example , may make a c t u a l c o n t a c t between 
people u n n e c e s s a r y . Other s p e c i a l t e c h n i q u e s i n c l u d e " p a r t i a l " 
p l ann ing and methods which may be used t o i n c r e a s e the co-
2 8 
o r d i n a t i n g r e l e v a n c e of t h e b u d g e t . The d i s advan tage of 
t he se methods i s t h a t t o be unde r t aken p r o p e r l y , they r e q u i r e 
a h igh l e v e l s k i l l and such s k i l l s may n o t be s u f f i c i e n t l y 
a v a i l a b l e . 
The flow of i n f o r m a t i o n i s of v i t a l impor tance i n any o r g a n i z -
a t i o n . I n f o r m a t i o n t a k e s many forms and may move a long formal 
27. The e x t e n s i v e use of t a s k agenc ies would be s e l f d e f e a t i n g i t i t 
i gnored the q u e s t i o n of how these agenc ies would f i t i n wi th the 
agenc ies they were supposed t o c o - o r d i n a t e and wi th o t h e r s t a f f 
agenc ies a l r eady c o - o r d i n a t i n g the same agenc ies for o t h e r purposes . 
i s . The concept of " p a r t i a l " p l a n n i n g w i l l be e x p l a i n e d below. 
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and i n f o r m a l c h a n n e l s . I t i s used fo r h i e r a r c h i c a l c o n t r o l and 
a l s o has non h i e r a r c h i c a l c o - o r d i n a t i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s . In the 
absence of good communicat ions , s e r i o u s non c o - o r d i n a t i o n i s 
a lmost i n e v i t a b l e y e t t h e r e i s no g u a r a n t e e t h a t s imply i n c r e a s -
29 
ing i n f o r m a t i o n flows always promotes harmony. Fur thermore 
too much i n f o r m a t i o n can cause o v e r l o a d and the consequent 
i n a b i l i t y of pe r sons t o d i s t i n g u i s h the i n f o r m a t i o n they need 
from the mass of i n f o r m a t i o n they do n o t r e q u i r e . 
The use of computers and c e n t r a l i z e d d a t a banks can be 
s i g n i f i c a n t b e c a u s e , i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , the form i n which 
in fo rma t ion i s t o be s t o r e d must be de f ined and secondly because 
agenc ies need to c o - o p e r a t e t o i n t e g r a t i n g t h e i r d a t a base s 
and t h i s may t end t o s p i l l over i n t o o t h e r a r e a s of a c t i v i t y . 
The widespread d i s s e m i n a t i o n of g e n e r a l i n fo rma t ion about what 
i n d i v i d u a l agenc i e s a r e doing could be very i m p o r t a n t because 
i t would a l low i n d i v i d u a l s t o d e t e c t s i t u a t i o n s V7here t h e i r 
own work could r e l a t e t o t h a t of o t h e r s . This may be promoted 
by the p u b l i c a t i o n of j o u r n a l s and i n t e r n a l newspaper s . While 
i t may be a rgued t h a t a person r e q u i r e s only tlie i n fo rma t ion 
needed t o do h i s own j o b , t h i s must i n c l u d e more i n f o r m a t i o n 
than needed t o do i t i n t he way i t has always be done. A 
c e r t a i n amount of r edundan t i n f o r m a t i o n i s needed t o enab le 
him to l e a r n and t o a s s i s t change w i t h i n t he o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
A p r o c e s s of c o - o r d i n a t i o n fo r which a t heo ry has only r e c e n t l y 
been d e r i v e d c o n s i s t s of b u i l d i n g u n o f f i c i a l communication 
30 ^^ 
channe ls between autonomous government a g e n c i e s . The 
29. As n o t e d by SPANN (1973) , p . 81 " I t may a l s o . . . promote more c o n f l i c t . 
The s t a b i l i t y of groups seems t o depend p a r t l y on r e s t r i c t i o n s of 
access apathy and u n c u r i o s i t y and so on" . 
30. FRIEND, POWER and YEWLETT (19 73) . The au tho r s argue fo r the d e l i b e r -
a t e development of such networks because lack of knowledge can 
p r e v e n t s a t i s f a c t o r y mutual a d j u s t m e n t s . 
They p r e s e n t four h y p o t h e s i s about such network b u i l d i n g which may be 
summarized a s : -
(a) the l e s s the formal power of an agency t h e g r e a t e r w i l l be i t s 
i n t e r e s t i n the development of outwardly connec t ive methods of 
o p e r a t i o n ; 
(b) t he success of the p r o c e s s w i l l be g r e a t e s t where t h e r e i s a 
formal ly r e cogn i zed framework for in format ion exchange; 
(c) network b u i l d i n g i s a l s o of b e n e f i t t o powerful agencies i f they 
a re i n a non "zero sum game" s i t u a t i o n ; 
(d) succes s of network b u i l d i n g experiments would i n c r e a s e the l i k e -
l i hood of s o c i e t i e s devo t ing more r e sou rce s t o i t . 
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concept of a " r e t i c u l i s t " was adopted to descr ibe a person who 
develops such channels . This i s done by many persons in the 
course of normal day to day opera t ions though i t i s poss ib le 
to conceive of a person employed s p e c i f i c a l l y to operate in an 
i n t e r co rpo ra t e f i e l d and promote communications in a highly 
s e l e c t i v e manner on the b a s i s of h i s knowledge of the 
. . 31 
a c t i v i t i e s of i nd iv idua l o rgan i za t i ons . 
Further exchange of information may be encouraged by the use 
of techniques of "environmental" approval which requi re formal 
consu l ta t ion between agencies and o ther groups p o t e n t i a l l y 
i n t e r e s t e d in a s p e c i f i c devleopment proposal . 
In some governments " p a r t i a l " at tempts a t c e n t r a l planning 
may be made because genuine corporate planning i s so d i f f i c u l t 
t ha t i t i s the exception r a the r than the r u l e . P a r t i a l 
planning could, for example, involve the s tatement of goals 
without cons idera t ion of means or might deal only with a 
l imi ted s e t of func t ions . Even p a r t i a l c en t r a l planning may 
have an important co-ord ina t ing e f f ec t because the processes 
involved in producing a document c a l l e d a plan w i l l provoke 
informal co -ord ina t ing responses between the agencies involved. 
In addi t ion the simple s ta tement of goals w i l l provide a 
general guide to day to day decis ions by agencies . On occasions 
p a r t i a l planning w i l l take the form of preparing a s e t of 
p red ic t ions of r e l evan t va r i ab l e s which may a lso provide a 
common framework for ope ra t i ona l agenc ies . 
Furthermore, an at tempt to prepare a plan may lead to the 
es tabl ishment of a mul t i -annual budget s ince there i s no 
e f fec t ive way in which a purely annual budget may be i n t e g r a t e d 
with a formal p l an . A budget involving forward es t imates i s 
31 . I t has been argued f u r t h e r t h a t the r e t i c u l i s t funct ion i n government 
i s performed w e l l by i n d i v i d u a l s wi th the fo l lowing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 
His i n t e r e s t s a re t a n g i b l e (not symbol i c ) ; he moves e a s i l y ac ross 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s , he i s e x p e r t i n b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s and 
i n h a r d b a r g a i n i n g wi th p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s ; he i s an e n t r e p r e n e u r of 
power; he i s s u s p i c i o u s of c o - o r d i n a t i o n through group concensus ; he 
i s p r e p a r e d t o use p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s t o achieve h i s ends b u t avoids 
c e n t r a l involvement i n p o l i t i c s ; he i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y devoid of i d e a l s 
b u t w i l l p r e f e r t o assume t h a t o t h e r a c t o r s a r e d r iven by s e l f i s h n e s s 
r a t h e r than a l t e r n i s m . POWER (1973) . Power ' s concept of the 
r e t i c u l i s t appears t o be as a power b roke r and tough n e g o t i a t o r r a t h e r 
than a person who develops such l i nkages i n c i d e n t a l l y to h i s normal 
a c t i v i t i e s . 
c;_f; 
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an effective co-ordinating tool because of the time available 
to correct inconsistencies which may be detected. In the. 
absence of any central plan a multi-annual budget may become 
extremelv important as one of the best possible formal means of 
non hierarchical co-ordination. Other methods which have been 
devised to im.prove the limitations of traditional budget 
procedures include the modern budgeting procedures described in 
Appendix H, as well as scientific approaches to project and 
programme appraisal. Their advantages are that they may involve 
approaches which cut across the boundaries of established 
agencies. Furthermore such techniques as cost effectiveness study 
essentially require that similar standards of performance are 
achieved by all agencies. 
5.5 Structural Methods 
Non structural methods of co-ordination are a poor substitute 
for re-organization where medium and long term needs and 
requirements change. Re-organization could involve a change to 
the government's entire basis of specialization. For example 
process specialists could take over logistic tasks on behalf of 
a number of agencies to promote their co-ordination or increased 
spatial specialization could be used to improve spatial 
co-ordination. 
For reasons which were argued in Chapter 3.8 not every co-
ordination problem can be resolved by re-organization. 
Fragmentation of responsibility for a problem and poor linkages 
between agencies responsible for aspects of it usually lead to 
pressure for centralization either by concentrating responsib-
ility at the general government level or by adjusting the basis 
of specialization. 
Centralization involving transfer of responsibility to another 
type of specialist agency (See Appendix F) could increase the 
role of the recipient agency to such an extent that much greater 
internal specialization was required within it. This might 
create more co-ordination problems than the centralization was 
meant to solve. 
A technique by which many governments have sought co-ordination, 
which is not always successful, is by consolidation of Ministries 
Ministerial specialization and other requirements (e.g. 
representation of diverse political groups) produces an increase 
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i n t h e number o f M i n i s t r i e s (up t o 50 i n command economies ) and 
t h i s i s s o u n w o r k a b l e t h a t r e g r o u p i n g s a r e u s u a l l y s o u g h t . T h i s 
may be done by r e d u c i n g t h e number o f M i n i s t r i e s o r by c r e a t i n g 
p r e d o m i n a n t M i n i s t r i e s (where a number of j u n i o r M i n i s t e r s a r e 
r e s p o n s i b l e t o a s e n i o r M i n i s t e r who a l o n e may be a men±)er of 
t h e C a b i n e t ) . U n l e s s t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e i n tl^e 
p r e d o m i n a n t M i n i s t r i e s i s g o o d , a l l t h a t i s done i s t o i n t r o d u c e 
a n o t h e r e c h e l o n w h i c h h i d e s t h e l a c k of c o - o r d i n a t i d ) v^hich i.t 
was mean t t o c u r e . I n s u c h a s i t u a t i o n d i s a g g r e g a t i o n of t h e 
p r e d o m i n a n t M i n i s t r i e s and t h e i r c o - o r d i n a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e 
Chief E x e c u t i v e c o u l d be j u s t a s e f f e c t i v e . 
I n S t a t e Government i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n s o l i d a t i o n of 
a g e n c i e s w i t h i n s i n g l e d e p a r t m e n t s h a s b e e n f a s h i o n a b l e 
32 
r e c e n t l y i n e n d e a v o u r i n g t o p r o m o t e c o - o r d i n a t i o n . T h e i r 
s t a r t i n g p o i n t d i f f e r s t o t h a t u n d e r a m i n i s t e r i a l s y s t e m and 
t h e p r o b l e m f o r s u c h S t a t e s m.ay be s i m p l y t o c r e a t e as much 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n w i t h i n f u n c t i o n a l s e c t o r s a s i s a l r e a d y i m p l i c i t 
i n a m i n i s t e r i a l s y s t e m . 
A n o t h e r s p e c i a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n t e c h n i q u e by which c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
h a s b e e n s o u g h t i n some g o v e r n m e n t s i s t h e c r e a t i o n o f 
s t a f f a g e n c i e s . U n t i l t h e S e c o n d Wor ld War, g o v e r n m e n t s were 
a l m o s t e n t i r e l y l i n e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Some have s i n c e t e n d e d t o 
d e v e l o p i n d e p e n d a n t s t a f f o r g a n i z a t i o n s on t h e g e n e r a l l e v e l of 
Government o r g a n i z a t i o n ( a s w e l l a s w i t h i n M i n i s t r i e s ) . These 
s t a f f s n o t u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l of t h e C h i e f E x e c u t i v e may be 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s u c h t h i n g s a s l i m i t e d p l a n n i n g , p r i o r i t i e s 
r e v i e w , p r o m o t i o n of s p e c i a l g o v e r n m e n t p r i o r i t i e s , and s o o n . 
Such s t a f f o r g a n i z a t i o n s may s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s 
u n d e r w h i c h d e c i s i o n s a r e made i n g o v e r n m e n t i f t h e y g i v e t h e 
e x e c u t i v e g r o u p a c h o i c e o t h e r t h a n a c c e p t i n g w h a t i t i s t o l d 
by t h e h e a d s of i t s d e p a r t m e n t s . At p r e s e n t s t a f f a g e n c i e s 
32. A survey of methods of co-ordination used in State Governments 
in the United Sta tes was conducted by the Coiincil of State Govern-
ments. This ind ica ted tha t the predominant process by which co-
ordinat ion was being sought were functional consolidation ( i . e . 
reorganizat ion) and Gubernatorial involvement ( i . e . involvement of 
the Chief Execut ive) . The l a t t e r often involved h i s person s taff , 
s t a f f of the planning agency which i s usually at tached to the 
Governor and co-ordinat ing committees and councils also linked to the 
Governor's office - COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS (19 70), pp. 5-6, 
See a lso SKOLER (19 76) . 
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such as t h i s do not e x i s t to any s i g n i f i c a n t ex t en t in 
Queensland. 
5.6 The Concept of a Department of Co-ordination 
When any problem in government i s perceived there i s a tendency 
to look to the c rea t ion of a s p e c i a l agency to be responsible 
for i t . Co-ordinat ion i s such a problem and the c rea t ion of a 
Department of Co-ordinat ion has occas iona l ly been at tempted. 
A separate min is t ry for co-ord ina t ion has been t r i e d in some 
countr ies ( e . g . Belguim, Greece and Turkey)but has always been 
found to be unsuccessful where the Minis ter for Co-ordination 
did not p a r t i c i p a t e in the au tho r i ty of the Chief Executive 
33 (e .g . as a Vice P r e s i d e n t ) . The reasons i s ttiat such 
Ministers have no r e a l b a s i s for p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the 
operat ions of o ther Min i s t r i e s and lack the Treasu re r ' s 
f inanc ia l reasons for involvement. 
The Department of Urban and Regional Development (DURD) was 
created by the Commonwealth Government in Aus t r a l i a in 19 73 to 
co-ordinate government a c t i v i t y v/ith r espec t to urban and 
regional a f f a i r s . The reasons for i t s f a i l u r e are many but 
probably the most s i g n i f i c a n t reason for i t s i n a b i l i t y to 
achieve i t s goal was the fac t t h a t i t was not under the 
. . 34 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Prime Min i s t e r . 
33. DELION (1970) p 71 . " I t would seem unnecessary to dwell on the 
expe r i ences of M i n i s t r i e s s o l e l y r e s p o n s i b l e for c o - o r d i n a t i o n which 
tend t o look upon c o - o r d i n a t i o n d u t i e s as s p e c i f i c t a sks capable 
of be ing e n t r u s t e d to a given M i n i s t r y . Such expe r i ences have been 
d i s a p p o i n t i n g and they confirm t h e i d e a . . . t h a t c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
should be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n and means 
of a c t i o n as a who le . " 
34. TROY (1976) argues t h a t t h e reasons for Department of Urban and 
Regional Development 's f a i l u r e were t h e long l ead t imes involved i n 
the programmes i t promoted, t h e i r marg ina l n a t u r e ( inc lud ing the 
f a c t t h a t they had t o be i n t e g r a t e d wi th e x i s t i n g a c t i v i t i e s of o t h e r 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) and o p p o s i t i o n from the S t a t e s . He notes t h a t a l l i t s 
programmes were " t i e d t o the g e n e r a l r e s e a r c h and c o - o r d i n a t i v e 
func t ions of t he depar tment and t o pu r su ing the o b j e c t i v e of improving 
d e c i s i o n making" i b i d , p . 18 . Such an o b j e c t i v e may n o t be e f f e c t i v e -
ly pu r sued on a comprehensive b a s i s through a p e r i p h e r a l depar tment . 
Given i t s m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h e r e may perhaps have been fewer 
problems had the Department of Urban and Regional Development sought 
l e s s of a c e n t r a l r o l e . The au thor o f f e r s no comment on whether 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n wi th r e s p e c t t o urban and r e g i o n a l i s s u e s would be an 
a p p r o p r i a t e i s s u e t o be promoted through the Prime M i n i s t e r i n the 
Commonwealth. 
5-66 
A Department of C o - o r d i n a t i o n i s n o t a v a l i d concept because 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n must be p r i m a r i l y b u i l t i n t o the normal s t r u c t u r e 
and o p e r a t i o n s of t h e government and canno t i n g e n e r a l be 
handled s e p a r a t e l y . I f an agency were t o be c r e a t e d t o p r o -
mote c o - o r d i n a t i o n i t must be p r i m a r i l y concerned wi th s p e c i a l 
i s s u e s and witl i methods in g e n e r a l and no t wi th r o u t i n e 
m a t t e r s . In a d d i t i o n , such an agency w i l l be u n s u c c e s s f u l unless 
i t i s a s s o c i a t e d w i th t he Chief Execu t ive of the government 
(or perhaps the T r e a s u r e r ) . 
5.7 S p a t i a l C o - o r d i n a t i o n 
The s p a t i a l dimension p r e s e n t s a s p e c i a l problem i n terms of 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n i n government which has n o t been adequa te ly 
covered above. Most h i e r a r c h i c a l systems a re o r i e n t e d 
towards e i t h e r f unc t i on or p r o c e s s and a re thus of liiTiited 
b e n e f i t i n promot ing s p a t i a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n . Fur the rmore , most 
s u c c e s s f u l metliods of non h i e r a r c h i c a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n which a re 
c e n t r a l l y i n s p i r e d a r e a l s o o r i e n t e d towards func t ion and 
p rocess and, u n l e s s the s p a t i a l dimension i s s p e c i f i c a l l y 
c o n s i d e r e d , i t must remain as a problem. What may appear t o be 
an ex t r eme ly minor m a t t e r as between f u n c t i o n a l agenc ies may 
be a c r i t i c a l i s s u e i n a l o c a l a r e a . 
Many of the p r o c e s s e s of c o - o r d i n a t i o n p r e v i o u s l y d e s c r i b e d 
can be a p p l i e d t o s o l v i n g the s p a t i a l ( r e g i o n a l ) co-
o r d i n a t i o n problem - e s p e c i a l l y where they might be a p p l i e d t o 
s p a t i a l l y s p e c i a l i z e d p a r t s of a government ( e . g . t o 
r e g i o n a l b r anches of a depar tment or between l o c a l b o d i e s . ) 
I t i s common, however, t o seek a somewhat d i f f e r e n t s e t of 
methods fo r s p a t i a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n . These i n c l u d e i n c r e a s e d 
s p a t i a l s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and c o n s u l t a t i v e o r formal " r e g i o n a l 
p l a n n i n g " s t r u c t u r e s . Many of the l a t t e r approaches appear to 
s u f f e r from t h e f a c t t h a t they i n c o r p o r a t e l i t t l e o r no 
a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of government and confuse 
c o n t r o l of l and use o r economic systems wi th governmenta l 
35. A special method of spat ia l co-ordination results from the act iv i t ies 
of elected menders of a legis la ture . In making inquiries and 
representations on behalf of their constituents tney may deal with a 
number of agencies and carry between them information on what others 
are doing in the same area. This is a r e t i cu l i s t role . 
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planning. The reason for this may be that the spatial co-
ordination problem is attacked at too low a level in government 
because i ts fundamental nature is not perceived (or is of no 
interest) at high levels. Delegating responsibility for spatial 
co-ordination to what is notionally a functional agency 
(responsible, for examipJ.e, for land use control) cannot be 
successful. The spatial (or regional) co-ordination issue will 
remain a largely unsolved problem in government organization 
as long as a predominantly functional approach is taken to the 
design of government organi zati.ons . 
5.8 Trends in the Development of Methods of Co-ordination 
Delion gives many interesting insights into co-ordination in 
government systems around the v;orld. He points out that the 
institutions and techniques used in v/idely differing countries 
are very similar and that the political and economic system 
has less influence on methods of co-ordination than i t does on 
many other aspects of government. 
Delion suggests that the stages of development of co-ordinative 
techniques have been similar in many governments. Firstly, 
simple administrative co-ordination is superimposed on the 
"traditional" government structure, e.g. by ensuring consist-
ency of legislation and by the use of committees. When this 
proves inadequate there is a general strengthening of the 
position of the Treasurer who, in seeking justification for 
money sought by agencies has an opportunity to examine their 
consistency.- His objective is not co-ordination bytthis tends 
to be a result. However, for the reasons above his role can 
have limited success. 
Co-ordination is then raised to the level of the Chief Executive 
He is traditionally responsible for political co-ordination 
36. In any system for s p a t i a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t the 
arrangement makes sense i n terms of the a c t u a l p l ann ing requi rements 
of the o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n v o l v e d . Unless the o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e s p o n s i b l e 
fo r a d m i n i s t e r i n g a p a r t i c u l a r m a t t e r a c t u a l l y e x i s t a t a r e g i o n a l 
l e v e l then r e g i o n a l p l ann ing ( for example) i s n o t a meaningful 
concept (by the d e f i n i t i o n of p lann ing adopted here) . None the l e s s 
a g r e a t d e a l of a c t u a l s p a t i a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n does r e s u l t from such 
e f f o r t s . The main problem i s t h a t t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s may n o t be 
recogn ized and c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t i s wasted i n the p u r s u i t of 
comprehensive mechanisms. 
3 7 . DELION (1970) 
5-68 
and would by this stage also have groups of his staff concerned 
with administration co-ordination. 
Next, unconventional administrative agencies tend to appear to 
stimulate and co-ordinate activity with respect to major 
governmental priorities. When i t is realised that, with all of 
the above techniques, i t is not possible to co-ordinate an 
infinite number of actions, attempts tend to be made to overcome 
the need for co-ordination by transferring co-ordination from 
the stage of particular decisions back into the definition 
of the framework of the decisions. This is usually done by 
reorganizing the decision making centres and by creating "staff" 
functional units and "horizontal" groups to which are attached 
co-ordinating or operational agencies with special responsibil-
i t ies . This produces structures of government far more complex 
than any in Australia. 
Delion suggests that the most advanced co-ordinative efforts hav? 
been in the field of financial, economic and managerial 
techniques. In the future, in advanced governments, develop-
ment of co-ordination techniques may involve the use of 
techniques of data integration - so that a common framework is 
used by specialized agencies for their activities. 
The present state of development of co-ordination techniques 
in the Queensland Government will be considered in Chapter 7. 
I t is apparent that there is s t i l l significant scope in that 
government for the development of co-ordination techniques 
identified by Delion. In Chapter 8 the possible contribution 
of a Co-ordinator General towards these conventional 
techniques of co-ordination will be considered. In addition 
an unconventional procedure which could be used by a non 
centralized government to minimize i ts co-ordination 
problems will be advanced. 
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6. NON CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT 
6.1 General 
A non centralized governrntont is one which, vrhether it is 
formally recognized or not, relies on non hierarchical 
processes rather than seeking co-ordination by central control. 
Government organizations are necessarily pluralistic no matter 
how much a government executive may seek centralized control, 
so the following discussion applies to a certain extent in 
all governments. 
Even using the most sophisticated met]iods of non hierarchical 
co-ordination, any non centralized government will face three 
residual co-ordination problems which can never be completely 
overcome without general centralization. The extent to 
which a government's planning processes assist in minimizing 
them will be a good measure of their success. 
The first problem is for the executive group to express its 
goals so as to establish a framework within which its agencies 
are able to work to achieve them. The second is to deal with 
conflicts between various goals and the third is to help its 
organj.zation to adapt when its goals or its environment change. 
6.2 Establishing and Defining Goals 
1 
The goals of a government are an expression of its purpose. 
1, It is desirable to distinguish two different concepts of purpose in 
hiiman organizations. The first will be referred to as a goal and 
this will be taken to mean a vaguely expressed purpose and this may 
be compared with an objective defined as a precise purpose. An 
objective must completely define the state of some real world variable 
and would normally be quantifiable if care were taken in its » 
expressions. It is always possible to tell if an objective is 
achieved but this may not be true of a goal. If a human organiza-
tion is asked to define its purpose it will usually be unable initially 
to do so because language and thought often do not run strictly in 
terms of system variables. The distinction between a goal and an 
objective is arbitrary but most desirable because there are two 
clearly identifiable concepts of purpose and it is better to have 
different terms to apply to them. An example might clarify this 
distinction. The goal adopted by a government might be to ensure 
a happy life for all people in its country. An objective which 
might flow out of this goal would be to give a free ice cream to each 
person each day on the assumption that one of the variables deter-
mining a happy life is an ice cream a day. A goal is a vague 
purpose while an objective is a precise purpose. 
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They would be required so that purpose oriented plans could 
be formulated and to give a guide against which results may 
be assessed. 
Goals need not be explicitly stated and a Government can 
exist and perform satisfactorily without them. Every 
decision made by a Government implies a certain set of goals 
(even though different decisions may not imply consistent 
goals) and agencies can learn a workable set of assumptions 
to make about the Government's goals relevant to its own 
activities from the sum of all decisions made in its field 
and from formal government statements. Such goals may then 
be used in the formulation of plans within the agency. 
The consequences of using an implicit set of goals rather 
than an explicit set are as follows: 
(a) Goals and objectives which various agencies impute 
may not be consistent. However through 
Ci) discussions between administrators in various 
agencies; 
(ii) the need for joint action; 
Ciii) the need for approval of many decisions by 
the government executive 
m.ost of the miore abrasive differences will be eliminated 
and a reasonably cohesive set of implicit goals used. 
(b) Because they are not formalised such goals are fairly 
easily managed and can adapt to new decisions which 
imply changes in goals. Formalised goals incur 
identifiable administrative costs in ensuring that they 
are kept up to date and these costs are avoided if 
goals are not stated. 
(c) Where objectives are not explicit any consideration of 
optimal allocation of resources is meaningless because 
there is nothing to optimize. 
(d) Criticism of the Government on the grounds of non 
fulfilment of objectives will not be possible (though 
criticism on the grounds of not being efficiently 
organized will, of course, be possible). 
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The explicit statement of government goals would normally 
be a response to: 
(a) pressure from a central government agency interested 
in improved management of the government; 
(b) the desire of the government executive (or perhaps of 
the chief executive only) to have a method of proving 
whether or not the government was being efficiently 
run. In the absence of a stated purpose an 
organization may be efficient but there is no way to 
prove or disprove it; 
(el the desire to encourage public participation in the 
activities of government or pressure from outside 
groups for such participation. 
Considerable difficulties are experienced in actually 
defining goals while objec-cives are almost impossible to 
state. Even while trying to define goals a government 
may strive to avoid making itself liable to attack. It 
could, for example, be attacked by persons who do not agree 
with its goals or by the public generally if it was forced 
in some situation to act contrary to one of its stated goals. 
Thus a government may seek to state goals to encourage 
public participation or for other reasons but it may still 
avoid the precise definition of the goals. 
Each member of the executive group can be expected to have 
a slightly different orientation of opinion from his fellows 
and quite possibly a major difference of opinion on some 
issues. A goal in any field (unless it is so vague as to 
be meaningless) is sure to be a consensus with which perhaps 
only a few really agree. The total set of goals so defined 
may not correspond to the goals of any individual. This 
problem of consensus is magnified many times when objectives 
are involved because of the degree of precision which is 
necessary. A government will attempt to appeal to as many 
different shades of opinion as possible. This also will make 
the government produce goals which are fairly vague so that 
they can be interpreted in several different ways by different 
special interest groups. 
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The question of who actually defines the goals is important. 
It is hard for the, executive group itself to do so because 
it is busy and because it may not clearly understand the 
details of the issues involved which are known only to 
administrators. Goals produced by administrators and then 
passed up to the executive are likely to be accepted by the 
executive without question and without interest and be ignored 
from the day they are adopted. 
A number of different procedures could be envisaged by 
which goals could be defined. Each of them has its own 
problems. 
The "policies" and platforms produced by political parties 
for an election or for some other reason could be used as 
goals. However, political parties must have difficulty in 
producing a set of goals sufficiently oriented towards the 
needs of government agencies to be useful to those agencies 
because they are not privy to all the activities of the 
government organization. 
Similarly a special commission or committee drawn from 
outside the government could be appointed and asked to produce 
goals. Such a method may not be very useful no matter what 
type of inquiry is made or how democratic it may be because 
the government may in practice simply set aside any goals 
which do not agree with its own ideas, and such a group will 
not have the inside information needed to produce realistic 
goals. 
Alternatively an inter-departmental committee could be 
specially constituted to define them. Such a committee 
could work from the imputed goals learned from past government 
2. It should be noted also that scientific definition of goals in 
terms of rationally proven needs will not necessarily give proper 
government goals (i.e. those reflecting the political 
framework). 
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decisions. As implied previously the executive might not 
appreciate the significance of goals dervied this way and 
could simply ignore them. 
Finally a task agency could be established within the govern-
ment organization to report direct to Cabinet. Such a 
method might not be very successful because of the need to 
pry very deeply into the activities of all other agencies 
which could easily stir up resentment and non-co-operation, 
unless strong backing were given by the executive group. 
This could most reasonably be achieved if the task agency 
took the form of a specialist catalytic secretariat to the 
executive group which was able to rationalize ideas submitted 
by various agencies and present them for discussion. The 
amount of time involved for the executive group would be 
considerable in this case and a government would need to be 
extremely dedicated to the use of explicit goals and 
objectives to go through such a demanding process. 
It is apparent from the above that the executive group 
itself must play a significant part in the production of 
any useful set of goals since otherwise they will not give 
them adequate backing. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
graft a formal comprehensive goal formulation procedure on 
to the executive group because of the difficulty of handling 
the details known only to the specialized agencies involved. 
A comprehensive set of goals will either have to avoid 
details and so be useless to the agencies involved or cover 
all details and be so voluminous that it could not sensibly 
be handled. As a solution to this problem the idea of 
multiple overlapping sets of goals in the form of strategies 
will be introduced in Chapter 8. 
3. This suffers from the difficulty of determining just what goals are 
important in specific decisions. They may have been a combination 
of logic, politics and personal whim and thus do not always conform 
to the reasons a government will give for a decision. For a 
comment on the relevance of stated goal see KATZ and KAHN 
(1966) . 
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6.3 Externalities 
The second problem for a non centralized government is the 
handling of conflicts between its goals. This may give rise 
to conflicts between agencies and is the source of the general 
problem of externalities where one individual's gain produces 
a loss or cost to another and the first individual does not 
take account of these side effects in his decision making. 
An agency designed to take care of a system will be expected 
to do a reasonable job as far as that system is concerned. 
At least, if the government feels it is not doing so, 
there should be little reason to complain, because it is up 
to the government to reorganize that agency. However, the 
agency's effects on systems, other than the principal one 
with which it is concerned, may be such that, deliberately 
or accidentally, by action or non-action, it damages the 
system in terms of some other government goal. 
To what extent can an agency be expected to take account of 
externalities? In pursuing its self interest an organization 
will not cause damage to other systems providing: 
(a) it is able to avoid doing so; 
(b) it is able to comprehend the effects of its action on 
the system; 
(c) it understands what is expected of it - i.e. that it 
should not damage the system; 
(d) there are sufficient constraints on it to inhibit its 
taking action which was otheirwise to its advantage. 
These constraints can take the foirm of conscience, 
social and cultural pressure (including threats of 
punishment) and legal constraint. 
The first point is irrelevant for present purposes, while the 
second involves the very important questions of infoinnation 
availability and communications. The third and fourth 
points relate to the cultural values of a society. Through 
formal and informal education systems, individuals learn 
the external factors they should take into account and the 
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weight these should be given. VJithin a government's agencies 
formal legal constraints are of little relevance unless cultural 
constraints are inadequate to compensate for the advantages 
to an organization of "deviant" behaviour or where there 
are changes to the external factors which should be taken into 
account. In that case agencies may not appreciate what is 
expected of them. An agency may take a considerable time to 
learn a new set of weightings to give to externalities. 
The external systems which an agency might affect can be 
classified into two categories - those for which some other 
agency is responsible and those for which no.agency has 
formal responsibility. Where a system is the responsibility 
of another agency, the latter can be expected to voice 
4 
disapproval of anyone else who interferes with it. Where 
a system is not protected in this way, problems can be 
expected. The so-called "environmental protection agencies" 
which have been set up by many governments typically try 
to establish a voice for many of the systems which previously 
had not been the conbern of anyone. Such agencies, to be 
successful, must intrude into the activities of more 
conventional organizations - which raises all of the normal 
problems related to the multiple feasible methods of task 
specialization which were identified in Chapter 3.8. 
Such agencies do not contribute to any major extent to the 
solution of the problem of externalities because much the 
same effect could be achieved by dividing up the systems for 
which an environmental protection agency was responsible and 
placing them under the control of other agencies. The main 
impact of an environmental protection agency in the short 
term is probably a development within it of an appropriate 
set of values and the development of conflicts between it and 
other agencies. The real requirement is for agencies to 
4. The problem in this case is for the protective agency to be aware 
of the proposal and for the proposer to be aware of their interest 
before a project is committed. This is a communications 
problem. 
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gain knowledge of^ and give due weight to,the requirements of 
systems other than the principal system in which they are 
interested. The learning process required for this can be 
encouraged by the use of techniques such as formal environ-
mental impact studies, while the communication problem can be 
minimized if it is required that such studies also involve 
inter-agency consultation. 
Though this problem can never be completely eliminated it 
will be minimized by giving explicit consideration to 
externalities in such formal analysis and appraisal of 
government activities as is undertaken and by making an 
attempt to produce a uniform central definition of the 
values to be used for externalities. 
6.4 Change 
Many of the problems of achieving change in a government 
organization in the face of the inertia implicit in a stable 
"7 
system have been identified elsewhere. A non centralized 
government may be characterized by considerable difficulty 
in making sudden, government wide, changes. In a non 
centralized organization there will inevitably be situations 
in which non hierarchical authoritative solutions must be 
sought in order to maintain consistency (e.g. in a crisis). 
A good index of the success of a non centralized government 
structure would be a reduction in the number of occasions on 
which central authoritative solutions must be sought as well 
as a minimization of the ntmiber of interagency conflicts. 
In order to facilitate change in a non centralized 
organization two requirements will be suggested. The first 
5. The real crux of the whole "environmental" movement is the need to 
internalize new sets of externality costs. 
6. While an agency may not actually ignore externalities it may tend 
to undervalue them in comparison with benefits to the system in 
which they are directly interested unless these values are 
standardized. 
7. See Appendices D, F and G. 
\ 
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i s t h a t , although there may be no c e n t r a l p lanning, the re 
be a c e n t r a l group assoc ia ted with the government executive 
which continuously monitors the way in which the organiza t ion 
i s performing and secondly t h a t pe r iod i c formal fundam.ental 
reviews of government a c t i v i t i e s be undertaken. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The three problems i d e n t i f i e d in t h i s Chapter are not uniquely 
confined to non c e n t r a l i z e d governments. Though they w i l l 
e x i s t in c e n t r a l i z e d governments they could a l l be d i r e c t l y 
a t tacked by a c e n t r a l planning agency. Thus,though the tech-
n ica l d i f f i c u l t i e s assoc ia ted with defining goa l s , handling 
e x t e r n a l i t i e s and change w i l l be the same in each case , a non 
cen t ra l i zed government w i l l have severe procedural d i f f i c u l t i e s 
as we l l . 
None the l e ss , for reasons explained i n Chapter 8 a non 
cen t ra l i zed approach to planning i s the most appropr ia te for 
use by the Queensland Government. Chapters 8 and 9 p resen t a 
co-ordinat ing procedure which could be used by t h a t government 
in order to minimize these problems. 
8. DROR (1968) identifies the need for such a procedure in his "ideal" 
policy making system. He refers to i t as meta policy making ( i .e . 
making decisions about how to make decisions). 
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7 . GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION IN QUEENSLAND 
7 . 1 E s t a b l i s h m e n t a n d C o n s t i t u t i o n 
I n o r d e r t o e x a m i n e t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e c o n c e p t o f 
c o - o r d i n a t i o n i n Q u e e n s l a n d , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o e x a m i n e t h e 
e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e o f t h e e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h i n Q u e e n s l a n d . 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s s u b j e c t i s s c a r c e 
a l m o s t t o t h e p o i n t o f n o n - e x i s t e n c e a n d , a s a r e s u l t , t h i s 
c h a p t e r m u s t b e l a r g e l y o r i g i n a l , b a s e d i n p a r t on t h e a u t h o r ' s 
own k n o w l e d g e a n d i n p a r t on s u c h s c a n t y p u b l i c a t i o n s a s a r e 
a v a i l a b l e . 
The Q u e e n s l a n d G o v e r n m e n t m u s t b e e n s e e n i n t h e c o n t e x t o f 
t h e S t a t e f o r w h i c h i t i s r e s p o n s i b l e . A p p e n d i x I g i v e s a 
b r i e f a c c o u n t o f some o f t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Q u e e n s l a n d 
w h i c h s h o u l d a f f e c t i t s g o v e r n m e n t ' s a p p r o a c h t o p l a n n i n g . 
The G o v e r n m e n t o f t h e c o l o n y o f Q u e e n s l a n d was s e t u p u n d e r a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f t h e c o l o n y o f New S o u t h W a l e s 
f rom w h i c h i t w a s s e p a r a t e d b y L e t t e r s P a t e n t i s s u e d i n 1 8 5 9 . 
T h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n w a s m o d i f i e d i n 186 7 a n d on a n u m b e r o f 
o c c a s i o n s s i n c e t h e n . The C o n s t i t u t i o n i s o f l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l 
r e l e v a n c e i n g u i d i n g t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h o f 
t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d a s s u c h i s n o t o f g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e f o r 
3 
t h i s t h e s i s . 
1. A u s t r a l i a has a f e d e r a l system of government wi th the r e s u l t t h a t t h e r e 
a r e two e l e c t e d governments having j u r i s d i c t i o n over Queensland. These 
a re t he government of the Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a ( r e f e r r e d t o he re 
as the Commonwealth) and the government of the S t a t e of Queensland. 
The Commonwealth Government i s n o t of d i r e c t i n t e r e s t for t h i s paper , 
however, as i s e x p l a i n e d l a t e r i n t h i s chapter the Federa l system has 
a s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e on the S t a t e Government. 
2 . "For Queens land ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h i s t o r y , t h e r e i s fo r i n s t a n c e , a p a r t 
from o f f i c i a l r e p o r t s and a r c h i v a l m a t e r i a l , l i t t l e excep t the inform-
a t i o n i n two b r i e f papers . . . None of the above s t u d i e s i s o r i e n t e d 
towards budge t ing or f i n a n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and i t i s c l e a r t h a t we 
have so f a r b a r e l y s c r a t c h e d the sur face of what i s a wide f i e l d 
o f f e r i n g many o p p o r t u n i t i e s for f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . " This comment 
by KNIGHT (1970) ,pp .7 -8 i s as t r u e of p lanning as i t i s of b u d g e t i n g . 
A d i s c u s s i o n of the l i t e r a t u r e concerning Queensland i s given i n 
KNIGHT and ADAMS (1974) . 
3 The C o n s t i t u t i o n and a number of Acts of the B r i t i s h P a r l i a m e n t 
e s t a b l i s h the l e g a l i t y of the Queensland Government. However, as no ted 
by LUMB (1963) the C o n s t i t u t i o n i s , even today, un t idy and u n s a t i s -
f a c t o r y . For example, Queensland i s s t i l l apparen t ly s u b j e c t t o some 
Acts of the B r i t i s h Pa r l i amen t - p a r t i c u l a r l y the Colonia l Laws 
V a l i d i t y Act of 1865. Probl.ems could occur wi th S t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n 
which was repugnant to B r i t i s h l e g i s l a t o r s . Ce r t a in c l a s s e s of b i l l s 
( con t inued on n e x t page) 
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Queensland was e s t a b l i s h e d as a S ta te when the Aus t ra l i an 
Federation was formed in 1901. Under the Aus t ra l i an 
Cons t i tu t ion the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the S t a t e s covers a l l mat ters 
which are not s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l oca t ed to the Commonwealth. 
The l e g i s l a t i v e branch of the Queensland Government cons i s t s 
of an e l e c t e d Parl iament which, unl ike the o the r Aus t ra l i an 
S ta tes and the Commonwealth, has only a s ing le house - the 
4 Leg i s l a t ive Assembly cons i s t i ng of 82 members. 
The j u d i c i a l branch i s headed by the Supreme Court which has 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for c i v i l and cr iminal ac t ions though appeal 
to the High Court of Aus t r a l i a i s poss ib le and, in some 
cases where federa l j u r i s d i c t i o n i s not involved, so i s 
appeal to the Privy Council . Below the Supreme Court i s a 
system of D i s t r i c t Courts and Magis t ra tes Courts which deal 
with progress ive ly more minor m a t t e r s . In addi t ion there are 
spec ia l cour ts and t r i b u n a l s which deal with Family Law, 
Small Claims and Small Debts. There i s a lso a Land Court 
and an I n d u s t r i a l Court a s soc ia ted with the S t a t e ' s 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission. 
As in a l l governments in A u s t r a l i a , the execut ive branch i s 
headed by the Crown whose au thor i ty i s exerc i sed by an 
appointed Vice- rega l r ep re sen t a t i ve (a Governor). The 
Governor has a nominal ro le and takes act ion on the advice of 
an Executive Council ( in fac t the Cabinet) drawn from the 
3. (continued from previous page) 
require Royal Assent - not simply tha t of the Governor. Laws concerning 
changes to the cons t i tu t ions must be passed in accordance with ex i s t ing 
law. There are problems with l e g i s l a t i o n which extends outside the 
t e r r i t o r i a l area of Queensland. These d i f f i c u l t i e s are seldom of 
major p r a c t i c a l concern but provide a generally unsat isfactory back-
ground to any consideration of the Queensland Government, 
4. A comprehensive accoiont of the a c t i v i t i e s and methods of operation of 
the Parliament i s outside the scope of t h i s present work. One account 
i s given in QUEENSLAND, STATE PUBLIC RELATIONS BUREAU (undated)."The 
Parliament of Queensland". Suffice i t to say t h a t the role of Parliament 
i s l imited in comparison with the execut ive . Theoret ical ly the 
Parliament reviews l eg i s l a t i on and i s responsible for voting monies 
needed by the execut ive . In fac t , however, l e g i s l a t i o n submitted by 
the Government i s seldom modified and, as far as funding i s concerned, 
"the necessary examination and control i s exercised by the Treasurer , 
the Cabinet and the Auditor General" ( ib id ) , p . 14. 
5 . S o u r c e - AUSTRALIA, BUREAU OF STATISTICS (QUEENSLAND OFFICE) ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 
p p . 201 - 2 0 4 . 
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majority p a r t i e s in the Leg i s l a t i ve Assembly. The members of 
Cabinet (18 in number p r i o r to the 19 77 S ta te Elect ion) are 
a l l Min i s t e r s , each of whom i s respons ib le for the adminis t ra t -
ion of one or more government agencies and of a number of Acts 
of the Par l iament . 
7.2 St ruc ture of the Executive Branch 
The.Queensland Government con t ro l s a large and complex 
organiza t ion . In 19 76 there were 9 3,0 76 Crown employees, of 
whom 45,5 36 were sub jec t to the Publ ic Service Acts.*^ 
This count of s t a t e employees excludes those who work for 
autonomous s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s . Figures complied by the 
Austra l ian Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s shows t h a t in 19 76 there were 
about 136,400 persons employed by the Queensland publ ic 
sec tor (State and Local Government).^ This represen ts nearly 
22% of the es t imated number of persons in c i v i l i a n employment 
in the S t a t e . The Crown i s c l e a r l y the l a r g e s t employer in 
Queensland and the l a r g e s t o rgan iza t ions poss ib ly sub jec t to 
corporate management are the Education and Railways Departments 
each employing over 20,000 persons . 
The complexity of the organiza t ion may be i l l u s t r a t e d by the 
fact t h a t there are more than 550 i d e n t i f i a b l e agencies , some 
of which operate very large numbers of speara te es tabl i shments 
(e .g . the Education Department has more than 1,100 primary 
6. The division of agencies and Acts between Ministers i s s e t out in the 
Administrative arrangements published per iod ica l ly in the Queensland 
Government Gazette. 
7. Source - QUEENSLAND, PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD (1976),p. 1. Crown 
employees are those whose s a l a r i e s or wages were paid by the Crown 
( i . e . through the Sta te Budget). They were d i s t r ibu ted as follows -
Education Department (26,689), Railway Department (24,349), and the 
balance in other departments. The number of public servants in 
Queensland i s g rea te r than in Victoria re f lec t ing the former S t a t e ' s 
less extensive use of independent boards. See KIMIGHT and WILTSHIRE 
(1973), pp. 9 - 1 0 . 
a. Source - AUSTRALIAN, BUREAU OF STATISTICS (1976)."Employment and Un-
employment", pp . 6 - 7 . Total publ ic sec tor employment including the 
Commonwealth Government amounted to 177,100 persons. State Authori t ies 
are c red i ted with 114,900 and loca l au thor i t i e s with 21,700. Thus, 
assuming tha t these figures are roughly comparable with the Public 
Service Board's est imate of Crown Employees, some 20,000 or so persons 
would be employed by independent s t a tu to ry au thor i t i e s apar t from 
loca l a u t h o r i t i e s . 
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and secondary schools). , The total number of separate offices 
and establishments operated directly and indirectly by the 
Government would be very difficult to determine but a guess 
in the range of four to five thousand would not be unreasonable, 
In 1975 the Government was divided into 18 Ministries and the 
arrangement of statutory organizations which were responsible 
to them is shown in Figure 7.1. There are a number of areas 
of uncertainty in this structure in the definition of statutory 
authorities because of the existence of organizations to which 
responsibilities have been delegated by legislation but which 
are not specifically dependent on legislation for their 
existence. 
In this strucutre there are three principal classes of 
organizations (though the distinction is not apparent from 
9 
Figure 7.1) namely -
(a) Ministerial Departments 
(b) Statutory Authorities with Statewide Competence 
(c) Local Bodies. 
M i n i s t e r i a l Depar tments . In 19 75 t h e r e were 26 M i n i s t e r i a l 
Departments (where a M i n i s t e r i a l Department i s c o n s i d e r e d t o be 
an o r g a n i z a t i o n wi th a permanent head r e p o r t i n g d i r e c t l y t o a 
M i n i s t e r ) . The permanent heads were i n many ca se s p u b l i c 
s e r v a n t s whi le i n o t h e r s they were o f f i c e r s of P a r l i a m e n t 
( e . g . Aud i to r -Gene ra l ) and i n o t h e r s were t he h o l d e r s of 
s p e c i a l Commissions under S t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n ( e . g . Commissioner 
for I r r i g a t i o n and Water S u p p l y ) . 
S t a t u t o r y A u t h o r i t i e s w i t h S t a t ewide Competence. There a r e 
a l a r g e number of o p e r a t i o n a l and a d v i s o r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o 
which c e r t a i n powers and f u n c t i o n s have been d e l e g a t e d by t h e 
Government ( e . g . Board of Advanced E d u c a t i o n , S t a t e F i r e 
S e r v i c e s C o u n c i l , S t a t e Government I n s u r a n c e O f f i c e , numerous 
9. This classification corresponds with that used by BARTON (1976). An 
alternative approach is as follows -
(a) S t a t e Government - agenc ies t o t a l l y funded through S t a t e Budget; 
(b) Local Government - l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s ; 
(c) Semi-government Bodies - t hose a p a r t from l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s whose 
f inances a r e wholly or p a r t l y excluded from the S t a t e Budget . 
See AUSTRALIA, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, (QUEENSLAND OFFICE) (1976), 
pp .463 - 506. Such an approach i s convenien t from a f i n a n c i a l 
p o i n t of view b u t l e s s u se fu l i n i d e n t i f y i n g the b a s i s of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n 
invo lved i n the government o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
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commodity m a r k e t i n g b o a r d s , a number o f t r a d e and p r o f e s s i o n a l 
r e g i s t r a t i o n b o a r d s , t h e C o u n c i l o f A g r i c u l t u r e and s o o n ) . A 
s i g n i f i c a n t number o f t J iese o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a v e no s t a f f o f t h e i r 
own and a r e s u p p o r t e d by M i n i s t e r i a l D e p a r t m e n t s o r o t J i e r 
s t a t u t o r y b o a r d s . The powers and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f t h e s e 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e a l l i n n a r r o w f u n c t i o n a l a r e a s . 
The a c t u a l numbers o f s u c h o r g a n i z a t i o n s i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
d e t e r m i n e p r e c i s e l y b u t i t i s t h e a u t h o r ' s e s t i m a t e t h a t t h e r e 
were o v e r 100 i n e x i s t e n c e i n 1 9 7 5 . 
L o c a l B o d i e s . L o c a l B o d i e s a r e c o n s i d e r e d t o be t h o s e 
s t a t u t o r y b o a r d s and c o u n c i l s h a v i n g an a r e a of j u r i s d i c t i o n 
which i s l e s s t h a n t h e who le S t a t e . T a b l e 7 . 1 d e f i n e s 
t h i r t e e n d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of l o c a l b o d i e s wh ich e x i s t e d i n 
19 75 u n d e r S t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n . 
TABLE 7 . 1 -^  _ 
MAJOR CLASSES OF LOCAL BODIES 
L o c a l Body C l a s s 
L o c a l A u t h o r i t i e s 
IN 
E l e c t r i c i t y G e n e r a t i n g A u t h o r i t i e s 
R e g i o n a l E l e c t r i c i t y B o a r d s 
R e g i o n a l C o - o r d i n a t i o n C o u n c i l s 
F i r e B r i g a d e B o a r d s 
A b a t t o i r B o a r d s 
R i v e r Improvemen t T r u s t s 
Wa te r B o a r d s 
D r a i n a g e B o a r d s 
H a r b o u r B o a r d s 
H o s p i t a l B o a r d s 
Ambulance B r i g a d e s 
L o c a l Cane P e s t and D i s e a s e C o n t r o l 
f ,, 
QUEENSLAND (19 75) 
B o a r d s 
Number 
131 
# 
fi 
1 ) 3 
1 1 
i 
s 
1$ 
.JL M 
1 
58 
100 
20 
10. This i s not a completely sa t i s fac to ry def in i t ion of Local Bodies, 
because for many purposes some statewide s ta tu to ry au tho r i t i e s are 
considered to be local bodies (e.g. under the "Local Bodies Loans 
Guarantee Act 1923-1975". Furthermore, for Loan Council purposes, a l l 
non "government" bodies are divided in to Semi-Governmental and Other 
Local Bodies on the bas is of whether or not they borrow more than 
$800,000 ( th is was the l i m i t in 1976/77) through debenture loans. 
However, for present purposes, i t i s sa t i s fac to ry and conforms to the 
t h e o r e t i c a l s t ruc tu re described in Chapter 3. 
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The m o s t i m p o r t a n t c l a s s of l o c a l b o d i e s a r e l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s 
which a r e t h e o n l y o n e s h a v i n g a w ide r a n g e o f f u n c t i o n s and 
whose members a r e d i r e c t l y e l e c t e d by t h e who le 
communi ty . O t h e r l o c a l b o d i e s a r e f r e q u e n t l y c o n t r o l l e d by 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s o r by Crown o r M i n i s t e r i a l 
a p p o i n t e e s . 
L o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s a r e w o r t h y o f s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n a s i n 
a p o l i t i c a l , i f n o t i n a s t r i c t l y l e g a l s e n s e , t h e y r e p r e s e n t 
a s u b s i d i a r y l e v e l of g o v e r n m e n t . They c a r r y o u t t h e two 
i d e n t i f i e d r o l e s of g o v e r n m e n t ( i . e . t h r o u g h b y - l a w s t h e y have 
a d e g r e e of c o n t r o l of t h e s o c i e t y i n which t h e y a r e embedded, 
and a l s o p r o v i d e community s e r v i c e s ) and a r e a l s o w i d e l y 
r e c o g n i s e d as r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e p e o p l e o f t h e i r a r e a . However , 
i n a s t r i c t s e n s e t h e y l a c k t h e e s s e n t i a l r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a 
g o v e r n m e n t , i n t h a t n o t a l l o t h e r c o n t r o l l i n g s t r u c t u r e s i n 
t h e s o c i e t y m u s t d e f e r t o t hem. L o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n 
Q u e e n s l a n d g e n e r a l l y c o v e r a w i d e r r a n g e o f f u n c t i o n s t h a n 
do t h e i r c o u t e r p a r t s i n o t h e r S t a t e s ( p o s s e s s i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t -
i e s f o r w a t e r s u p p l i e s , s e w e r a g e s c h e m e s , and e l e c t r i c i t y -
and , i n some c a s e s , p u b l i c t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ) . However , " l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s a r e c l o s e l y s u p e r v i s e d and c u r t a i l e d i n t h e i r 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s by t h e S t a t e Government" w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n 
of t h e B r i s b a n e C i t y C o u n c i l wh ich i s t h e o n l y l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t y i n A u s t r a l i a t o h a v e more o r l e s s c o m p l e t e 
12 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a c a p i t a l c i t y m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a . 
Because of i t s s i z e , c o m p l e x i t y and t h e c a l i b r e o f some o f 
11. There i s a conceptual danger i n regarding local au thor i t i e s as a 
' separate leve l of government because one i s then l ike ly to make 
statements l ike " local government should be responsible for function 
A while the s t a t e government should be responsible for function B." 
There are many d i f fe ren t c lasses of local bodies and functional and 
process s p e c i a l i s t departments have many complex re la t ionsh ips with 
them. I t i s more useful in a p r a c t i c a l sense to define how functions 
A and B should f i t i n to the t o t a l spectrum of function, process 
and s p a t i a l agencies ra ther than in to a s impl i s t i c two level system. 
12. See BERBUDEAN (1970), p . 3. MILIAR and JINKS (1971), p . 114 note t ha t 
"the Council i s unique amongst local au thor i t i e s in Austral ia insofar 
as i t operates under a general and not a speci f ic grant of powers: 
i t can take any measures i t sees f i t for the government of the c i t y , 
subject to the approval of its ordinances by the S ta ts Government". 
In Aus t ra l i a , because of the p r inc ip le of u l t r a v i r e s , loca l 
au tho r i t i e s only hold powers they are spec i f i ca l ly given. In some 
other countries e . g . U.S.A. loca l au thor i t i e s are allowed to do 
anything not spec i f i ca l ly forbidden or a l loca ted to some other agency. 
PURDIE (1976). 
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i ts leaders, i t has been able to function with a high degree 
of autonomy. 
There appears to be no v/idespread public support in Queensland 
(and in Australia in general) for an increase in the 
13 
relative importance of local authorities. They originated 
by the devolution of services to property from the state 
government and have l i t t l e involvement in services to people. 
Such attempts as have been made to increase their responsibil-
ities are often resisted by the Councils themselves on the 
grounds of cost. 
Task Specialization 
Within the Queensland Government organization a number of 
agencies may be identified which fulfil a staff or service 
role i . e . whose basis of specialization is primarily process 
rather than input, output or location. 
These include the Premier's Department, Treasury, Works 
Department, Pi±)lic Service Board and the Co-ordinator-General's 
Department, and a number of others which are partly based on 
process specialization and partly on the basis of output, 
e.g. Government Printing Office, Solicitor-General, Surveying 
and Mapping, Lands Department. 
Most of the other important departments are based on functional 
specialization to varying degrees. Most local bodies (except 
for local authorities)also have fairly narrow functional 
specialization combined with spatial specialization. 
The activities undertaken by the government through al l of 
i ts agencies are very extensive and a complete description of 
14 them is outside the scope of this thesis. The dominant 
13. " I t appears tha t local government i s involved in a vicious c i r c l e . 
Having done l i t t l e t h a t would f i r e the imagination of i t s c i t i z e n s , 
i t has not obtained t h e i r confidence suf f ic ien t ly t o make them demand 
tha t i t have more ambitious things to do." MILLER and JINKS (197i) , 
p .114. 
14. No comprehensive statement of the a c t i v i t i e s of the government i s 
a v a i l a b l e . Probably the neares t (though r e l a t i ng only to the budget 
sector) i s , QUEENSLAND, STATE PUBLIC RELATIONS BUREAU (1976), though 
other ind ica t ive sources are the State budget, and the organizat ion 
s t ruc tu re shown in Fig. 7 . 1 . The existence of a l loca t ions for 
p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s and of agencies whose t i t l e s r e l a t e to them can 
be taken as evidence of involvement in these a c t i v i t i e s . State 
(contu.nued on next page) 
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se rv ices which the government provides in terms of expendi t -
15 
ures are undoubtedly hea l th and educa t ion . 
The systems in i t s environment which the Queensland Government 
endeavours to con t ro l in d e t a i l are many in number but i t s 
philosophy i s not apparent ly i nc l i ned towards comprehensive 
d i r ec t i ve e x t e r n a l systems c o n t r o l . Hence though there are 
many systems which the government inf luences and over which i t 
has l imi ted c o n t r o l , the re are few where con t ro l i s compre-
hensive . The government's organiza t ion r e f l e c t s t h i s in t h a t 
most agencies are o r i en t ed towards the production of community 
service outputs r a t h e r than towards systems management and 
con t ro l . Such con t ro l as i s exer ted i s usual ly though 
agencies providing a se rv ice which most d i r e c t l y impacts on 
the system i n quest ion though some purely regu la tory agencies 
do e x i s t . 
7.3 The Federal Environment 
This t he s i s i s genera l ly downward looking in t h a t i t i s 
concerned with planning i n the Queensland Government and l e s s 
concerned with the environment in which t h a t government 
e x i s t s . However i t s a c t i v i t i e s must be co-ordinated to a 
c e r t a in ex t en t with those of other Aust ra l ian S ta tes and with 
those of the Commonwealth Government. The Federal system was 
crea ted o r i g i n a l l y to improve co-ord ina t ion across Aus t r a l i a 
by t r a n s f e r i n g c e r t a i n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to the Federal 
Government and by the es tabl i shment of c e r t a i n i n t e r s t a t e 
16 
co-ord ina t ing s t r u c t u r e s . 
The Aus t ra l i an federa t ion has passed through a number of 
phases which have been descr ibed as co-ordina te federal ism, 
17 
co-opera t ive federal ism and coercive federa l i sm. "Under 
14. (continued from previous page) 
Legis la t ion should completely describe the government's a c t i v i t i e s , 
however, i t i s too extensive to be readi ly surveyed and does not 
dest inguish between important and unimportant a c t i v i t i e s or enable 
inac t ive tasks to be i d e n t i f i e d . 
15. Education and Health account for 44% and 23% respec t ive ly , of f ina l 
consumption expenditure by the Queensland Government in 1974/75. 
S o u r c e : AUSTRALIA, BUREAU OF STATISTICS (QUEENSLAND OFFICE)(1977) , 
pp. 471-472. 
16. For example the I n t e r s t a t e Commission whose existence i s provided for 
by Section 101 of the Const i tu t ion . 
1 7 . MATHEWS (1977) 
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the system of co-ordinate federalism which operated during the 
early years of federation, governments not only believed that 
they could act independently of each other but generally 
succeeded in doing so. Co-operative federalism flourished in 
the period between the First and Second World Wars, when 
Governments found it mutually convenient to co-operate in 
formulating policies and were able to do so from a position of 
equal bargaining strength, so that their independence was 
preserved. Coercive federalism had its origin in the financial 
domination of the national Government which began during the 
Second World War and was characterized by a growing tendency for 
the national government to intrude into and impose its 
18 priorities in areas of traditional State responsibility." 
Where co-ordinate action is required a federal system generates 
a number of problems which would not be present in a unitary 
19 . . 
state. This arises because of the independence of the 
governments involved which inhibit many of the essentially 
centrally inspired methods of intercorporate co-ordination which 
are possible within a single government. The Australian 
Constitution was devised about 80 years ago and made little 
allowance for processes of resolving intergovernmental conflicts. 
Probably, because of the failure of the Constitution to provide 
for such mechanisms, financial coercion, a most unsatisfactory 
method, has tended to dominate as a basis for the promotion of 
national co-ordination. 
In the recent past, Australia has experienced two quite 
radical changes in the nature of Federal/State relationships. 
First, from 19 72 to 19 75, the Labor Government in the 
Commonwealth endeavoured by the extensive use of Section 96 
of the Constitution to gain a major degree of control over 
20 State Government decision making. This acted to reduce 
18. Ibid, p. ix 
19. See KNIGHT (1974). It should be noted, of course, that there are 
advantages in a federal system and that a unitary system is not wit±iout 
difficulties. 
20. Section 96 of the Australian Constitution states - "During a period of 
ten years after the establishment of the Commonwealth and thereafter 
until the Parliament otherwise provides, the Parliament may grant 
financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the 
Parliament thinks fit." This section, combined with effects of the 
Uniform Tax Case of 1942 which left the Commonwealth with complete 
control of Income Tax (traditionally the major growth tax), produced a 
(Continued on next page) 
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t o a low l e v e l the a b i l i t y of a S t a t e Government to p r e p a r e 
meaningful p l a n s and i n t e r n a l l y c o - o r d i n a t e the a c t i v i t i e s 
2 1 
of i t s a g e n c i e s . In 19 74/75 Queensland S t a t e A u t h o r i t i e s 
r e c e i v e d 65.9% of t h e i r t o t a l a v a i l a b l e funds from the 
22 
Commonwealth Government. Of t h i s amount some 41.7% was 
for s p e c i a l purposes so t h a t , of t o t a l funds a v a i l a b l e t o the 
S t a t e Government some 27.5% was t o be expended under Common-
2 3 
wea l th d i r e c t i o n . The p r o p o r t i o n of t i e d funds was h i g h e r 
for c a p i t a l funds wi th an e s t i m a t e d 38% i n 19 74/75 be ing fo r 
• -. 24 
s p e c i a l p u r p o s e s . 
There were two p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t s of the e x t e n s i v e use of 
s p e c i a l programmes. F i r s t l y t h e r e was a s h a r i n g of the 
c o n t r o l of S t a t e a c t i v i t i e s between t h e S t a t e Government and 
t h e Commonwealth. The Commonwealth involvement was c a r r i e d 
on through numerous s p e c i a l Commissions (Schoo l s ' Commission, 
H o s p i t a l s ' and Hea l th S e r v i c e s ' Commission, Bureau of Roads, 
U n i v e r s i t i e s ' Commission, C h i l d r e n ' s Commission, e t c . ) and by 
v a r i o u s Departments ( e . g . Department of Urban and Regiona l 
Development, Department of S o c i a l S e c u r i t y , e t c . ) . Secondly , 
numerous a d m i n i s t r a t i v e problems and s i d e e f f e c t s were 
produced which inf lue 'nced d e c i s i o n making and p l a n n i n g 
11 2 5 proces se s g e n e r a l l y . 
P lann ing by an o r g a n i z a t i o n always t a k e s p l a c e i n an 
environment of e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t s b u t , though t h i s 
h y p o t h e s i s canno t be proved , i t appea r s t h a t the number, 
complexi ty and c r i t i c a l impor tance of c o n s t r a i n t s imposed by 
s p e c i a l programmes a t t h a t t ime reduced t o a low l e v e l t he 
20Z (Continued from previous p a g e ) ^ 
situation where the Commonwealth could exert significant financial 
control over the States ' ac t iv i t i es . _-... •-^ -- - - . -, 
2 1 . CRAIG U9 75)/ "Commonwealth Government F i n a n c i a l Ass i s t ance Schemes". 
22 . AUSTRALIA, BUREAU OF STATISTICS (1976), "Year Book - A u s t r a l i a 1975/76" 
p . 604. T o t a l a v a i l a b l e funds were $1,572.8M. i n c l u d i n g Commonwealth 
g r a n t s for r e c u r r e n t purposes ($614. IM.) and for c a p i t a l purposes 
($242.6M.) and n e t advances of $179,9M. i n c l u d i n g Loan Council funds . 
2 3 . I b i d . , p . 5 7 1 . General purpose funds were F i n a n c i a l Ass i s t ance Grants 
( $ 4 1 4 ! 4 M ! ) . S p e c i a l Grants ($24.7M.), S p e c i a l Revenue Ass i s t ance 
($10.4M.) , C a p i t a l A s s i s t a n c e ($46.IM.) and S t a t e Works Programme 
Funds ($87.5M.) . 
24 . CRAIG (1975), "Commonwealth Government F i n a n c i a l Ass i s t ance Schemes", 
p . 5 . 
2 5 . See WADE (1974) and CRAIG (1975), " Commonwealth Government F i n a n c i a l 
A s s i s t a n c e Schemes". 
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a b i l i t y o f S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s t o o p e r a t e e f f e c t i v e l y . 
S i n c e 19 75 t h e L i b e r a l / N a t i o n a l - C o u n t r y P a r t y G o v e r n m e n t h a s 
2 7 
r e v e r s e d t h i s t r e n d w i t h a n o t h e r "new f e d e r a l i s m " p o l i c y . 
U n d e r t h i s t h e d e v o l u t i o n b a c k t o t h e S t a t e s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
f o r p l a n n i n g f o r m a t t e r s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n d e r t h e i r 
2 8 j u r i s d i c t i o n h a s b e e n s t r e s s e d . A t t h e t i m e o f w r i t i n g , 
h o w e v e r , t h e e f f e c t o f t h i s h a s n o t a d e q u a t e l y d e v e l o p e d f o r 
m e a n i n g f u l c o m m e n t s t o b e m a d e . T h e r e a r e s t i l l many s p e c i a l 
p u r p o s e f u n d i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s i n e x i s t e n c e a n d S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s 
h a v e n o t p u b l i c l y i n d i c a t e d t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n t a k i n g new 
29 i n i t i a t i v e s f o r p l a n n i n g w i t h i n t h e i r a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s . 
H o w e v e r , i f t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h G o v e r n m e n t c o n t i n u e s w i t h t h e 
s p i r i t o f I n c o m e T a x I n d e x a t i o n a s i n t r o d u c e d i n 1 9 7 6 / 7 7 , i t 
i s m o s t u n l i k e l y t h a t i t w o u l d a g a i n b e i n a p o s i t i o n t o 
p r o m o t e m o r e e x t e n s i v e u s e o f s p e c i a l p u r p o s e f u n d i n g . 
As f a r a s t h i s t h e s i s i s c o n c e r n e d t h e F e d e r a l e n v i r o n m e n t 
f o r S t a t e p l a n n i n g h a s t w o m a j o r i m p l i c a t i o n s . F i r s t l y , t h e 
i n v o l v e m e n t o f t h e Commonwea l t h G o v e r n m e n t i n m a t t e r s o f 
S t a t e c o n c e r n , e i t h e r d i r e c t l y b y f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e o r 
i n d i r e c t l y b y t h e p r o m o t i o n o f c o - o r d i n a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e S t a t e s , 
3 1 
m u s t b e r e c o g n i z e d . T h i s r e q u i r e s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l S t a t e 
a g e n c i e s b e a b l e t o e n g a g e i n e x t e n s i v e d i r e c t l i a i s o n w i t h 
t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s i n o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s i n A u s t r a l i a . 
S e c o n d l y , i f i t i s n o t r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e S t a t e a n d F e d e r a l 
26. In 19 75/76 t h e r e were 89 s e p a r a t e s p e c i a l programmes for S t a t e 
Governments i n Atas t ra l ia (with 68 in Queensland) . Almost a l l were 
complexes of r e l a t e d programmes admin i s t e red i n a more or l e s s co-
o r d i n a t e d manner and the t o t a l number of s e p a r a t e c o n s t r a i n t s on S t a t e 
a c t i v i t y would have been much g r e a t e r . For example, t h e r e were t e n 
c a t e g o r i e s under the Road programme, e i g h t fo r Technica l and F u r t h e r 
Educa t ion , nine fo r Schools and so on. In additJ.on t h e r e were more 
s p e c i a l programmes fo r l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s (and an a d d i t i o n a l n ine of 
the S t a t e programmes inc luded funds for onpass ing t o l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s ) . 
Source - CRAIG (1975) , "Commonwealth Government F i n a n c i a l A s s i s t a n c e 
Schemes", p . 4 . 
27 . HOGMARA (pub.) (1975) , p p . 2 9 - 3 1 . Compare WHITLAM (1971) . 
2 8 . See AUSTRALIA (1976), Budget Paper No. 7 , p p . 31-32 . 
2 9 . There appears t o have been a decided r e l u c t a n c e t o e n t e r i n t o Stage 2 
of the P e r s o n a l Income Tax Shar ing arrangements proposed by the 
Commonwealth which would have a l lowed S t a t e s t o levy a marg ina l income 
t a x , i b i d . p p . 15-18 . 
30. See AUSTRALIA (1976), Budget Paper No. 1, P . 2 8 . 
31 . In a d d i t i o n t h e r e are a r e a s , such as h e a l t h and w e l f a r e , where the 
S t a t e and Commonwealth share r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and n e i t h e r can ope ra t e 
e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h o u t t he o t h e r . 
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Governments e a c h h a v e a p r o v i n c e of o p e r a t i o n i n w h i c h i t i s 
a g r e e d t h a t t h e o t h e r w i l l n o t i n t r u d e , s e v e r e o r d e v a s t a t i n g 
d i s t o r a t i o n s of t h e S t a t e ' s p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s e s mus t be 
32 
e x p e c t e d . 
7 .4 P l a n n i n g 
The Q u e e n s l a n d Government h a s no c e n t r a l p l a n n i n g a g e n c y . Thus 
i n c o n s i d e r i n g p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s e s i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o be 
c o n c e r n e d w i t h p l a n n i n g w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l a g e n c i e s and w i t h 
t h e mechanisms of c o - o r d i n a t i o n which a r e u s e d t o i n t e g r a t e 
t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . 
The f o l l o w i n g a c c o u n t o f agency p l a n n i n g i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
l i m i t e d and i n a d e q u a t e b e c a u s e t h e r e i s l i t t l e p u b l i s h e d 
i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e on t h e s u b j e c t . Thus t h e e v i d e n c e 
which w i l l be o f f e r e d h e r e i s m a i n l y n e g a t i v e . The a b s e n c e 
of s o p h i s t i c a t e d me thods of p l a n n i n g can be assumed b e c a u s e , 
i f t h e y e x i s t e d , t h e y wou ld be d e s c r i b e d . The p u b l i s h e d 
r e p o r t s o f S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t s t y p i c a l l y make no m e n t i o n of 
g o a l s and o b j e c t i v e s o r o f t h e use o f s c i e n t i f i c d e c i s i o n 
making m e t h o d s . 
P l a n n i n g p r o c e s s e s i n a number o f Q u e e n s l a n d d e p a r t m e n t s 
33 
were d i s c u s s e d a t a s e m i n a r h e l d i n 19 7 3 . Many d e p a r t m e n t s 
i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y e n g a g e d i n f o r w a r d p l a n n i n g b u t g e n e r a l l y 
a p p e a r e d t o h a v e an u n d e v e l o p e d c o n c e p t of a s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
p l a n n i n g and h a v e d i f f i c u l t y i n i n t e r a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n o f 
d e p a r t m e n t a l d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . Some a g e n c i e s ( e . g . P o l i c e , 
R a i l w a y s , H e a l t h , S t a t e E l e c t r i c i t y Commiss ion , E d u c a t i o n ) 
d e s c r i b e d s p e c i a l " c e n t r a l " p l a n n i n g s e c t i o n s b u t n o t o f t e n 
d i d i t a p p e a r t h a t t h e p l a n n i n g s e c t i o n had a s i g n i f i c a n t 
r o l e i n d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . 
The g e n e r a l i m p r e s s i o n g i v e n i n t h e r e p o r t of t h e s e m i n a r i s 
t h a t d e p a r t m e n t s a r e g e n e r a l l y t e c h n i c a l l y c o m p e t e n t b u t t h a t 
32. This requirement may lead to d i f f i c u l t i e s in adjusting r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
between governments. However, i t i s important that such adjustments as 
do occur be swift changes ra the r than a prot racted power s t r u g g l e . 
Neither a person nor an organization can be expected to perform 
ef fec t ive ly while being slowly s t rangled . 
33. The procedings of t h i s seminar are reported in QUEENSLAND, CO-
ORDINATOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT (1973). The approach of State 
agencies to planning may a lso be gauged from ROYAL INSTITUTE OF 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (QUEENSLAND REGIONAL BRANCH) (1974). 
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me thods of p l a n n i n g a r e n o t a l l w e l l d e v e l o p e d . T h i s 
r e p r e s e n t s a l a c k o f b a l a n c e i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s a p p r o a c h 
b e c a u s e t h e r e i s l i t t l e p o i n t i n e f f i c i e n c y i n t h e a c t u a l 
c a r r y i n g o u t of g o v e r n m e n t a c t i v i t i e s i f t h e r e i s n o t a 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n p l a n n i n g and d e c i s i o n mak ing 
p r o c e s s e s . 
The p l a n n i n g t e c h n i q u e s u s e d by v a r i o u s autonomous b o a r d s 
and. l o c a l b o d i e s a r e a l s o of s i g n i f i c a n c e b u t a g a i n b e c a u s e 
t h e r e i s l i t t l e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e i t may s a f e l y be assumed 
t h a t s o p h i s t i c a t e d me thods a r e t h e e x c e p t i o n r a t h e r t h a n t h e 
r u l e o 
The B r i s b a n e C i t y C o u n c i l i s t h e l a r g e s t l o c a l body u n d e r 
s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n . I t i s d i v i d e d i n t o d e p a r t m e n t s 
whose work i s c o - o r d i n a t e d c e n t r a l l y by a number o f 
c o m m i t t e e s o f which t h e E s t a b l i s h and C o - o r d i n a t i o n Commi t t ee 
34 IS t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t . T h i s g r o u p i s i n e f f e c t t h e C o u n c i l ' s 
" C a b i n e t " . B e c a u s e o f i t s s i z e t h e C o u n c i l ' s p l a n n i n g 
p r o c e d u r e s mus t be n e a r l y a s complex as t h e s e of t h e S t a t e 
Government b u t a r e p robaM y no more s o p h i s t i c a t e d i n a 
35 
s c i e n t i f i c d e c i s i o n making s e n s e . 
7 .5 C o n t r o l and C o - o r d i n a t i o n 
7 . 5 . 1 C o n t r o l by t h e Government E x e c u t i v e Group 
The methods u s e d t o a c h i e v e c e n t r a l c o n t r o l of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
i n c l u d e a l l of t h o s e i d e n t i f i e d i n C h a p t e r 4 e x c e p t t h e u s e 
of a c e n t r a l p l a n n i n g a u t h o r i t y . The p r e d o m i n a n t me thod 
r e v o l v e s a r o u n d h i e r a r c h i c a l a u t h o r i t y w i t h t h e b u d g e t a c t i n g 
p r i m a r i l y a s a method o f c o n t r o l by t h e T r e a s u r e r r a t h e r 
t h a n t h e g o v e r n m e n t g e n e r a l l y . As i n any g o v e r n m e n t t h e 
b u d g e t a r y p r o c e s s h a s an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h e o v e r a l l p l a n n i n g 
p r o c e s s . A b r i e f r e v i e w of b u d g e t i n g , b a s e d on t h e l i m i t e d 
a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n , i s g i v e n i n Append ix J . Because o f 
i t s s t r u c t u r e and a n n u a l o r i e n t a t i o n t h e b u d g e t i s of 
34. BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL (1976), p p . 44-45 
35. I t may be noted that the Council has a Department of Planning and 
Co-ordination which includes a corporate planning section but t h a t 
i t s role i s l imi ted to in t eg ra t ing the Council 's five year programme 
of c a p i t a l works with land use control proposals . Ibid , p . 111. 
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l imi ted relevance in exe r t ing con t ro l over the outputs of 
government agenc ies . In p a r t t h i s appears to be the r e s u l t 
of a d e l i b e r a t e emphasis by the Treasury on decen t ra l i zed 
^ • • V 36 
decis ion making. 
7.5.2 Co-ordination 
The Cabinet serves as the S ta t e Governments u l t imate decis ion 
making cent re and i s consequently one of the major means by 
which consistency between the plans of various agencies i s 
sought. 
Numerous o ther process of co-ord ina t ion are used some of which 
were given as examples when co-ordina t ion was discussed in 
general in Chapter 5 . These w i l l not be repeated h e r e . Many 
of the more s o p h i s t i c a t e d techniques of co-ord ina t ion which 
i t may be p red ic ted t h a t governments w i l l use have not been 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y developed so t h a t , unless an unusual course 
i s followed, the future development in methods of co-ord ina t ion 
should be more or l e s s p red ic tab le . (See Chapter 5.8) 
However, the Queensland Government has attempted some unusual 
approaches to co-ordina t ion involving non cen t r a l i z ed 
planning based on a Co-ordinator-General . The ro les which the 
Co-ordinator-General has f u l f i l l e d in Queensland since 19 38 
are discussed b r i e f l y i n Appendix K. 
The Co-ord ina tor -Genera l ' s Department i s only one amongst four 
process s p e c i a l i s t agencies a t the c e n t r a l government l eve l 
37 
which have important co-ord ina t ing r o l e s . The o ther th ree 
are -
(a) Premier ' s Department. The department contains the 
Cabinet S e c r e t a r i a t and the Parl iamentary Draftsman, 
whose ro l e s were r e f e r r ed to in Chapter 5 . In addi t ion i t 
provides admin i s t r a t ive support for the Premier who, as 
Chief Execut ive, rece ives correspondence on a wide range 
36 "Under the Queensland system, departmental experts assess the priorit-ies of Departments' services - and allocate funds from the total 
appropriation to the Department to those services they judge to have 
the highest priority." HIELSCHER .(1968), p. 16, 
37. Unfortunately two of these agencies namely Treasury and the Premier's 
Department produce no annual reports so that public information about 
their activities- is inadequate. 
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o f m a t t e r s and s o i n v o l v e s h i s d e p a r t m e n t i n r e f e r r a l of 
t h e m a t t e r s r a i s e d t o s p e c i a l i s t a g e n c i e s ; 
(b) T r e a s u r y . T h i s d e p a r t m e n t ' s r o l e i n p r e p a r i n g t h e b u d g e t 
h a s a l r e a d y b e e n m e n t i o n e d . The T r e a s u r y a l s o h a s an 
i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n c o - o r d i n a t i o n of t h e a p p r o a c h e s made 
by v a r i o u s d e p a r t m e n t s f o r Commonwealth f i n a n c e ; 
(c) P u b l i c S e r v i c e B o a r d . T h i s agency i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s o f s e r v i c e of P u b l i c S e r v a n t s , w i t h t h e 
p r o m o t i o n of e f f e c t i v e management t e c h n i q u e s i n p u b l i c 
s e r v i c e a g e n c i e s and w i t h r e v i e w of o r g a n i z a t i o n and 
m e t h o d s . 
The s c o p e o f i n t e r e s t o f t h e s e t h r e e a g e n c i e s i s g e n e r a l l y 
l i m i t e d t o t h e b u d g e t s e c t o r o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t . The Co-
o r d i n a t o r - G e n e r a l i s t h e o n l y c e n t r a l agency w i t h an e x t e n s i v e 
i n v o l v e m e n t i n c o - o r d i n a t i o n of autonomous l o c a l b o d i e s a s 
n 38 
w e l l . 
S i n c e 19 75 t h e s e a g e n c i e s h a v e b e e n l i n k e d a t h i g h l e v e l by 
c o m m i t t e e s r e f e r r e d t o i n i t i a l l y a s t h e " P r i o r i t i e s Review 
Commi t t ee" when i t i n v o l v e d o n l y t h o s e a g e n c i e s i n v o l v e d i n 
v a r i o u s a s p e c t s of r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n ( T r e a s u r y , Co-
o r d i n a t o r - G e n e r a l , P u b l i c S e r v i c e B o a r d ) . The name was l a t e r 
changed t o t h e " C o - o r d i n a t i o n and Review Commit tee" wh ich 
i n c l u d e s t h e P r e m i e r ' s D e p a r t m e n t . The a c t u a l i m p l i c a t i o n s 
39 
of t h e s e l i n k a g e s i s n o t a p p a r e n t from any p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n . 
7 . 5 . 3 Review of Q u e e n s l a n d E x p e r i e n c e w i t h Non C e n t r a l i z e d 
P l a n n i n g 
A d e l i b e r a t e a t t e m p t t o c r e a t e a s y s t e m f o r non c e n t r a l i z e d 
40 p l a n n i n g was made i n Q u e e n s l a n d d u r i n g t h e 19 7 0 ' s . T h i s 
38. The Treasury i s involved in administration of s t a t e funds used by loca l 
bodies but not spec i f i ca l ly in co-ordinating t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . Other 
individual departments are involved in co-ordination of local bodies 
with respect to t h e i r f ie lds of functional or process spec ia l i za t ion 
pr imari ly through supervision of cap i ta l works a c t i v i t i e s . (See 
Appendix L) . 
39. P o l i t i c a l commentators such as TRUNDLE (1976) saw th i s committee as 
a move by the Premier to gain a degree of control over Treasury 
a c t i v i t i e s . 
40. The in ten t ion to make such an attempt was c lear ly s e t out in 
QUEENSLAND, CO-ORDINATOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT (1970) 
p . 4, and subsequent annual reports and in other publ ica t ions of t h a t 
department. 
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revolved around the a c t i v i t i e s of the Co-ordinator-General 
which are descr ibed for the r e l e v a n t per iod in Appendix K . 
I t involved unconventional formal approaches to reg iona l and 
"environmental" co-ord ina t ion and an extens ive involvement 
in multi-agency i n v e s t i g a t i o n and research p r o j e c t s . 
At the time of wr i t i ng (19 78) the r eg iona l approach has been 
abandoned and the "environmental" system i s i n o p e r a t i v e . 
The Co-ord ina tor -Genera l ' s annual r epo r t for 19 77 s t a t e d t h a t 
h is primary ro le remained as the production of a programme 
of works. In the same repor t a large number of cont inuing 
" technica l co-ord ina t ion" p r o j e c t s were descr ibed . 
The quest ion remains of how successfu l these approaches were 
and how successful they might have been i f d i f f e r e n t methods 
had been used. I t was argued in Chapter 6 t h a t "environment-
a l " problems pr imar i ly requ i re information exchange and a 
change to values he ld by r e l evan t o r g a n i z a t i o n s . As such, 
spec ia l procedures must l o g i c a l l y terminate a t some time and 
be replaced by simple information exchange systems and t h e i r 
success must be judged in terms of future decis ions made by 
the government on "environment" i s s u e s . At the time of 
wr i t ing success or f a i l u r e i n these terms may not be 
r e a l i s t i c a l l y judged. 
Spa t i a l or r eg iona l co-ord ina t ion i s , however, not a t r a n s i e n t 
problem and i t appears , for reasons which were never s t a t e d , 
t ha t the government considered t h a t the Regional Co-ordinat ion 
system was a f a i l u r e . A number of reasons why t h i s might have 
been so are suggested in Appendix K, but the lack of p u b l i c i t y 
given to the a c t i v i t i e s of the Regional Co-ordinat ion Councils 
and the reasons for t h e i r terminat ion makes t h i s d i f f i c u l t to 
a sce r t a in with c e r t a i n t y . 
The o r i g i n a l concept appears to have been to develop a formal 
s t r a t e g i c "planning" framework a t the reg iona l l eve l wi th in 
which the plans of i nd iv idua l government agencies could be 
formulated."^-^ S t r a t e g i c "plans" were prepared for a number 
of regions but there appears to have been no e f f ec t i ve method 
4 1 , QUEENSLAND, CO-ORDINATOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT ( u n d a t e d ) , " R e g i o n a l 
Planning and Regional Co-ordination" . pp. 6-9. 
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found f o r i m p l e m e n t i n g them and t h i s may be t h e main r e a s o n f o r 
t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e r e g i o n a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n s c h e m e . I n t h e 
a u t h o r ' s o p i n i o n r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g i c " p l a n s " m u s t be i m p o s s i b l e 
t o a d m i n i s t e r u n l e s s p l a n n i n g i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from e x t e r n a l 
s y s t e m s c o n t r o l . C h a p t e r s 8 and 9 o f t h i s t h e s i s s u g g e s t a 
r e a l i s t i c way i n wh ich such a s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g framework 
c o u l d h a v e b e e n c r e a t e d . 
42 7.6 A s s e s s m e n t of t h e Q u e e n s l a n d Government O r g a n i z a t i o n 
I f a g o v e r n m e n t h a d a s e t o f f o r m a l l y d e f i n e d r e a l i s t i c g o a l s 
i t wou ld be p o s s i b l e t o e s t i m a t e how e f f e c t i v e l y i t s 
o r g a n i z a t i o n wou ld c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e m . No s u c h g o a l s a c t u a l l y 
e x i s t f o r t h e Q u e e n s l a n d Government and s o o n l y t h e e x e c u t i v e 
g roup i t s e l f wou ld be a b l e t o make any a u t h o r i t a t i v e comment 
43 
a b o u t t h e adequacy o f i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
The g o v e r n m e n t s s t r u c t u r e and a r r a n g e m e n t s may however be 
r e v i e w e d i n t e r m s o f t h e c r i t e r i a d i s c u s s e d i n C h a p t e r 3 . 8 . 
The d e s i r e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s u g g e s t e d f o r a good g o v e r n m e n t 
o r g a n i z a t i o n w e r e s t a b i l i t y , a d a p t a b i l i t y , e f f i c i e n c y , 
e q u i t a b i l i t y , r e s p o n s i v e n e s s , c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y and s i m p l i c i t y . 
There can be l i t t l e q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n 
i s s t a b l e and g i v e n t h e i n e v i t a b l e p r o b l e m s i n any 
44 
o r g a n i z a t i o n p r o b a b l y a c c e p t a b l y e f f i c i e n t . As r e g a r d s 
a d a p t a b i l i t y , i t may be s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t s s t a b i l -
i t y i s s o g r e a t , b a s e d on l o n g e s t a b l i s h e d a g e n c i e s , t h a t 
a d a p t i o n i s i n h i b i t e d . However , a g e n e r a l i n s p e c t i o n of t h e 
g o v e r n m e n t s o r g a n i z a t i o n shows t h a t i t may n o t be b a d l y a d a p t e d 
t o i t s e n v i r o n m e n t . C o n s e r v a t i v e a t t i t u d e s p r e d o m i n a t e i n 
Q u e e n s l a n d a n d , i n s u c h a s i t u a t i o n , g o v e r n m e n t s t a b i l i t y r a t h e r 
t h a n r a p i d change may be p r e f e r r e d . I n f a c t , c l o s e 
o b s e r v a t i o n o v e r a p e r i o d o f t i m e shows t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t 
42, This assessment deals only with the government organization below the 
p o l i t i c a l l e v e l , 
43, The author i s pess imis t i c about determining a r e a l i s t i c se t of goals 
for any government for reasons advanced in Chapter 6. 
44, The government lacks any effec t ive means whereby eff iciency can be 
measured, such as the connection of outputs measures to the budget 
p rocess , so th i s i s necessar i ly an unsupported observat ion. Contrary 
asse r t ions could be readi ly be made. 
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r e a r r a n g e m e n t s and l e a r n i n g a r e c o n s t a n t l y t a k i n g p l a c e . 
The d o m i n a n t mechanism which t h e g o v e r n m e n t e x e c u t i v e u s e s t o 
c o n t r o l i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n i s h i e r a r c h i c a l a u t h o r i t y , and t h i s 
i s a s e f f e c t i v e a s can be e x p e c t e d . Methods of c o r p o r a t e 
management i n i n d i v i d u a l a g e n c i e s a r e n o t w e l l d e v e l o p e d . 
B u d g e t i n g i s o n l y a p o o r me thod o f c o n t r o l s i n c e i t i s 
c o n n e c t e d o n l y w i t h i n p u t s and n o t w i t h o u t p u t s . 
The o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e i s s i m p l e enough and does n o t 
r e q u i r e t h a t i t be w i d e l y u n d e r s t o o d i n o r d e r t o o p e r a t e . 
T h i s i s p r o b a b l y j u s t a s w e l l s i n c e , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f 
w i d e s p r e a d d i s s e m i n a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t how i t does 
work , v e r y few of i t s e m p l o y e e s o r t h e p u b l i c wou ld a p p r e c i a t e 
45 i t s o v e r a l l a c t i v i t i e s . 
R e s p o n s i v e n e s s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t t o t h e d e s i r e s o f t h e p u b l i c 
i s a c h i e v e d , a s i n any g o v e r n m e n t , by a m i x t u r e of b o t t o m up 
and t o p down p r o c e s s e s . Few fo inna l ly r e c o g n i z e d p r o c e d u r e s 
f o r a c h i e v i n g r e s p o n s i v e n e s s a r e u s e d , b u t t h e r e a r e many 
i n f o r m a l o n e s . T h i s may be p re sumed t o be a d e q u a t e i n t e r m s 
of t h e g o v e r n m e n t s g o a l s . 
A number o f comments may be made on p r o b l e m s of e q u a t a b i l i t y 
i n h e r e n t i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t s t r u c t u r e . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e many 
d e p a r t m e n t s a r e d o m i n a t e d by one o r two p r o f e s s i o n s and n o t 
a l l r a n g e s o f o p i n i o n i n t h e community h a v e an e f f e c t i v e v o i c e 
46 i n t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f i t s d e c i s i o n s . The re a r e f o r example 
few s o c i o l o g i s t s , e c o n o m i s t s , l a w y e r s , t r a d e u n i o n i s t s , 
a b o r i g i n e s , m i g r a n t s and women i n t h e s e n i o r p o s i t i o n s i n t h e 
g o v e r n m e n t . S e c o n d l y , f u n c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s e x p r e s s e d by 
m i n i s t e r i a l d e p a r t m e n t s d o m i n a t e o v e r r e g i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . 
Whi le t h i s i s t o be e x p e c t e d i n any c o n v e n t i o n a l l y o r g a n i z e d 
g o v e r n m e n t t h e r e i s , a t t h e t i m e of w r i t i n g , no f o r m a l 
mechanism f o r s p a t i a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n a t a l l a p a r t from l a n d 
use c o n t r o l by l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s (and i n t r a - d e p a r t m e n t a l c o n t r o l s ) 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e image t h e Q u e e n s l a n d p u b l i c 
h a s of i t s S t a t e P u b l i c S e r v i c e a s t h i s h a s n e v e r b e e n 
s u r v e y e d . I t i s p r o b a b l y p o o r l y r e g a r d e d t h o u g h t h e change t o 
45, There i s , for example, no information avai lable to employees as 
comprehensive as tha t given to new employees in New South Wales. See 
NEW SOUTH WALES, PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD (1968), 
46, SCHAFFER and KNIGHT (1963) . 
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r e c r u i t i n g o n l y p e r s o n s w i t h e d u c a t i o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n a t t h e 
m a t r i c u l a t i o n l e v e l c o u l d r e s u l t i n an - improvemen t o v e r a 
• ^ ^ 4-- 47 p e r i o d o f t i m e . 
As s t a t e d above t h e a d e q u a c y w i t h w h i c h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a i d s 
t h e g o v e r n m e n t e x e c u t i v e i n t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of i t s g o a l s c an 
o n l y be a s s e s s e d by t h e g o v e r n m e n t i t s e l f . However , b e c a u s e 
i t s s t r u c t u r e and me thod o f o p e r a t i o n h a v e n o t b e e n r e v i e w e d 
f o r a niomber o f y e a r s , a c o m p r e h e n s i v e o v e r h a u l wou ld 
c e r t a i n l y be b e n e f i c i a l . Even a s i m p l e i n q u i r y i n t o t h e b a s i s 
of t a s k s s p e c i a l i z a t i o n wou ld u n d o u b t e d l y t u r n up many 
48 p r o b l e m s . Not a l l w o u l d b e c a p a b l e o f r e s o l u t i o n b e c a u s e 
t h e way i n w h i c h t a s k s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i s a r r a n g e d i n a g o v e r n -
ment i s n o t u n i q u e and i n v o l v e s many v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s . 
However, i n t h e n e x t c h a p t e r , i t w i l l be a r g u e d t h a t t h e 
e x i s t i n g a g e n c i e s o f t h e Q u e e n s l a n d Government c o u l d be u s e d 
a s t h e b a s i s f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s p l a n n i n g . T h i s i s o n l y 
l o g i c a l i f i t i s a s sumed t h a t t h e s e a g e n c i e s c o n t i n u e t o 
r e f l e c t t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s g o a l s and t h i s w i l l be u n c e r t a i n 
u n l e s s p e r i o d i c r e v i e w s of t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s s t r u c t u r e a r e 
u n d e r t a k e n . 
47, See SHEA (1971) 
4:8, For example, (a) there are areas where the production of r e l a t ed 
outputs i s highly fragmented e .g . in the f i e ld of water resources 
where many agencies are involved; (b) the supply of p a r t i c u l a r 
types of outputs i s sometimes not closely linked with the control 
of ex te rna l systems r e l a t ed to tha t service e . g . land development 
by the Land Administration Commission and the Queensland Housing 
Commission witJi land use control tinder local au thor i t i e s generally 
supervised by the Local Government Department; (c) there are 
areas where important processes involved in the supply of 
p a r t i c u l a r government outputs are located outside the agency suppos-
edly d i r ec t l y responsible for them (e .g . school buildings are 
planned by the Buildings and Si tes Section of the Works Department 
not by the Education Department) ; (d) some agencies e x i s t with a 
f i e ld of operation which could be too small to warrant t he i r 
exis tence (e .g . some loca l au thor i t i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y in western areas 
of the Sta te serve very small popula t ions) ; (e) there are 
fvmctional areas which may be iden t i f i ed where no c lear cut bas i s 
for a unif ied s t ra tegy i s poss ible because of d ivis ions of 
r e spons ib i l i t y a t the m i n i s t e r i a l l eve l , e . g . the energy and 
transportatJ.on s e c t o r s . 
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8. A NON CENTRALIZED PLANNING CONCEPT FOR THE QUEENSLAND 
GOVERNMENT 
8.1 General 
In this chapter a non centralized planning system which could 
be used by the Queensland Government will be advanced. It 
will be argued that there are two concepts whose implementation 
would improve the quality of planning while overcoming to a 
certain extent the problems faced by a non centralized govern-
ment which were identified in Chapter 6. The first involves 
the implementation of corporate planning based directly on 
the existing agencies of the government while the second 
would require the creation of a strategic framework for 
these corporate plans to minimize the problems which might 
otherwise be created. The application and administration 
of these concepts will be discussed in Chapter 9 in relation 
to capital works programming. 
A non centralized planning system is discussed rather than 
1 
a centralized one for the following reasons: 
(a) there is no clear evidence that centralized planning 
is superior to decentralized planning and, to date, 
no first world government has been conspicuously 
successful in establishing a central planning system; 
Cb) as shown in Appendix I non centralized planning would 
appear to be more acceptable in Queensland; 
Cc) the existing government structure is non centralized 
and the adjustments required for central corporate 
planning would be difficult to achieve. Furthermore 
centralized planning would involve a major change to 
the traditional relationships between ministers and 
their departments; 
(d) as shown in Appendix F large centralized organizations 
may have a serious destabilizing effect on their social 
1, A non centralized system is assumed here to be one in which co-
ordination is sought by non hierarchical P-^-^^f ^ f ^ f^,J^ ,^ ^ 
central control, m such a system there would be no central 
planning agency or any determined attempt to enforce central 
corporate planning. 
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environments and the development of effective methods 
of operating non centralized organizations is important; 
(e) centralization is not appropriate for either level of 
government in a federation because i t would inhibit 
the necessary direct dealings between related agencies. 
8.2 Corporate Planning 
For the sake of efficiency corporate planning is desirable 
at some level in an organization. If i t is not centralized 
in a government the next level at which i t could be under-
2 taken is that of the government's agencies. 
The first proposal for improving planning processes in the 
Queensland Government is that corporate planning be sought 
in the existing agencies of the government. This would 
lead to the development of strong hierarchical processes 
within agencies which, as explained below, has a number of 
disadvantages but would enable efficiency to be pursued 
without risking the Instabilities which may be a consequence 
of centralizing the overall government structure. 
The adoption of existing agencies as the basis for corporate 
planning does not necessarily imply that these agencies are 
perfect and should be retained indefinitely. Rather v;hat-
ever agencies the government actually has at a point in time 
3 
should be used for corporate planning. 
The use of agency corporate planning would tend to worsen the 
problems for any non centralized government which were 
identified in Chapter 6. They were to express government 
goals in a useful manner, to deal with externalities, and to 
2. Planning i s the process whereby an organizat ion determines i t s future 
a c t i v i t y . When t h i s process i s control led pr imari ly a t one point in 
an organizat ion then "corporate" planning i s the consequence. I t i s 
not appropriate to discuss in d e t a i l the techniques of corporate 
planning which are avai lable as these are covered extensively in 
the management l i t e r a t u r e . The actual in t roduct ion of agency 
corporate planning would, however, not be a t r i v i a l exe rc i se . See 
for example BARKDOLL (1976). 
3. Thus the planning system would be independent of any p a r t i c u l a r bas i s 
for spec ia l i za t ion which the government used. 
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handle change. In any government, organization structure 
has a significant effect on performance and agency based 
corporate planning would make the definition and review of 
this even more important. The development of a stronger 
hierarchical structures within agencies will tend to increase 
their resistance to change, and possibly make the establish-
ment of satisfactory working relationships between agencies 
more difficult so that, at the very least, conventional 
techniques of intercorporate co-ordination would need to be 
extensively used. 
8.3 Creating a Strategic Framework for Corporate Planning 
Because of these problems, the creation of a general co-
ordinating framework for the activities of individual agencies 
would be needed. This could be based on a series of 
conventional and unconvential non hierarchical co-ordination 
techniques, some of which could involve a Co-ordinator-General. 
Emphasis on non hierarchical processes of co-ordination above 
the agency level, with corporate planning within agencies, 
would require that the executive group and all central govern-
ment agencies (including a Co-ordinator-General) promote a co-
operative rather than a coercive philosophy in dealing with 
agencies.'* This is essential if the intercorporate co-
ordination processes are to avoid disrupting efficient 
agency planning. There must however be some distortion of 
an agency's planning if any adjustments to the requirements 
of other agencies are made. This should be minimized if 
possible and one way in which this can be achieved is by the 
recognition of a number of constraints in structuring an 
4. Using co-operation as a basis for co-ordination requires simply that 
most conflicts (or potential conflicts) be resolved by discussion 
and mutual adjustment with only a few requiring central authoritative 
prescription. The essential difference between a co-operative and 
coercive approach i s whether or not the co-ordinated are made to 
change their policies to conform to the views of the co-ordinator. 
In a co-operative system the views of the co-ordinator will not 
necessarily prevai l . 
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an agency and in its approach to corporate planning. The 
arrangement which an agency might adopt, in isolation, would 
be unsatisfactory if it prohibited effective integration of 
its activities with other agencies. Suggested restrictions 
on agency corporate planning are discussed in Appendix M. 
The key concept which will be discussed in the following 
involves creating a co-ordinative framework through a series 
of formal strategies which would be used as an expression of 
government goals, co-ordinated by a Co-ordinator-General 
and administered through the State's programme of capital 
works. 
Reliance on any single process of co-ordination would not 
be sensible because of the severe consequences of its 
failure. Thus many other processes of co-ordination should 
also be sought. In Chapter 5 the conventional co-ordinative 
mechanisms which governments use were discussed, many of 
which would naturally be appropriate. 
8.4 The Involvement of a Co-ordinator-General 
8.4.1 General 
Before considering how a Co-ordinator-General could contribute 
to the creation of a general co-ordinative framework in 
government through the administration of a set of strategies, 
a theory will be proposed to justify the type of roles which 
a Co-ordinator-General might fulfil in government in relation 
to the more conventional mechanisms of co-ordination. 
8.4.2 Models of a Co-ordinator-General 
The concept of a Co-ordinator-General in an organization 
which is proposed here is that there exist, at the adminis-
trative level, a senior person able to assist the executive 
group with co-ordination by acting as a focus for the 
corporate identity of the organization as a whole. There 
are at least two valid models of such a role. 
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Hie ra rch ica l Model 
In the f i r s t p lace a Co-ordinator-General might be seen as a 
General Manager. In such a s i t u a t i o n the formal h i e r a r c h i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e would be such t h a t a l l p a r t s of the o rgan iza t ion 
would be d i r e c t l y under h i s c o n t r o l . This would requ i re 
t ha t the execut ive group acted as a Board of Di rec tors by 
defining general p o l i c i e s but having no day to day involve-
ment in the a c t i v i t i e s of s p e c i f i c agencies . This might be 
an e f f ec t ive means of corporate planning a t the general 
government l eve l though the re would be numerous problems 
assoc ia ted with i t ( e .g . the notion of m i n i s t e r i a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y would have to be modif ied) . 
Such a model i s widely used in p r i v a t e corporat ions but does 
not appear to be used in government. There i s a good 
reason for t h i s qu i t e apar t from the p o l i t i c a l i s sue of 
concentrat ion of power. Norraally a la rge p r i v a t e 
corporat ion w i l l deal with a ntimber of products which can be 
counted in tens Ce.g. twenty or t h i r t y ) , while governments 
are involved in the production of products which must be 
counted by the hundreds. The complexity involved i s such 
t h a t d i r e c t i n g a l l information flows through a s ing le manager 
i s unworkable, 
Non Hie ra rch ica l Model 
The second model of a Co-ordinator-General i s one in which 
he had no formal h i e r a r c h i c a l au tho r i t y b u t , in o ther ways, 
held s u f f i c i e n t s t a t u s to a id in resolv ing d i spu tes wi th in 
5, I t is interesting to speculate on the modifications which would be 
made to government organization generally if i t v/ere run by a general 
manager rather than by a group of ministers. Drawing an analogy 
with a private corporation enables functional specialization to be 
equated with organization structured around separate produce lines 
and this is not the predominant method used in such organizations, 
A more usual approach is to specialize in such tasks as production, 
sales, accounting and advertising across a range of products. Thus 
i t may be hypothesised that a government controlled by a general 
manager would use a greater degree of process specialization than 
is used when ministers are equated with specific functions. 
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the organization. This model is appropriate in government 
or in a private corporation whose executive group utilizes 
a cabinet system.^ This is possible for private corporations 
with an abnormally high number of product lines or for 
multinational corporations where, for nationalistic reasons, 
it is necessary to give nationals more or less autonomous 
control of activities within their own country. 
There are two modes of operation of a non hierarchical Co-
ordinator-General. Firstly he could operate primarily 
through formally established non hierarchical co-ordinative 
mechanisms which were oriented towards general classes of 
problems. Formal structures could be established to deal 
with the areas where it was predicted that co-ordination 
problems would occur because of the structure of the 
organization (e.g. towards spatial co-ordination). The 
second approach would involve only the establishment of ad 
hoc structures oriented towards specific problems. Under 
this approach his emphasis would be on solving established 
problems and he would be less likely to take a leading role 
in the government. 
In the balance of this chapter only the non hierarchical 
model of a Co-ordinator-General will be considered because 
it is the one which is applicable to governments with a 
Cabinet and Ministerial system. In this model, a Co-
ordinator-General, with a small staff, would be attached to 
the Chief Executive of the government and have sufficient 
status to resolve difficulties at any level within the 
government organization. 
Public Works Co-ordination Model 
Another model of a Co-ordinator-General applicable in 
Queensland which deserves to be mentioned in passing would 
be of a "Co-ordinator-General of Public Works", This 
6. Thus a non hierarchical Co-ordinator-General would not have a valid 
role in a Presidential government where the president had day to 
day control of the executive branch. 
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name and style were adopted by the Co-ordinator-General until 
early in the 1970's."^ Taken literally it would imply that 
his role was limited to the integration of a capital works 
programme which would not justify the description offered 
above of a Co-ordinator-General as the focus of government 
activity at the administrative level. It would be an 
appropriate concept if the head of a Department of Public 
Works had responsibility for recommendation on Public Works 
priorities of other agencies. It would be a simple staff 
role which would not legitimately be under the jurisdiction 
o 
of the Chief Executive of a Government. 
8.4.3 Basic Informal Activities 
The primary interest of a non hierarchical Co-ordinator-
General would be in those areas where non hierarchical co-
ordination is conventionally required in government. This 
involves interagency relationship along the dimensions of 
function, process and space. In addition, a Co-ordinator-
General could also be involved in those areas discussed in 
Chapter 6 where, in a non centralized government, no amount 
of co-ordination will provide a complete solution. 
Structural Co-ordination 
In terms of conventional co-ordination, a Co-ordinator-
General 's direct involvement in specific issues should be 
limited and his main concern should be with reviewing the 
processes of co-ordination in the government to identify 
areas where problems are occurring and initiating solutions 
to them. However, this is not possible in isolation and a 
substantial involvement in issues is required to provide the 
information on existing problems. However, in this, a Co-
ordinator-General should always adopt a wider perspective. 
7. The Co-ordinator-General, in Queensland, has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been an 
Engineer. This i s appropriate for a "Co-ordinator-General of Public 
Works" but for the more general models suggested previously an 
Engineer would have no spec ia l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . 
8. Though t h i s name was adopted by the Co-ordinator-General for many 
years , there i s no doubt tha t h i s a c t i v i t i e s were more extensive 
than implied by the t i t l e , probably because he was under the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Premier. 
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Non Structural Co-ordination 
There are three direct ways in which a Co-ordinator-General 
could be involved in specific issues without requiring the 
development of formal non hierarchical co-ordination 
mechanisms. 
Firstly he could act as a professional disinterested chairman 
of interagency committees. Interagency activity may be 
plagued by questions of status because one agency might be 
unwilling to work on a committee being run by someone with 
whom it is competing, especially if the agencies involved 
fall into different ministries or one is a local body while 
the other is a ministerial department. By being 
conventially recognized as fulfilling the role of chairman, 
a Co-ordinator-General can provide a useful solution to this 
problem. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 5.4, the benefits 
of committee work depend largely on the quality of the 
secretariat. A Co-ordinator-General would be able to pro-
vide a technically competent secretariat which, because of 
their experience with this work, should perform it well. 
The notion of a Co-ordinator-General's involvement in 
committees could be extended to that of Co-ordination 
Councils.^ Such councils would be distinguished from 
conventional committees by the degree of formality given to 
their existence and by their emphasis on processes of 
decision making and with general policies rather than with 
specific issues. Such councils would be appropriate in 
areas where interagency problems were continuously occurring 
which could not be resolved by reorganization. This would, 
in general, be in either a spatial or a functional context. 
A Co-ordinator-General's involvement in such councils would 
generally be by way of providing a chairman and secretarial 
9. This concept of a Co-ordination Council is similar to but not 
exactly the same as the "Regional" Co-ordination Councils which 
have been used previously in Queensland. 
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and t echn ica l support.""^^ The Chairman could be a "Co-
ord ina to r" of whatever the counci l was involved wi th . Such 
counci ls would be seen as having a long term ex i s t ence but 
not as permanent because, in any funct iona l a r ea , i n t e r -
corporate problems would be temporary r a t h e r than permanent. 
For example in 1980 an Energy Co-ordinat ion Council might be 
appropr ia te but in 1970 and poss ib ly in 1990 t h i s might not 
be the case . S p a t i a l problems are always l i k e l y to e x i s t 
and, i f such an approach were to be used , the need for S p a t i a l 
or Regional Co-ordinat ion Councils would be l i k e l y to be 
more permanent because, as noted in Chapter 5 .7 , s p a t i a l 
co-ordinat ion problems can not be e l iminated by s t r u c t u r a l 
changes so long as governments are organized b a s i c a l l y on 
funct ional and process s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . However a Co-
ordinator-General might choose a f a i r l y small involvement 
in s p a t i a l co-ord ina t ion because i t i s an area which 
involves a l a rge number of small p ro jec t s and the data 
processing requirements for s p a t i a l co-ord ina t ion may be 
incons i s t en t with the need for a co-ord ina t ive agency to 
remain small in s i z e . . ^  
The second way in which a Co-ordinator-General could be 
involved without a formal s t r u c t u r e would be by ac t ing as 
a poin t of r e f e r r a l for problems which a r e , because of the 
government's o rganiza t ion s t r u c t u r e , too hard for any 
spec i f i c agency to r e s o l v e . Such problems could o r i g i n a t e 
from the execut ive group, i f a problem was so content ious 
t h a t no reasonable compromise so lu t ion was apparent , or from 
ind iv idua l agenc ies , where interagency c o n f l i c t s could not 
be resolved.''""'" Agencies could not pass on such problems i f 
10. Under some circumstances ne i ther a Co-ordinator-General nor h i s s taf f 
would need to be ac t ive ly involved. A ptirely nominal ro le for a 
Co-ordinator-General as chairman, while someone e l se does a l l the 
work, i s a useful concept. The myth of what the Co-ordinator-
General would or would not accept could be a useful point of 
reference in deal ings between agencies (cf. the nominal executive 
ro le of the Crown), 
11 . Al te rna t ive ly i t could a r i s e from the need of a p r iva te organizat ion 
to negot ia te with the government as a whole on a multitude of 
matters connected, for example, with a proposed development. 
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there were any possibility of an area of their jurisdiction 
being taken by the Co-ordinator-General as a result. This 
requires that he be seen to be unbiassed and uninterested 
in empire building. 
The approach which a Co-ordinator-General could use to deal 
with such problems would be firstly to endeavour to negotiate 
a reasonably rational compromise on the immediate issue 
and then, if there is any possibility of its re-occurrence, 
to endeavour to create more satisfactory routine procedures 
within the other agencies concerned. Where new issues 
arise which no government agency is equipped to handle, a 
Co-ordinator-General, providing he had the resources, could 
take on responsibility for them on a temporary basis. 
This may then establish the legitimacy of a task for which 
another agency should have been responsible but, because of 
lack of precedent, was unwilling to accept. Sufficient 
interdepartmental jealousy may be created for them to take 
over the task. In this way a Co-ordinator-General may 
catalyze needed change in the government. 
The third role which a Co-ordinator-General may adopt is as 
a reticulist. This would involve the development of desir-
able channels of communications in an interagency framework 
and the selective exchange of information. Being in a 
position to discuss the role of any particular agency 
without regard to the formal hierarchy, a Co-ordinator-
General should be able to draw their attention to the 
activities of others whose work may be related. A Reticulist 
role may best be performed by persons having an established 
position in an organization."'•^  This position may either be 
a formal one or one based on personal political status but 
is necessary to prevent his efforts causing him to be crushed 
when the authority of the formal organization to negate his 
involvement has to be used. The high status necessary for 
a Co-ordinator-General would ensure that his role was not 
seriously or permanently damaged by such occasional setbacks. 
The Reticulist role in government would be, by no means, 
confined to a Co-ordinator-General or his staff. They would, 
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however, be able to make a unique contribution because of 
their wide ranging involvement in many different types of 
projects covering almost all areas of government activity. 
The scope for such persons to detect areas where 
communication channels need to be improved is much greater 
than for individuals whose activities are restricted to a 
single functional area. 
In Queensland,which is involved in a Federal system, the 
adoption of these roles would also tend to involve public 
agencies not within the Queensland Government. Protocol 
may require that the co-ordinative role in a particular 
issue be adopted by some agency apart from a Co-ordinator-
General. Generally, if the problem is primarily one of 
State jurisdiction, then the Co-ordinator-General should 
adopt these roles even though external agencies were 
involved. However, if this was not the case, then the Co-
ordinator-General (if involved for some reason) could 
simply represent general Queensland Government interests. 
The roles described above are the most basic ways in which 
a Co-ordinator-General could directly participate in a 
government. They are rather limited and it must be 
emphasized that not all problems of co-ordination in 
government may be attacked by a Co-ordinator-General. 
Many other processes are still required. For example, 
one area of co-ordination which could not be covered would 
be between departments and local bodies operating in the 
same functional area (e.g. Main Roads Department and local 
authorities in building roads. Harbours and Marine Depart-
ment and Harbour Boards, Hospital Boards and the Health 
Department). However, in such areas there are hierarchical 
processes which would be expected to achieve a high degree 
of co-ordination in any case. Before considering further 
ways in which a co-ordinative agency could be involved in 
co-ordination, a number of restrictions which must be 
accepted for any agency endeavouring to fulfil such a role 
will be outlined. 
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8.4.4 Restrietions on a Non hierarchical Co-ordinative 
Agency 
A non hierarchical Co-ordinator-General could not operate 
effectively without the recognition of a number of guidelines, 
In the author's opinion the following are important: 
Status 
He must participate in the authority of the chief executive 
(i.e. in Queensland he must come under the Premier). He 
must not however compete for status with Cabinet, individual 
Ministers or other departments, or conflict could result 
leading to the collapse of the co-ordination system, or the 
isolation of the Co-ordinator-General from the rest of the 
government. In particular, while the Co-ordinator-General 
can often act as an "agent of change" in the government, he 
must be content to remain firmly under the control of the 
chief executive. In Chapter 5.6 the inevitable failure of 
a separate ministry of co-ordination was explored and if a 
Co-ordinator-General sought a base, independent of the 
13 
chief executive, the same fate would befall him. 
Powers 
The au tho r i ty of a co -ord ina t ive agency should be conserved 
and not used on i r r e l e v a n t i s s u e s . I t must have power 
but t h i s must not be abused or i t s bas i s for future ac t ion 
i s l o s t . I t should not i n s i s t on any p a r t i c u l a r so lu t ion 
to a problem because i t i s important pr imar i ly t h a t the 
approaches used are c o n s i s t e n t . Under some circumstances 
such r e s t r a i n t could be very d i f f i c u l t , s ince i t i s not 
easy to " lose a b a t t l e " to "win the war". 
I t i s very d e s i r a b l e t h a t a Co-ordinator-General have some 
cont ro l of resources as an incen t ive to o ther agencies to 
co-operate ( e . g . the production of a c a p i t a l works programme) 
13.. In Queensland the Co-ordinator-General is appointed with a seven year 
term which should make him independent of political pressures, in 
the short term. However this independence is irrelevant because, 
under the non hierarchical model, he lacks the ability to operate 
successfully without the continued support of the executive group. 
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but he should not control the budget as the defensive mechanisms 
needed to protect the size of the budget act to inhibit positive 
problem solving. There is a very considerable danger involved 
in any control of funding that financial allocation becomes an 
end in itself rather than a means to an end. Even responsibility 
for recommending allocation of recurrent and capital funds, without 
a Treasurer's greater responsibilities for taxation and day to 
day administration of a budget, would put a Co-ordinator-General 
into a similar position to the United States Bureau of Budget and 
this would also inhibit his positive co-ordinative role. 
It might be suggested that, where a Co-ordinator-General has 
responsibility for development of a programme of works rather 
than in relation to recurrent funding, this would tend to favour 
the "development theme" in government rather than, for example, 
a "welfare" theme. While this must be partly true, it is not 
unreasonable because it is primarily to the capital side of a 
budget that spatial co-ordination issues can be linked, and this 
is one of the key problems for any government. Furthermore, in 
Queensland the development theme has been, and still appears to 
be, fairly relevant. However, at the national level in 
Australia, for example, where most spatial responsibilities are 
handled by State Governments, a Co-ordinator-General would 
probably be better involved in some way in recurrent rather than 
capital resource allocation because he would be unable to take a 
leading role in spatial co-ordination. 
Responsibilities 
A co-ordinative agency should have no permanent responsibilities 
of its own and the only time an attempt to control any specific 
matter should be made would be when several agencies were 
proceeding in conflicting directions or when a new problem arose. 
This is difficult to achieve because there is a tendency for major 
and minor tasks to accumulate because: 
(a) in initiating an idea, the co-ordinating group may have 
to carry it out themselves since other organizations 
may not want it; 
14. See HUGHES (1970) , 
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(b) there is a need for the persons involved in the co-
ordinating agency to have something concrete to do. 
Such tasks as do accumulate should be ruthlessly hived off 
to other organisations because, if they are not, the group 
will quickly lose its disinterested position and will lack 
the resources to continue seeking out new problem areas. 
This is one of the most serious problems which a co-
ordinative agency will face in practice. 
Personnel 
The organization must be a small group which concentrates 
on quality rather than quantity in recruiting its members. 
The required characteristics would be common sense and the 
ability to handle people as well as a reasonable degree of 
technical competence. 
The personalities of its members should be such that they 
can take satisfaction from achievement rather than from 
status. The approach of the organization should be to lead 
from behind - to take a leading role without its being 
obvious and allow status to accrue to others. Furthermore, 
there must be no tendency for an elitist viewpoint to 
develop. This may require regular exchanges of personnel 
with other organizations. As there will be a career problem 
for the persons involved who may lose touch with professional 
specialities in following generalised matters, such exchanges 
might be welcomed. 
There should be an ethical viewpoint in its members which 
limits their personal ambition and constrains them not to 
take advantage of their position to build an empire. If 
the system works well the latter is easy because there should 
be a "soft" co-operative relationship with other agencies -
but the moment an empire develops and other agencies see a 
threat to their own roles, the system will break down 
because defensive barriers will be erected. This reinforces 
the previous argument about hiving off routine tasks and 
perhaps explains the early difficulties of Co-ordinator-
Generals in Queensland to live up to their co-ordinative 
expectations. 
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Outlook 
The organization must at all times be impartial to particular 
government policies and treat completely fairly between 
different agencies of the government. 
It cannot rely on its own competence alone. If other 
agencies in the government are not competent to handle a 
problem then the problem is not properly solved. Hence 
self development by other government organizations must 
always be encouraged rather than showing that what they want 
to do is wrong and overriding them. It must not threaten 
specific agencies in their areas of competence or it may 
become the victim of bureaucratic assignation. However, the 
organization must not be seriously less competent than others • 
particularly with respect to its reticulist roles. 
It should represent the entire state government's viewpoint 
in dealings with outsiders or with any agency of the govern-
ment. This requires acquiring general knowledge of all 
functional areas and -of the roles of various agencies as a 
basis for keeping others informed. In particular it is 
desirable that a Co-ordinator-General understand the basis of 
task specialization which is implicit in the government 
organization and educate others in this to minimize the extent 
of duplication. This can assist particular agencies to keep 
in touch with their required role. In a large government, 
an agency may lose its sense of purpose and, when this occurs, 
it may only require an idea of a sensible new role to 
overcome the problem. 
8.5 Strategies 
8.5.1 General 
The purpose of this section is to develop a concept of an 
unconventional process for non hierarchical co-ordination 
involving the use of formal strategies administered, in part, 
by a Co-ordinator-General. The primary purpose of a 
strategy would be to create a practical linkage between the 
goals of a government and the plans of its agencies. 
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A strategy will be defined as a general concept of future 
activity in a particular field (e.g. in the field of a 
government function, process or geographic area). It 
invites comparison with a plan which is a specific concept of 
future activity by an organization. The boundary of a plan 
is quite specific but the boundary of a strategy may only be 
vague. In general a strategy would consist of the corporate 
plan of one (or more) agency plus its concept of activity by 
others which may be partially under its control. 
Two types of strategies would be relevant, namely spatial 
strategies and functional strategies.^^ A function 
strategy would be a general concept of future activity in 
some functional area (e.g. health, education, etc.) over many 
regions (possibly the whole State) while a spatial strategy 
would cover only one region but probably deal with many 
functions. The reason for selecting a functional and 
spatial set of strategies is that this would enable them to 
be linked to a programme based budget and also provide a 
flexible inexpensive solution to the spatial co-ordination 
problem in government. A programme budget would be oriented 
towards the final outputs of government and by definition 
this is equivalent to a functional approach. 
Strategies have been prepared in the past for many different 
purposes and in different forms and many have been called 
plans, strategies or simply reports on particular problems. 
The concept of a strategy by itself is of no use. Rather 
it is important to define a suitable procedure within which 
they could be prepared and used. 
8.5.2 Production of Strategies 
There are several requirements for strategies if they are to 
serve a useful role in co-ordinating a non-centralized 
15. Process strategies will seldom be of interest to a government though 
they are possible. It is considered that they should only be used 
on an ad hoc basis because unlike functional strategies they may 
not be directly linked to a functional (or programme) budget. 
16. A region is, in general, any part of the State. 
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government. They must be prepared in such a way that they be 
related to agency plans and must be appropriately approved if 
they are to reflect government goals. Furthennore there must 
be mechanisms to detect inconsistencies between strategies 
before their approval, and between approved strategies 
and the actual plans of agencies. 
A fragmented overlapping set of spatial and functional 
strategies rather than a single strategy would be appropriate 
because of the problem of handling detail identified in 
Chapter 6. If a single strategy was to be produced, it 
would either have to ignore details and so be useless to the 
agencies it was supposed to assist or be so voluminous that it 
was impossible to produce or use it effectively. Fragmenting 
the strategy would also enable it to be produced in 
conjunction with agency corporate plans. A fully 
comprehensive set of strategies (functional or spatial) would 
not have to be prepared nor would they always be completely 
up to date or consistent. This would be an unnecessarily 
onerous restriction. Strategies could be prepared in such 
detail and in such manner as was most suitable for the actual 
activities of government agencies at any particular time. 
Spatial strategies of some sort would probably be required in 
every region but not every function either in the region or 
in the State would require a strategy. Thus there should 
always be expected to be gaps in the framework of strategies. 
State government departments generally have functional 
responsibilities and as part of the process of corporate 
planning could produce strategies for those functions. This 
should produce alignment between the functional strategy and 
the agencies' own plans."""^  In order to produce a functional 
strategy they would have to go beyond their own organization 
into the activities of local bodies whom they have 
17. A number of departments might have to co-operate in the production of a 
strategy on some occasions and in every case, outside comments on a 
strategy would need to be sought before it was approved. 
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responsibility to supervise and into the activities of the 
private sector. They could be approved by State Cabinet 
after being submitted by the relevant Minister. There 
would be no difficult political issues involved in their 
approval as State Cabinet is recognised as having jurisdiction 
over functional state departments. Autonomous functional or 
process specialist agencies would not in general be required 
to produce strategies as their activities would be covered 
by ministerial departments through whom they would usually 
deal. However for those autonomous functional agencies 
whose size and importance warranted a strategy the political 
issue involved in legitimizing them would be similar to that 
of local bodies as discussed below. 
Local Bodies could also produce spatial strategies as part 
of their process of corporate management (though the region 
involved may only be as large as a local authority area). 
In order to gain economies of scale the production of 
regional scale spatial strategies through some sort of 
Regional Co-ordination Council, rather than by individual 
local bodies, would be most logical. At such a scale their 
production would have to be supported by the State Government 
in the absence of established regional agencies. Spatial 
strategies prepared in such a way would only indirectly have 
any components of actual plans. They would in general 
be comprehensive and cover all functions within the region. 
However, this is not a necessary requirement and special 
purpose regional strategies could be envisaged in many 
instances (e.g. they might cover only public infrastrcuture 
or only social welfare facilities etc.). Spatial strategies 
could be fed up through the Co-ordinator-General and the 
Premier to Cabinet where approval for the strategy would be 
sought unless some appropriate authority at the regional 
level were created by the State Government to legitimize 
them. This question is discussed further in the next section. 
Spatial and functional strategies would necessarily have many 
points of overlap as they represent two points of view on the 
same topic. Conflict between strategies may result from 
different perceptions of a problem which are equally valid 
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and thus the resolution of inconsistencies would be of real 
significance. In the preparation of any specific strategy 
all existing strategies would need to be considered and in 
particular the consistency of regional and functional 
strategies could be evaluated by the Co-ordinator-General 
(and a report produced) prior to their approval. 
Inconsistencies between functional strategies should be 
detected in the process of Cabinet approval but if they were 
not, then the Co-ordinator-General could be required to 
initiate action to resolve the issue by compromise, 
negotiation and, if necessary, by proposing a central 
solution. 
8.5.3 The Spatial Co-ordination issue 
Strategies might provide a simple and flexible method of 
promoting spatial co-ordination in the Queensland Government. 
There are, however, a number of questions related to their 
use, namely: 
(a) the political issue involved in legitimizing a 
spatial strategy; 
(b) the issue of land use control; 
(c) The non involvement of the Queensland Co-ordinator-
General in formal spatial co-ordination at the time of 
writing. 
The concept of strategies developed in this thesis was in-
tended for an environment such as prevailed between 19 72 and 
1977 when the Queensland Government's approach to spatial 
co-ordination was based around Regional Co-ordination 
Councils. At the time of writing, however, there is no 
formal process of spatial co-ordination in operation above 
the level of town plans administered by local authorities 
which are of very little relevance in terms of interagency 
spatial co-ordination. 
The difficulties of establishing a Regional Co-ordination 
Council capable of resolving real co-ordination issues, while 
at the same time, providing politically legitimate 
representation of a region was discussed in Appendix K. 
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This l i m i t a t i o n could be overcome by the use of e i t h e r of 
two approaches: 
(a) a p o l i t i c a l l y acceptable Regional Co-ordination 
Council could be e s t ab l i shed to have a formal but 
l imi ted r o l e with most of the ac tua l work being done 
through sub-committees nominally under i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n ; 
(b) an informal Regional Co-ordinat ion Council could be 
used having no p re t en t ion of p o l i t i c a l l y acceptable 
s t a t u s . Such a group would probably be c r i t i c i z e d 
by l oca l p o l i t i c i a n s for i t s lack of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
but would p r o h i b i t the development of h i e r a r c h i c a l 
processes of co-ord ina t ion a t the regional l eve l which 
i n h i b i t the non h i e r a r c h i c a l processes which the 
Councils might otherwise provide . 
A compromise would be the es tabl ishment of two groups, the 
f i r s t being a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e Council which would be expected 
to ac t as a p o l i t i c a l pressure group but could a t l e a s t 
p a r t i a l l y l eg i t im ize s p a t i a l s t r a t e g i e s . The second group 
could be a lower l eve l group drawn from a l l government 
agencies having an i n t e r e s t in the region. 
The use of s t r a t e g i e s to promote s p a t i a l co-ordina t ion would 
only be c o n s i s t e n t with an informal approach based on reg iona l 
co-ordina t ion and not with a comprehensive foirmalized approach 
-, 18 
which might be devised on the bas i s of land use c o n t r o l . 
Spa t i a l s t r a t e g i e s , l i k e funct ional s t r a t e g i e s , should 
pr imar i ly be seen as a r e f l e c t i o n of the goals of the 
executive group of the government r a t he r than the goals of a 
regional p o l i t i c a l group. However, because many government 
a c t i v i t i e s are con t ro l l ed by loca l p o l i t i c i a n s i t i s reasonable 
for them to have a r o l e in l eg i t imiz ing a reg iona l s t r a t e g y . 
While a s p a t i a l s t r a t egy would be leg i t imized through 
18. Legitimizing a comprehensive encorceable land use based strategy 
for a region would be far more difficult because of the necessity 
to incorporate the views of functional departments (without any 
inconsistencies) not under the hierarchical jurisdiction of a 
regional political group. If inconsistencies can be tolerated m 
strategies (which are seen as a means of raising issues rather 
than resolving them), then this problem is reduced. 
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Cabinet approval, spatially specialized agencies should have a 
large involvement in its development. Situations of conflict 
would be inevitable but for them to be identified, hopefully 
before they became critical, is better than conflict which 
is concealed until it is too late. It would be part of the 
role of a Co-ordinator-General in reviewing strategies to 
endeavour to negotiate reasonable compromises in situations 
where this was necessary. 
A strategy would not be statutorily enforceable and where a 
specific agency of the government with statutory responsibility 
for a particular matter was determined to go its own way 
contrary to the strategy, the strategy could not be used to 
prevent it.19 if the government regarded such a situation 
as being of critical importance, then structural changes to 
its organization would be required, not the enforcement of 
the strategy. 
8.5.4 Format of a Strategy 
A strategy would take the form of a document supported by no 
greater authority than the approval of the executive group 
of the government. It could not be statutorily enforceable 
and at the same time provide a flexible linkage between the 
government's goals and the corporate plans of its agencies. 
A statutory strategy would probably cease to be an effective 
means of informal co-ordination and instead become the basis 
for a general plan around which co-ordination would have to 
be sought. Non statutory strategies would be flexible and 
could be approved and amended without complex procedures. 
The possible format of a strategy document is illustrated in 
Table 8.1. Since it should relate directly to the corporate 
plans of one or more agencies its format would be subject to 
the following constraints: 
19, Providing a strategy was devised by persons who have a major 
influence on decision making their commitment ot it may lead to its 
being brought into effect even without formal methods of enforcement. 
TOius it would be important that strategies be primarily identified 
with the responsible agencies, rather than with the Co-ordinator-
General. 
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TABLE 8.1 - HYPOTHETICAL CONTENT OF A STRATEGY 
1. GOALS - general statement of purpose imputed to the 
executive group 
2. OBJECTIVES - specific statement of purpose - if 
possible. 
3. GENERAL OVERALL CONCEPT OF FUTURE ACTIVITY - for 
entire community involved in particular function or 
region 
4. GENERAL CONCEPT OF FUTURE ACTIVITY BY GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES -
PROGRAMMING PERIOD (e.g. YEAR 1 to YEAR 5) -
some details 
INTERMEDIATE FUTURE (e.g. YEAR 6 to YEAR 20) -
general indications 
5. GENERAL CONCEPT OF CONTROLS TO BE APPLIED OUTSIDE 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES - for 20 year period - Specifying 
which agencies would apply controls 
6. POLICIES - routine responses to various situations 
expected to arise in the future - for all government 
agencies concerned 
7. EXPECTED EFFECTS - direct effects on primary systems, 
external effects on other systems 
8. LONG TERM PROBLEMS - problems foreseen in the long 
term if present policies are pursued 
9. CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT 
Note: Year 1 is the first financial year covered by the Strategy. 
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(a) it should identify the goals and objectives which were 
to be imputed to the government for the purposes of 
the strategy; 
(b) it should cover a time scale similar to that of the cor-
porate plans of the agency or agencies most directly con-
cerned. This requires different emphasis to be given to 
--' particular matters over various time periods (Appendix M) , 
In general the time horizon of a strategy would cover the 
intermediate future (10 to 20 years) though identify major 
problems in the long term future (say 100 years). More 
effort should be involved in the early years covered by 
the strategy (the programming period of 3 to 8 years) 
because of the certainty that major updating of the 
strategy would be required at the end of such a time; 
(c) a strategy should deal with specific information useful 
to the agencies involved. It should separate the two 
major roles of government (provision of services and 
external systems control) and define briefly what would 
be required of specific agencies under the strategy. 
Because it would be a working guide to agencies of the 
Government it could not cover the needs of the public 
for information about government activity because it 
2 0 
would not provide the necessary background explanations. 
It would tend to emphasize conclusions reached rather 
than the methods used to arrive at them. 
Some information which could be included in a strategy or a 
corporate plan would be confidential. This could arise 
where some disadvantage to an agency could result from 
premature release of its plans (e.g. advantages could 
accrue to persons learning of proposed land acquisitions 
or of proposals to commence or cease a politically 
sensitive programme). Many methods may be sought to 
minimize advantages to the unscrupulous, but no matter , , 
how sophisticated they are, there will be occasions 
when any widespread dissemination of an agency's plans 
20. other methods, not part of st:rategies, would be required for public 
information. 
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would be damaging. However, non disclosure within the 
government may be just as serious if two agencies have 
conflicting "secret" plans which are not detected by the 
government executive group. 
A suitable compromise would be to provide a confidential 
attachment to strategies and corporate plans for the benefit 
of the government executive and the Co-ordinator-General so 
that there was at least some chance of discrepancies being 
detected. Access to such information would be strictly 
controlled by those to whom it was made available. 
8.5. Strategy Review and Change 
The production and review of strategies could be a means of 
21 formally managing change in a government. 
The problem of change in government is two-fold. Firstly 
there is the difficulty of identifying directions in which 
important changes are required while the second is to 
implement these changes in the face of homeostatic 
organizational responses. One approach would be to use the 
framework of strategy review to detect required changes while 
ensuring that the persons with a major interest in it be 
directly involved. 
Strategies would ideally be presented in documentary form. 
They could then be updated incrementally annually without 
repeating the overall study necessary for their initial 
production, by Regional Co-ordination Councils and State 
Departments respectively. This annual updating of strategies 
would be related directly to the corporate planning and 
budget preparation of various agencies and would arise out 
of decisions and actions during the financial year. 
The annual review would take care of small, but not large, 
adjustments required to strategies. To deal with the latter 
the use of formal programme analysis and review studies would 
21. The method outlined below would not of course be the only method of 
achieving change. It would however be a formal means of 
detecting major requirements for change. 
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be useful. This would involve selecting a particular pro-
gramme (or functional area) and conducting a fundamental 
review of it as the basis for a review of the organizational 
arrangements and the production of a new strategy. Such 
studies would be part of the annual planning and budgeting 
cycle but not every programme would be examined every year. 
A major review every five or ten years would be required 
for most programmes. 
Programme Analysis and Review Studies would be most useful 
if they were primarily the responsibility of the agency or 
agencies most directly concerned with the programme. To 
ensure a degree of consistency between the approaches the 
central government agencies responsible for resource alloca-
tion (including the Co-ordinator-General) should also have 
a voice in the studies - probably by representation on a 
steering committee. Programme Analysis and Review Studies 
would be appropriate in relation to both Functional and 
Regional strategies and ways in which they could be generated 
will be suggested ia Chapter 9. The advantage of Programme 
Analysis and Review Studies is that they would enable 
periodic fundamental review of programmes to be achieved 
without the necessity to incur the cost or inconvenience of 
fundamental programme reviews on an annual basis. 
8.6 Supporting Roles for a Co-ordinator-General 
While, under the planning framework outlined above, individual 
agencies would be the basic units of government planning, there 
are a number of ways in which a Co-ordinator-General could 
further assist to co-ordinate their activities. 
Firstly, a Co-ordinator-General could use such resource 
allocation responsibilities as he had to achieve an integration 
between corporate planning, strategies and finance. The 
manner in which this could be done is discussed in Chapter 9. 
Secondly, a Co-ordinator-General, as the focus of corporate 
activity at the administrative level in the government could 
be required to produce a general State strategy covering 
many functional areas. Such a strategy would, of course, 
not contain any components of an actual plan. Such a 
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strategy would enable the government organization to express 
a central intelligence below the level of the executive 
group. 
The production of a central strategy in a non centralized 
government would be both a necessity and a nuisance. 
Fundamental review of the government structure and 
method of operation (such as would be required to implement 
the system discussed in this thesis) would require direction 
by a central intelligence. Thus, even the creation of a 
non centralized system (if based on a consistent principle) 
would require a central intelligence because a simple non 
centralized system could never evolve such a consistent 
principle. However the extensive use of central strategies 
would cut across agency corporate planning and across 
regional and functional strategies and such central 
strategies could only be sparingly used. 
Thirdly, a Co-ordinator-General could provide a partial 
solution to the prob'lem of externalities identified in 
Chapter 6. Under a non centralized planning system a 
great deal of the responsibility for analysis and review of 
specific government projects would fall to the agencies 
undertaking them. The problems with this are that 
(a) they may not be aware of the effects which they will 
have on systems other than the.principal one with 
which they are concerned; 
(b) they may undervalue those effects. 
A Co-ordinator-General may not feasibly be involved in the 
first of these problems because the volume of work would be 
too great and other procedures for information exchange 
would be required. However, he could contribute by the 
specification of a standard of values to be assigned to 
specific externalities. This would ensure their consistent 
treatment across the government as a whole. 
Finally, a Co-ordinator-General could provide support for decision 
making and evaluation processes in specific agencies. 
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The quality of decisions which an organization can make 
concerning its environment depends largely on its image 
2 2 (i.e. on the model which it has of its environment). 
This involves its ability to understand the way systems 
will respond to actions which it takes and also its 
ability to monitor changes which occur and so modify its 
plan. 
Data of many different types are collected by and for many 
different government agencies and are used either for the 
23 construction of models or for monitoring of change. 
As much of this data is interlinked and frequently duplicated, 
a process specialist agency is sometimes used to collect data 
and construct a data bank for use by a government. The 
Bureau of Statistics adopts a general data collection role 
though it does not specifically provide a data bank service 
for the Queensland Government. While such a role is not 
appropriate for a Co-ordinator-General because of the 
volume of work involved, there is a role in this field which 
could be. 
In many fields of government activity the construction of 
formal mathematical models of particular systems may provide , 
agencies with the best possible image they may have of the 
relevant part of their environment. This is a difficult 
task which tends to emphasize the relationships between the 
systems with which a Government is concerned. It leads 
to a requirement in some areas to build "big" models which 
cover many systems, are difficult and expensive to use, and 
for which, there is a high degree of overlap with the models 
derived in other areas. The contribution a Co-ordinator-
General could make would be the construction of a framework 
model into which the specific models of other agencies could 
22, See Appendix D. 
23. The construction of a model does not necessarily involve a complex 
mathematical procedure. It may be as simple as drawing a graph 
or mentally comparing two items. 
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be i n c o r p o r a t e d . Such a model would have t o be modular in 
s t r u c t u r e and p r o v i d e an envi ronment r e f l e c t i n g any a s p e c t 
which was n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l t w i th i n an a g e n c y ' s own 
24 d e t a i l e d model . 
8.8 A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
The concep t s which have been i n t r o d u c e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r 
could p r o v i d e t h e b a s i s fo r an e f f e c t i v e system of non 
c e n t r a l i z e d p l a n n i n g fo r t h e Queensland Government. The 
no t ion of c o r p o r a t e p l a n n i n g combined wi th s t r a t e g i e s i s 
q u i t e g e n e r a l and would no t depend on any s p e c i f i c s t r u c t u r e 
in t he government . However, i n o r d e r t o be u s e f u l they 
would need t o be i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t he r o u t i n e p r o c e s s e s of 
the government so t h a t s t r a t e g i e s might be produced, 
reviewed or amended i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h agency c o r p o r a t e 
p l a n n i n g . The p r o d u c t i o n of s t r a t e g i e s o u t s i d e such a 
procedure would be a was te of t i m e . The nex t c h a p t e r w i l l 
sugges t a method of i n v o l v i n g a c o - o r d i n a t e d programme of 
c a p i t a l works by which t h i s could be ach i eved . 
24, The concept of a framework model i s by no means adequately explored 
here. I t was i n i t i a l l y intended that this thesis deal extensively 
with such a concept but, for reasons of space and time, this was 
not attempted. The concept i s introduced only because i t 
represents a legitimate role for a Co-ordinator-General if such 
a framework model were feasible. 
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9 . CAPITAL WORKS PROGRAMMING AND EVALUATION 
9 . 1 G e n e r a l 
The c o - o r d i n a t i o n of c a p i t a l works t h r o u g h a C o - o r d i n a t o r -
G e n e r a l c o u l d be o f ma jo r i m p o r t a n c e i n non c e n t r a l i s e d 
p l a n n i n g i n t h a t i t c o u l d p r o v i d e a means of i n t e g r a t i n g 
s p a t i a l s t r a t e g i e s w i t h f u n c t i o n a l s t r a t e g i e s and w i t h agency 
p l a n n i n g , e x t e r n a l s y s t e m s c o n t r o l and b u d g e t i n g . C a p i t a l 
works a r e i n v o l v e d i n s t r a t e g i e s , i n agency p l a n n i n g , i n 
e x t e r n a l s y s t e m s c o n t r o l and i n b u d g e t i n g , y e t i t i s n o t 
i m m e d i a t e l y c l e a r how a f o r m a l t e c h n i q u e of c a p i t a l works 
programming c o u l d be d e v e l o p e d t o p r o v i d e f o r i n t e g r a t i o n 
be tween t h e m . F o r m a l c a p i t a l works programmes have b e e n 
p r o d u c e d by t h e C o - o r d i n a t o r - G e n e r a l i n Q u e e n s l a n d f o r many 
y e a r s b u t t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s have n o t been d e v e l o p e d . 
A n o t h e r o b v i o u s i s s u e i n c a p i t a l works programming i s t h e 
a l l o c a t i o n of f i n a n c e . A r e a s o n a b l e d e g r e e of r a t i o n a l i t y 
i n t h i s p r o c e s s i s n e c e s s a r y b u t t h i s s h o u l d n o t be t h e 
p r i m a r y i n t e r e s t o f a C o - o r d i n a t o r - G e n e r a l . I f r a t i o n a l 
r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n were t h e main i s s u e t h e n i t s h o u l d be u n d e r 
t h e c o n t r o l of t h e o r d i n a r y f i n a n c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s ( i . e . 
T r e a s u r y i n Q u e e n s l a n d ) a s i t i s o n l y t o p r o v i d e a C o - o r d i n a t o r -
G e n e r a l w i t h a b a s i s f o r o p e r a t i o n and t o e n a b l e p l a n n i n g , 
e x t e r n a l s y s t e m s c o n t r o l and b u d g e t i n g t o be l i n k e d t h a t i t 
s h o u l d b e i n h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
9 .2 R e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a C a p i t a l Works Programming Sys tem 
A C a p i t a l Works Programme m u s t be p a r t of t h e a n n u a l p r o c e s s 
whereby funds a r e a l l o c a t e d t o a c t i v i t i e s t o be u n d e r t a k e n i n 
1. I f the co-ordination of cap i t a l works i s a goal worth seeking, i t might 
be argued t h a t t h i s could bes t be achieved by a s ingle agency 
responsible for a l l capi ta l works. Thus a process s p e c i a l i s t (a Works 
Department) would take over t h i s role on behalf of the functional and 
s p a t i a l s p e c i a l i s t s . As noted in Chapter 3 there i s an inevi table 
tendency to consider put t ing any given problem under the control of 
one agency. There i s however, no rea l reason to favour cap i ta l works 
spec ia l i za t ion in the Queensland Government over other types of 
spec ia l i za t ion and the system discussed in th is Chapter would not 
operate e f fec t ive ly i f a Works Department had extremely wide j u r i s d i c t -
ion because i t would not be possible to link planning by functional 
agencies d i r ec t ly with cap i t a l works. Furthermore, as noted by POPE 
(1972) excessive cen t ra l i za t ion i s a common problem in s e t t i ng up public 
works organiza t ions . 
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the next financial year. However capital works themselves 
involve an engineering process whereby they are investigated, 
designed and constructed and this does not necessarily fi t well 
2 into the annual financial cycle. Thus one major requirement 
for a Capital Works Programming system must be that i t 
facilitate the engineering processes. 
Forward Programming 
Realistic forward scheduling of major projects should be 
possible about five years in advance. While many minor 
projects can acceptably be programmed for construction only 
one or two years in advance (where land acquisition and non 
standard designs are not issues), for major civil , electrical 
and mechanical engineering works a minimum of five years is 
often required. Furthermore from the point of view of public 
sector decision making involving interaction and co-operation 
between various agencies i t is important that as much notice 
as possible be given of major proposals. I t is not 
essential that a totally committed foirward budget be involved 
but only that future* target levels for funding be defined. In 
the absence any indication of possible future funding levels 
the most logical assumption that an agency can make is that the 
same resources (in real terms) would be available to i t each 
year. The definition of future targets enables an agency to 
refine these assumptions and,except where major projects are 
involved,is al l that is required. For major projects the 
funds required to carry them out over an extended period must 
4 be regarded as committed when the project is commenced. This 
should amount to no more than half of the total available funds 
2. For p r a c t i c a l reasons there could be advantages for cap i t a l works in a 
programming cycle which did not correspond to the f inancial year . In 
p a r t i c u l a r the wet season in north Queensland cuts across the period of 
maximum a c t i v i t y based on f inancial yea r s . However, the adoption of a 
programming period which did not correspond to what was generally 
accepted as a f inanc ia l year would lead to many accounting and p r a c t i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
3. Spec i f ica l ly , where undesirable environmental consequences may flow from 
a project , as much time as possible should be allowed for them to be 
i d e n t i f i e d and remedied, 
4 . In the absence of such forward programming a government w i l l have no 
way of apprecia t ing i t s commitments. I t may tend to approve projects 
and programmes "subject to a v a i l a b i l i t y of finance". This can produce 
considerable wastage i f pro jec ts with no rea l chance of implementation 
are approved and the subs t an t i a l costs of inves t iga t ion and design 
incur red . 
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(say), so actually committing the entire forward budget would 
be unnecessarily restrictive. 
A rolling forward programme rather than fixed period pro-
grammes is consistent with the use of target programmes 
because each financial year, as i t is approached, is the start 
of a new target programming period. At the start of the next 
cycle one additional year is added and details for the 
intervening periods updated. Under such a system the degree 
of definition of projects can vary and only become firm as 
the time for their commitment draws nearer. The alternative 
to a rolling forward programme would be a fixed period pro-
gramme (e.g. a triennial system as used by the Commonwealth in 
the funding of Universities). I t is similar to an annual 
programming approach except that the time period involved 
reflects more realistically the requirements for implementat-
ion of the programme. I t suffers however, from the same end 
of period uncertainty as an annual programme. A further 
severe disadvantage of fixed period forward programming would 
arise if all agencies were not operating on the same cycle and 
were \inable to enter into joint commitments at the same time. 
Other Requirements 
A capital works programming system should facilitate actual 
planning and detailed programming of capital works by the 
responsible agencies. I t should introduce minimum administrat-
ive inconvenience and, in order to enable corporate planning 
by agencies to be pursued, should require l i t t l e external 
5 . . . 
control of details. The responsibilities of agencies should 
be defined as should be the limits to central interference in 
their activit ies. 
•The system should provide for meaningful expression of priority 
preferences by the government executive group and by elected 
representatives in local bodies. This implies a certain 
structuring of choices, decentralization of certain types of 
decision making and that there is l i t t l e purpose in pursuing 
5. Delegation of responsibility within an agency can be very di f f icul t i f 
detailed control i s exerted from outside. Where detailed control i s 
extensive and responsibility i s delegated, the abi l i ty of the 
hierarchical manager to properly plan for his organization wil l be 
upset. 
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highly s o p h i s t i c a t e d techniques of programme a p p r a i s a l i f they 
were not meaningful to these t a r g e t groups of decis ion 
makers . 
The system should be f l ex ib l e enough to adapt to changes i n 
the government's organiza t ion s t r u c t u r e and not i n h i b i t the 
government's en t ry i n t o new areas of a c t i v i t y . In o the r words 
i t should be independent of any p a r t i c u l a r de f in i t i on of s t a t e 
a c t i v i t i e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 
F ina l ly i t i s important t h a t i t a s s i s t the government to 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n genuine na t iona l s t r a t e g i e s and to deal 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y with s p e c i a l purpose Federal funding. This 
reqiiLres s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t : 
(a) needs be i d e n t i f i e d in such a way as to enable the S ta t e 
Government to produce convincing arguments in deal ing with 
the Commonwe a1th; 
(b) the impact of Commonwealth funding cont ro l s be s p e c i f i c -
a l l y considered. 
9.3 Implementation 
Implementing these goals would involve many d e t a i l e d adminis t -
r a t i v e cons idera t ions which are not r e levan t h e r e . The 
following discuss ion i s l imi t ed t o p r i n c i p l e s . The e s s e n t i a l 
points are as follows -
(a) the Co-ordinator-General would compare c a p i t a l works 
proposals and corporate plans with funct ional and s p a t i a l 
s t r a t e g i e s . Those pa r t s of s t r a t e g i e s which c o n s t i t u t e d 
plans would be used as the bas i s for c a p i t a l works 
programmes and s t r a t e g i e s would be rou t ine ly updated as 
p a r t of the annual programming process ; 
(b) a r eg iona l approach would be emphasised as an a id to 
s p a t i a l co -ord ina t ion ; 
(c) eva lua t ion of c a p i t a l works would be non c e n t r a l i z e d and 
e s s e n t i a l l y incremental with the use of pe r iod ic funda-
mental programme reviews. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n for c a p i t a l 
works should be incorpora ted i n t o an agencies formal 
corporate p lan ; 
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lai funding would be a l l oca t ed to c a p i t a l works on a programme 
b a s i s r a t h e r than to i nd iv idua l p r o j e c t s . The annual 
programming process would involve approval of programmes 
for a s ing le year and updating a four year t a r g e t programme; 
(e) consu l t a t i ve committees a t both the s t a t e and reg iona l 
l eve l would be used as a forum for the discuss ion of 
c a p i t a l works i s sues inc luding fundamental programme 
reviews and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of d iscrepancies between 
s p a t i a l s t r a t e g i e s and works p roposa l s . 
An annual cycle by which t h i s could be implemented i s ou t l i ned 
in Appendix N. That Appendix should be read in conjunction 
with the comments in the following s e c t i o n s . 
9.4 Use of Corporate Plans and S t r a t e g i e s 
The production of formal corporate plans by agencies was 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
In order to be useful in the system under discussion each 
agency's corporate plan would be f i na l i z ed a t the same time as 
t h e i r budget for t h e ' y e a r was known ( i . e . a t the s t a r t of the 
f inanc ia l y e a r ) . The corporate plan would iden t i fy t h a t y e a r ' s 
a c t i v i t i e s but as they were by the s tage almost completely 
fixed would pay them minimum a t t e n t i o n . Their main focus would 
have to be on future a c t i v i t y pe r iods . 
Corporate plans could be used as follows -
(a) the Co-ordinator-General would receive each agency's 
plan accompanying the submission for c a p i t a l funding 
requirements for the following f i nanc i a l yea r . I t would 
be used as the ba s i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the agencies proposed 
programme. Thus the corporate plan would have to conta in 
s u f f i c i e n t information to enable i t to be used t h i s way; 
(b) r e l a t i o n s h i p s between plans and s p a t i a l and funct ional 
s t r a t e g i e s would be i d e n t i f i e d by the Co-ordinator-
General and d isc repanc ies re fe red to the agencies involved 
6, A programme i s in t h i s sense defined as a s e t of r e l a t ed p r o j e c t s . 
7 The corporate plan could also be used to support other agency requ i re -
' ments for resources addressed to the Treasury or the Public Service 
Board i f appropr ia te . 
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or used as the bas i s for programme ana lys i s and review 
study p roposa l s . S p a t i a l s t r a t e g y r e l a t i o n s h i p s would be 
p 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of Regional Co-ord ina tors ; 
(c) the s t a t e departments respons ib le for s p e c i f i c funct ional 
s t r a t e g i e s would review the corporate plans of l oca l 
bodies opera t ing in r e l a t e d f i e l d s and advise the Co-
ordina tor -Genera l of apparent d i s c r epanc i e s . 
S t r a t eg i e s would be updated a t the same time as corporate plans 
were prepared. Formal inputs to the s t r a t egy review process 
would be the r e s u l t s of programme ana lys i s and review s tud ie s 
and d iscrepancies previously de tec ted between plans and e x i s t -
ing s t r a t e g i e s . 
9.5 Regional Approach 
The adoption of a r eg iona l approach to c a p i t a l works programmes 
Q 
and s t r a t e g i e s i s c r i t i c a l to the system being d iscussed . 
I f c a p i t a l works were not used as a means of r e l a t i n g s p a t i a l 
s t r a t e g i e s to plans then o ther techniques would be requ i red 
for s p a t i a l co-ord ina t ion which might c o n f l i c t with t h i s system. 
Thus, although the Co-ordinator-General i s not a t the time of 
wr i t ing pursuing a r eg iona l approach, t h i s must be assumed for 
the purpose of t h i s argument. 
Spec i f i ca l ly a r eg iona l approach could involve -
(a) support for the production and review of s p a t i a l 
s t r a t e g i e s ; 
(b) the ex i s tence of Regional Co-ordinators leading and 
8. As explained in Chapter 9.5, i t is assumed that the 
Cb-ordinator-General re-establishes an involvement in 
spatial co-ordination. At the time of writing Regional Co-ordinators 
did not exist. 
9. I t may be assumed that the regions being discussed are the regions 
defined by the Co-ordinator-General in 1972. Their precise arrangement 
is not relevant. Essentially all that is required is 1±iat they be areas 
less than the state as a whole, greater than the areas of jurisdiction 
of most local bodies and logically defined in that most topics were of 
mutual interest to persons within the region. 
10, If a regional approach is not taken then this system is not relevant to 
spatial co-ordination. Not only would other methods be required for 
spatial co-ordination but the development of strategies and corporate 
plans would probably be more relevant in relation to recurrent fionding 
than to capital funding. 
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support ing reg iona l consu l t a t i ve groups and a l so poss ib ly 
dea l ing with the c a p i t a l works programmes of l oca l 
bod ie s . 
The reg iona l consu l t a t ive group could be e s t a b l i s h e d under the 
umbrella of Regional Co-ordinat ion Councils i f they e x i s t e d . 
I t could c o n s i s t of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a l l agencies with a 
s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r e s t in the reg ion . This would involve a large 
number of persons and would not c o n s t i t u t e an e f f ec t i ve work-
ing group. Consul ta t ion with the group would involve 
discussion of proposed a l l o c a t i o n s to various programmes in 
the region both when programme requirements were f i r s t 
received and a t the time f i n a l a l l oca t i ons were determined. 
Programmes discussed would be both those under the con t ro l of 
loca l bodies and s t a t e departments . The group could a l so 
recommend a s e t of programme analyses and review s tud ies 
required i n r e l a t i o n to reg iona l s t r a t e g i e s e i t h e r to a 
Regional Co-ordinat ion Council or d i r e c t l y to the Co-ordinator-
General. 
P r i o r i t y preferences could be expressed by the members of the 
group in r e l a t i o n to a no t iona l reg iona l c a p i t a l budget in 
which the f i r s t programme year was t r e a t e d as reasonably f ixed . 
This r e s t r i c t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l because, for c a p i t a l works, the 
lead time involved i s such t h a t by the time a reg iona l 
consu l ta t ive group met to discuss programme proposals 
f l e x i b i l i t y for the next f i nanc ia l year would be very smal l . 
With good forward programming t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n would not be 
important . 
The no t iona l r eg iona l c a p i t a l budget would not be an a c t u a l 
budget in which funds could be r e a l l o c a t e d by the reg iona l 
12 consu l t a t ive group. The reasons for t h i s are as fo l lows : -
(a) the consu l t a t i ve group would lack the p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s 
to l e g i t i m a t e l y r e f l e c t the views of the region; 
11. The f irst programme year is the financial year after the current year 
in which discussion would take place. Thus debate would be limited 
to projects not due to commence for at least 1^ or 2 years. 
12* A proposal for a regional budget was advanced to the Royal Commission 
on Australian Government Administration in 1975. This was seen as 
eventually representing a real budget in which funds could be re-
allocated. However, such a system would inevitably undermine the 
efficient corporate management of a government's agencies. See 
AUSTRALIA, ROYAL COMMISSION ON AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 
(1975) ,pp . 31 - 33 . 
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(b) to be most e f f ec t i ve budgeting should re inforce planning 
(and t h i s involves h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e s in o rgan iza t -
ions) not cut across i t ; 
(c) funding i s obta ined from a diverse s e t of sources and 
s p e c i f i c r e a l l o c a t i o n s would frequently be imprac t i ca l ; 
(d) some resources may be ava i l ab l e to a region only for a 
s p e c i f i c major p ro j ec t with s t a t e or na t iona l impl icat ions . 
Rea l loca t ing these would be imposs ib le . 
The reg iona l consu l t a t i ve groups ' ro le would be l imi t ed to 
ind ica t ing areas of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with proposed p r i o r i t i e s 
and d iscrepancies between proposed programmes and regional 
s t r a t e g i e s . 
The reg iona l approach should not , i f i t were intended to 
promote co -o rd ina t ion , be the bas i s for ac tua l con t ro l and 
adminis t ra t ion of governmental a c t i v i t i e s . I f a reg ional body 
has s p e c i f i c admin i s t r a t ive r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i t s a t t e n t i o n 
w i l l focus on them and i t w i l l emphasis t h e i r importance in 
r e l a t i o n to o ther a c t i v i t i e s . Thus i t w i l l tend to become 
one of the agencies whose a c t i v i t i e s must be co-ordinated 
ra the r than an agent of co -o rd ina t ion . I f the reg iona l l eve l 
was to be seen as an admin i s t r a t ive l eve l then fundamental 
s t r u c t u r a l r eorgan iza t ion of the government to r e f l e c t t h i s 
would be requi red r a t h e r than arrangements which cut across 
13 
the s t r u c t u r e of government. 
9.6 Programme and P ro j ec t Appraisal 
9 .6 .1 General 
Under the system discussed above i t would be appropr ia te for a 
pragmatic r a t h e r than a t h e o r e t i c a l op t imal i ty seeking 
approach be taken to the a p p r a i s a l of c a p i t a l works. The 
13, 'The disadvantage of a separate organization for a region is that in 
Australia there are already three levels of government and the addition 
of a fourth can txnnecessarily complicate matters." FOGG (1974), p .551. 
This author also notes that a separate regional level of government 
would reduce the availability of trained staff at al l levels and make 
the allocation of worthwhile tasks to lower levels very difficult. 
14. Economics is concerned with the allocation of scarce resources and with 
various aspects of external system control by government (e.g. economic 
stabilization, income distribution, etc.) and the limitations on 
rational decision making imposed by the existence of human organizat-
ions are not always sufficiently considered. For this reason greater 
(continued next page) 
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reasons for t h i s are as fol lows-
(a) the p r i n c i p a l purpose of the system would be to a id co-
ord ina t ion with resource a l l o c a t i o n as a secondary goal ; 
(b) the l eve l of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n in programme and p ro jec t 
a p p r a i s a l in the Queensland Government i s no t high and 
i t would be u n r e a l i s t i c to assume any sudden dramatic 
improvement. There i s , l i t t l e poin t in determining a 
p rec i se discount r a t e for future benef i t s and cos ts i f 
bene f i t s cannot even be quan t i f i ed ; 
(c) under a non c e n t r a l i z e d planning system decision making 
would be p l u r a l i s t i c . An approach which concentrated on 
optimal decis ion making for a s ing le c e n t r a l decis ion 
maker able to con t ro l a l l or almost a l l fac tors r e l e v a n t 
to h i s dec i s ion , may not be very he lp fu l . Furthermore, 
an assumption t h a t a decis ion maker was able to r e a l l o c a t e 
resources between a l t e r n a t i v e s would be of l i t t l e help 
where ava i l ab l e funds were divided in to dozens of spec i a l 
purpose baskets whose adminis t ra t ion was d i spersed . 
Since p r o j e c t a p p r a i s a l would not be the sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
any agency n e i t h e r the Co-ordinator-General nor anyone e l s e 
would have independent con t ro l of a c a p i t a l works p ro j ec t or 
be able to ass ign to a p a r t i c u l a r p ro jec t an absolute p r i o r i t y . 
I t would be important however t h a t the decision making r i g h t s 
of the var ious agencies involved be p rec i se ly ass igned . A 
h i e r a r c h i c a l arrangement would be most appropriate so t h a t 
s t a t e departments and s t a t u t o r y bodies would be responsib le for 
primary a p p r a i s a l and d e t a i l e d con t ro l of p ro jec t s while the 
Co-ordinator-General (in consu l ta t ion with Treasury) would only 
be involved in a ssess ing the r e l a t i v e p r i o r i t i e s of programmes. 
This h ie ra rchy i s discussed fur ther in Appendix O. 
9.6.2 Programming Cycles 
Programme and p r o j e c t app ra i sa l involves two separa te c y c l e s . 
The f i r s t involves p ro jec t design, assessment and programming 
by a s p e c i f i c agency while the second revolves around the 
14. (continued from previous page), 
emphasis is given in this section to constraints on programme and 
project appraisal than is given to economic optimality. 
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annual budge t a ry p r o c e s s . Though d e c i s i o n s reached i n t h e 
former must be r e l a t e d t o the l a t t e r , the i n t e r n a l p r o c e s s e s of 
d e c i s i o n making used by a g e n c i e s would be a t l e a s t as i m p o r t -
a n t as t h o s e used by the C o - o r d i n a t o r - G e n e r a l . The r easons 
fo r t h i s a r e -
(a) p r o j e c t d e t a i l s may be c o n s i d e r e d only a t t h e agency l e v e l , 
( fo r r o u t i n e and minor p r o j e c t s ) ; 
(b) d i v e r s e s o u r c e s of funds a r e i nvo lve for on ly a few of 
which c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l would be a v a i l a b l e . I t i s n o t 
l o g i c a l t o have a d i f f e r e n t s e t of p rocedures t o a s s e s s 
p r o j e c t s funded from t h e s e s o u r c e s from methods used t o 
a s s e s s u n c o n t r o l l e d s o u r c e s of funds; 
(c) m i n i s t e r i a l depar tment s may submit major proposed p r o j e c t s 
t o Cab ine t f o r a p p r o v a l i ndependen t of t h e annual budge t 
c y c l e . 
These c y c l e s may be r e l a t e d by t h e use of the concept of 
programmes as d i s c u s s e d p r e v i o u s l y . For an agency a programme 
would r e p r e s e n t t he h i g h e s t a g g r e g a t i o n of p r o j e c t s i n which 
i t would be i n t e r e s t e d . For r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n purposes 
programmes would be t r e a t e d as the s m a l l e s t u n i t i n g e n e r a l t o 
which funds would be a l l o c a t e d wi th t he p r o j e c t s of which i t 
15 
was composed s imply r e p r e s e n t i n g s u p p o r t i n g d e t a i l s . This 
approach would have t h e advantage of a l lowing f l e x i b i l i t y t o 
c o n s t r u c t i o n a g e n c i e s i n the phas ing of p r o j e c t s i n l i n e w i th 
o t h e r c o n s t r a i n t s which they face ( e . g . manpower, p l a n t 
15, The use of a programme as an allocation unit i s the existing practice 
for s ta te departments but represents an important change for local 
bodies. Considerable detailed control has been exerted over local 
body projects because of the requirements of the State Subsidy scheme 
where subsidies are paid on actual expenditures according to a very 
complex procedtire. The elimination of this detail would be important 
to enable better processes for evaluating local bodies programmes 
to be used but would have a number of other implications. The State 
Svibsidy scheme would have to be modified so that general rather than 
special purpose financial assistance was given to local bodies and 
review of local body plans by state departments could be eliminated. 
Under the "Local Body Loans Guarantee Act, 192 3-1975 " i t i s required 
that plans be approved by the government before debenture loans by 
local bodies are guaranteed by the Treasurer, This i s based on the 
myth that a loan i s secured on the asset which i t creates. This i s no 
longer valid as the notion of a bank repossessing a sewerage treatment 
works (for example) i s hardly l ikely. State departments could gain an 
adequate appreciation of local body plans from a review of their 
corporate plans and their involvement in reviewing project designs i s 
usually unnecessary. 
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availability, weather, etc.) 
9.6.3 Principles of Appraisal 
Theoretically the best method of appraising a programme or 
project is to compare i ts costs and i t s effect on all signific-
ant systems (i .e. the system which i t is desired to effect as 
well as al l environmental systems). If the value imputed to 
beneficial effects exceeds the costs and no other project or 
programme exist with greater benefits using the same resources, 
then the project or programme would be justified. 
For some projects a complete appraisal on this basis (which 
can be referred to as benefit-cost analysis) would be 
warranted. However for minor or routine projects, of which a 
large part of the works programme is composed, such formal 
analysis would be unwarranted because of the high cost in 
relation to the value of the project. In such cases i t should 
be more useful to implicitly appraise the project by apprais-
ing the whole programme of which i t is a part and from this 
defining standards for public facili t ies. If the project 
exceeded the defined standard then i t would not be justified. 
Appraisal by an agency either by benefit cost analysis or 
by reference to standards is exactly equivalent as far as 
programme appraisal is concerned. 
Fundamental rational appraisal of programmes would not be 
warranted as part of the annual works programme procedure for 
two reasons. I t would be too expensive and time consuming to 
endeavour to appraise each programme anew each year and 
furthermore the rationale for a programme will not alter 
17 
significantly from year to year. Fundamental appraisal of 
programmes though periodic programme analysis and review 
18 studies would be more appropriate. For programmes consisting 
of minor projects this would result in a redefinition of the 
16. The evaluation of e x t e r n a l i t i e s (or environmental effects) should be 
completely in tegra ted to pro jec t appra isa l and no separate "environ-
mental study" i s desirable because i t implies that a separate s e t of 
issues are involved which cannot be r e l a t ed to conventional 
techniques of appra i sa l . 
17. Once a programme i s commenced i t w i l l take a nvmiber of years to pro-
duce s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s , and in addi t ion , may not usually be termin-
ated on shor t n o t i c e , 
18. Compare programme analysis and review procedures used in Br i t a i n , 
See EAST (1973), 
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s tandards app l icab le to the programme while for programmes 
conta in ing major p r o j e c t s t h i s would iden t i fy the l eve l of 
b e n e f i t - c o s t r a t i o which should be sought for i nd iv idua l 
p r o j e c t s . 
9.6.4 S tandard iza t ion of Appraisal Procedures 
Common a p p r a i s a l procedures could not be used i n a l l f i e l d s of 
government a c t i v i t y . However, the more uniform the methods 
used by ind iv idua l agencies the l e s s would be the need for 
de t a i l ed involvement below the programme l eve l by the Co-
ord ina tor -Genera l . Such s t andard iza t ion of methods could be 
achieved to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t by spec i f i c a t i on by the Co-
ordina tor -Genera l of - -
(a) values to be assigned to e x t e r n a l i t i e s ; 
19 
(b) methods of discount ing future benef i t s and c o s t s ; 
(c) methods of specifying s tandards for rout ine p r o j e c t s . 
Unless c o n s t r a i n t s are s e t on the evaluat ion of major p ro j ec t s 
there can be no c e r t a i n t y t h a t the procedures used and the 
values assigned to e x t e r n a l i t i e s w i l l not be designed to s u i t 
the i n t e r e s t of the responsib le agency. 
9.6.5 Recognition of Resource Limitat ions 
Projec ts should not under any circumstances be approved ou t s ide 
the context of ava i l ab l e r e sources . Major p ro jec t s proposed 
by an agency w i l l f requent ly be submitted to the execut ive 
group (or the agency's own con t ro l group i n the case of a 
loca l body, i . e . a l oca l council) for approval outs ide the 
context of the annual works programme. By submit t ing major 
p ro jec t s in the context of a s p e c i f i c programme for which 
tarqet funding had been defined there would be a high c e r t a i n t y 
, . 20 
of t h e i r execut ion once approval was given. 
19 The assignment of uniform methods of discounting does not imply that 
all benefits and costs should be discounted at the same rate. This 
is frequently assumed though there is a good case for arguing that 
fundamental needs should be discounted at a lower rate than higher 
levels needs. Thus a lower discount rate might be applied to invest-
ments related to security than would be applicable to higher level 
needs such as entertainment and recreation faci l i t ies . 
iO Projects submitted in isolation which appear attractive might other-
wise be approved with no possibility of funding. 
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P r o j e c t s wh ich w e r e p a r t o f a programme t o which t h e d e f i n i t -
i o n o f s t a n d a r d s was a p p r o p r i a t e wou ld n o t be a p p r o v e d 
i n d i v i d u a l l y i n t h i s way . R a t h e r i t would be n e c e s s a r y t o 
e n s u r e t h a t s t a n d a r d s w e r e d e f i n e d i n such a way t h a t 
r e s o u r c e a v a i l a b i l i t y was t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t . I t w o u l d be 
a p p r o p r i a t e t o h a v e two s e p a r a t e s t a n d a r d s .^•'- The f i r s t w o u l d 
be a d e s i r a b l e s t a n d a r d b e i n g t h e s t a n d a r d a t wh ich t h e i m p l i c i t 
b e n e f i t c o s t r a t i o o f componen t p r o j e c t s r e a c h e d t h e l e v e l 
r e g a r d e d a s a c c e p t a b l e . The s e c o n d t y p e would be a p r a c t i c a l 
s t a n d a r d wh ich w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y be a lower s t a n d a r d w h i c h 
would r e p r e s e n t a s t a n d a r d wh ich c o u l d be a c h i e v e d i n t h e 
programming p e r i o d ( s ay 5 y e a r s ) g i v e n t h e p r o b a b l e l e v e l o f 
a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s . The l a t t e r wou ld be u s e d i n t h e a s s e s s -
ment of any s p e c i f i c p r o j e c t . 
9 . 6 . 6 Programme A p p r a i s a l by a C o - o r d i n a t o r - G e n e r a l 
Under t h e non c e n t r a l i z e d s y s t e m d i s c u s s e d h e r e t h e a c t u a l 
i n v o l v e m e n t of a C o - o r d i n a t o r - G e n e r a l i n programme a p p r a i s a l 
would be l i m i t e d t o -
(a) a s s e s s i n g r e l a t i v e p r i o r i t i e s b e t w e e n s p a t i a l and 
f u n c t i o n a l p r i o r i t i e s ; 
(b) r e v i e w i n g c o n s i s t e n c y b e t w e e n programmes and s t r a t e g i e s ; 
(c) s u p e r v i s i o n of a s s e s s m e n t p r o c e d u r e s u s e d by i n d i v i d u a l 
a g e n c i e s . S p e c i f i c g u i d e l i n e s c o u l d be l a i d down on 
s p e c i f i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which s h o u l d be t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t 
i n a s s e s s i n g m a j o r new p r o j e c t s j u s t e n t e r i n g t h e f o r w a r d 
p rogramme; 
(d) a s s i s t i n g w i t h f u n d a m e n t a l programme a n a l y s i s and r e v i e w 
s t u d i e s . The programmes t o be s o r e v i e w e d c o u l d be 
d e t e r m i n e d p a r t l y on t h e b a s i s o f c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s of 
them by t h e C o - o r d i n a t o r - G e n e r a l a s p a r t o f t h e works 
22 programme r e v i e w . 
21. A standard could cons is t of a number of c r i t e r i a agains t which to 
measure a spec i f i c p ro jec t . These c r i t e r i a could be of three types 
namely, ex i s tence , quanti ty and qual i ty c r i t e r i a . Existence c r i t e r i a 
would e s t ab l i sh whether a p a r t i c u l a r f a c i l i t y or service should be 
es tab l i shed and once th i s had been passed then the appropriate s ize 
and qua l i ty would be se t by the quanti ty and qua l i ty c r i t e r i a . 
Technical design standards would generally be pa r t of the qua l i ty 
c r i t e r i a . 
22, Programmes for review could a lso be determined by Cabinet or by Sta te 
or Regional Capi tal Works Committees. 
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The two i s sues which must be resolved about a programme -
(a) whether i t i s to be undertaken, and i f so 
(b) how much should be a l l o c a t e d to i t i n a given y e a r . 
The annual works programme procedures would l a rge ly involve 
a process of balancing competing demands on the bas i s of 
information provided on the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of programmes by 
agency corporate plans . This would be an incremental 
procedure with base l eve l s genera l ly s e t by programme ana lys i s 
and review s t u d i e s . 
Another cons idera t ion which the Co-ordinator-General could 
take i n to account would be the des i rab le l eve l of o v e r a l l 
c a p i t a l investment in Queensland. This i s of l i t t l e relevance 
where the l e v e l of s t a t e c a p i t a l investment i s l a rge ly 
deteirmined by the Commonwealth Government as has 
been the case in the p a s t . Revenue sharing arrangements 
between the Commonwealth and the S t a t e s , such t h a t the S ta te 
had a r e a l choice on i t s l e v e l of c a p i t a l investment, would 
make t h i s i s sue impor tant . 
10-141 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
10.1 General 
This thesis was divided into three distinct parts. The first 
dealt with a theory of planning and co-ordination in government; 
the second with the present structure and planning processes of 
the Queensland Government while the final section proposed a 
method for improving the planning processes in that government. 
The conclusions reached from each of these sections will now be 
drawn together. 
10.2 Theory of Planning and Co-ordination 
A useful model of government organization may be derived simply 
by treating it as an organized system. This is adequate to 
enable the widespread confusion between planning and external 
systems control by government to be resolved, to identify 
difficulties which the executive group has in exerting direct 
control over a government organization and to describe the 
most commonly used processes of co-ordination. 
Though considerable use was made of existing literature in the 
analysis of this model, the approach is original because it 
conforms quite strictly to the theory of organization drawn 
from systems theory. It was found that some theories in the 
literature had to be specially interpreted in order to fit the 
model. However, the use of such a model provides a firm 
base from which expansion and development of the theory of 
government planning should be possible. 
Co-ordination was identified as an extremely general process in 
an organization which is initially sought by hierarchical control 
but, because of the inevitable breakdown of this method in a 
large organization, non hierarchical processes are used as well. 
The most important method on non hierarchical co-ordination is 
reorganization but this is not a satisfactory solution to all 
problems. Irrespective of the methods used in a non centralized 
government, it is inevitable that the executive group will find 
difficulty in ensuring that its agencies properly conform to its 
goals. 
In any government organization which uses a ministerial system, 
the role of a non hierarchical Co-ordinator-General would be 
valid. A Co-ordinator-General could contribute effectively to 
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the conventional processes of non hierarchical co-ordination by 
acting as a focus for the corporate identity of the government 
at the administrative level. His role is limited and subject 
to numerous constraints of which the most important is that he 
be given committed backing by the executive group. 
10.3 Queensland Government 
In reviewing the present methods used by the Queensland Govern-
ment the principle conclusion reached was that insufficient 
information is available to make any specific conclusions 
possible but that this, in itself, is probably evidence that 
the governments planning systems are unsophisticated. There 
can be little doubt that a fundamental review of the governments 
structure and methods would be beneficial. Furthermore, the 
Queensland Government could gain substantial benefits from 
devoting an increased proportion of its resources to 
planning processes.-'- Substantial expenditures have been 
incurred in recent years in many "planning" studies which do 
not always appear to have been beneficial. However, the more 
the expenditures are oriented towards the actual agencies of 
the government the greater would be the return. 
10.4 Suggested Planning System 
A planning system based on this principle was suggested in 
Chapters 8 and 9. This would involve the use of corporate 
planning at the agency level and the creation of a formal 
strategic framework for such planning. Strategies could be 
defined to reflect the goals of the executive group, prepared 
in conjunction with corporate planning and administered in part 
by a Co-ordinator-General in relation to the production of a 
2 
programme of capital works. 
1, Any organization may underinvest in forward planning and methods research 
because such costs may be seen as avoidable in the short term. DROR 
(1968), p.283. They may even be seen to be avoidable in the long term 
if the organization can copy the results of research in other organiz-
ations. However, in spite of this, such investments are essential and 
offer considerable benefits. 
2. The existence of a Co-ordinator-General is ftondamental to the system and 
the problem for another government in adopting it would be much more 
severe. The creation of the role of Co-ordinator-General would involve 
extracting power and responsibilities from some of the most senior 
officials in the government organization. For example, unless a Co-
ordinator-General held a responsibility for resource allocation he could 
not last long in the face of hierarchical processes. The role will not 
Continued on next page. 
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The principal factors acting against a search for improved 
planning procedures by the Queensland Government is the lack 
of interest which the public generally appears to have in State 
Government methods and the governments own lack of awareness of 
its corporate existance. However,this state of affairs might 
be altered for the better as a consequence of the so called 
"new federalism". If the policy of returning general respon-
sibility to State administration were pursued for a number of 
years then a general m.ovement towards re-examining methods of 
administration and co-ordination could be expected.3 
The methods suggested in this thesis are oriented towards the 
requirements of a State Government in a federal system. The 
study of State Government planning problems is an almost 
universally neglected topic because States are usually regarded 
as less interesting and important than national governments, 
Queensland is a prime example of this where, despite the size 
and importance of its government, previous studies are almost 
non existent. The scope for future productive research is 
almost unlimited. 
2. Continued from previous page. 
evolve naturally from conventional government structures because it is 
a non hierarchical concept. The only effective way to create it would 
be to appoint a person already holding some of the necessary roles and 
gradually divorce his new role from his old one. 
It is also necessary that a Co-ordinator-General have a role in spatial 
co-ordination. At the time of writing, formal involvement in this has 
been relinquished and, as noted in Chapter 9, this implies that the 
system discussed here could not be useful. However, the Queensland 
Government will probably be obliged to seek an alternative method of 
spatial co-ordination when economic growth is restored. This could 
either involve the Co-ordinator-General or another more conventional 
method (e.g. State Land Use Authority). In the latter case, a Co-
ordinator-General would still have a valid role but the system described 
here would be of limited relevance. 
3. This was the experience in the United States where a similar "new 
federalism" led to significantly greater interest in State Government 
co-ordination techniques. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS (1970K This 
is consistent with the view expressed by HUGHES (1970), "The Polity" p.240, 
that the decline in interest in State activities in Australia dates from 
the introduction of uniform taxation. 
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APPENDIX A - DEFINITIONS 
The definition of terms is a matter of major importance in 
dealing with a number of disciplines. Unfortunately words 
are used with connotations which are convenient within a 
given discipline and, when the same word has a different 
meaning to others, simple statements may mean different 
things to persons with different backgrounds. ' 
In order to overcome this difficulty a number of the terms and 
concepts used in this thesis are defined briefly below and in 
the text should be read with these meanings. They are almost 
all defined elsewhere in this thesis and the purpose of this 
appendix is simply to bring them together. These definitions 
are in general based on the concept of systems. 
The following are arranged in a conceptually logical order 
rather than alphabetic order. 
SYSTEM RELATED CONCEPTS ^ ' 
System 
A system is a set of elements which are connected by 
relationships (See Appendix B). A system is open if it 
exchanges material, information and energy with its environment 
but closed if it does not. The environment of a system is the 
set of all systems in the universe except the system itself. 
Each system in the environment is an "external system". 
Organization 
A system possessing a predominantly hierarchical process of 
control. The behaviour of each element in the system is 
determined by the part above it in the hierarchy (See 
Appendix B). A "perfect" organization is one where all 
behaviour is determined by this hierarchical process while, in 
an "imperfect" one, autonomous behaviour by the parts is 
possible. 
1. This problem was described by SIMON (1957). 
A-2 
A human organization is one in which at least two of the 
elements are human beings. Where the context is clear 
organization by itself is used as an abreviation for human 
organization. 
Planning 
The process of determining a future course of behaviour by 
an organized system. See Appendix D where many alternative 
definitions are also given. Corporate Planning is unified 
planning for an organization as a whole. 
Decision 
Non random selection between alternatives. 
Rationality 
A characteristic of a decision which requires that all 
alternatives be considered, their effects evaluated and that 
alternative selected which produces the most beneficial 
effects (See Appendix D). 
Purpose 
Any desired system state or event. A purpose may be 
restorative in which case the desired system state represents 
a pre-existing condition or displaced in which a new state is 
sought (See Appendix D). 
Control 
Process which leads to the achievement of a desired system 
state or event. 
Goals and Objectives 
Two distinct concepts are used here for convenience. A goal is 
considered to be a vague or general purpose while an objective 
is a precise purpose. A goal would result from the normal 
verbal expression of purpose by human beings while an 
objective would be expected to be sufficiently precise to be 
quantified. See Chapter 6. 
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GOVERNMENT RELATED CONCEPTS 
Government 
T h a t o r g a n i z e d s t r u c t u r e h a v i n g a d e g r e e o f c o n t r o l o v e r a 
s o c i e t y t o w h i c h o t h e r o r g a n i z e d c o n t r o l l i n g s t r u c t u r e s mus t 
d e f e r ( s e e A p p e n d i x C) . 
P o l i t i c s 
The c o m p e t i t i o n f o r dominance i n a s o c i e t y . 
L e g i s l a t u r e 
Tha t b r a n c h of g o v e r n m e n t c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e making of 
l a w s . 
J u d i c i a r y 
T h a t b r a n c h o f g o v e r n m e n t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f 
d i s p u t e s a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l aws i n 
p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s . 
E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h 
T h a t b r a n c h of g o v e r n m e n t c o n c e r n e d w i t h c a r r y i n g o u t t h e 
day t o day a c t i v i t i e s o f g o v e r n m e n t ( i . e . i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e laws). 
E x e c u t i v e o r E x e c u t i v e Group 
The c e n t r a l c o n t r o l u n i t of t h e e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h ( s e e C h a p t e r 
3 ) . I n Q u e e n s l a n d t h i s i s t h e C a b i n e t . 
C h i e f E x e c u t i v e 
The l e a d e r o f t h e e x e c u t i v e g r o u p . I n Q u e e n s l a n d t h i s i s 
t h e P r e m i e r . 
Head o f S t a t e 
T h a t p e r s o n i n whom t h e p r i n c i p a l e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y o f 
. t h e g o v e r n m e n t r e s i d e s . I n Q u e e n s l a n d t h i s i s t h e G o v e r n o r . 
The r o l e c o u l d c o i n c i d e w i t h t h a t o f C h i e f E x e c u t i v e i n a 
p r e s i d e n t i a l s y s t e m . 
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Agency 
An organization or administrative body of any type which forms 
part of the total government organization (See Chapter 3,5) . 
Statutory Body 
Any organization created by statute by a government. All 
statutory bodies are agencies but not all agencies are 
necessarily statutory (though most are in Queensland). 
Department 
An agency given legal responsibility over the whole spatial 
area of a government's jurisdiction. It includes the common 
concept of department, as a ministerial department (i.e. one 
whose permanent head reports directly to a minister), and 
autonomous statutory authorities (e.g. government business 
undertakings). (See Chapter 3.6). 
Local Body 
An agency having jurisdiction over only a part of the spatial 
area covered by a government. 
Local Authority 
Strictly a local authority is regarded as a local body having 
responsibility for all functions and process of government in a 
specific area (See Chapter 3,6). It is also used to refer to 
multi-functional local bodies whose control group is elected 
by the community in its area of jurisdiction. 
Function 
A function of government is set of its outputs which are 
related in some way (See Chapter 3.5). 
Centralization 
Concentration of a specific task (often decision making) at 
some point in an organization. Four different types of 
centralization may be identified namely functional, process, 
spatial and general centralization (See Appendix F). 
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Bureaucracy 
A human organization with a specific set of characteristics 
These are set out in Chapter 3.2. 
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APPENDIX B - SYSTEMS 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The c o n c e p t of s y s t e m s i s b a s i c t o t h i s t h e s i s . The r e a l 
w o r l d i s a s y s t e m w h i c h may be b r o k e n down i n t o an i n f i n i t e 
number o f s u b s y s t e m s . Human o r g a n i z a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g 
g o v e r n m e n t s , a r e s y s t e m s , and n e a r l y a l l of t h e t h i n g s w i t h 
which t h e y d e a l a r e s y s t e m s . T h e r e a r e c o n c l u s i o n s wh ich may 
be drawn a b o u t s y s t e m s from a g e n e r a l s t u d y of them and t h e 
p u r p o s e o f t h i s a p p e n d i x i s t o i d e n t i f y b r i e f l y some w h i c h a r e 
r e l e v a n t t o t h i s t h e s i s . 
The s u b j e c t i s c o v e r e d e x t e n s i v e l y i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e and y e t 
i t i s t h e a u t h o r ' s e x p e r i e n c e t h a t many p e o p l e f i n d i t 
m y s t e r i o u s . * The r e a s o n i s p r o b a b l y t h a t , a s y e t , few 
d i s c i p l i n e s i n t r o d u c e s y s t e m s c o n c e p t s a s t h e b a s i s f o r 
a n a l y s i s e v e n t h o u g h t h e y may be d e a l i n g w i t h r e a l s y s t e m s ? * 
The s t u d y of s y s t e m s i n g e n e r a l o r i g i n a t e d w i t h t h e work o f 
Von B e r t a l a n f f y who n o t e d many common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
s y s t e m s i n a l l s c i e n c e s and s u g g e s t e d t h a t c o n c l u s i o n s m i g h t 
p o s s i b l y be drawn a b o u t s y s t e m t y p e B from a s t u d y of s y s t e m 
t y p e A, i . e . t h a t t h e r e m i g h t be g e n e r a l s y s t e m s t h e o r i e s which 
3 
would a p p l y t o a l l t y p e s of s y s t e m s . * However , i t i s now 
r e c o g n i s e d t h a t , w h i l e t h e c o n c e p t o f s y s t e m a s a f u n d a m e n t a l 
u n i t o f a n a l y s i s i s r e l e v a n t t o a l l s c i e n c e s , t h e a n a l y s i s of 
any s p e c i f i c s y s t e m r e q u i r e s a d e t a i l e d knowledge of t h e 
4 
e l e m e n t s of w h i c h i t i s composed and of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . * 
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e u s e of t h e c o n c e p t o f s y s t e m s i s m a i n l y u s e f u l 
where a s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g s y s t e m e x i s t s c o n t a i n i n g complex 
feedback r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
1, A useful account of systems concepts i s given in EMERY (1969) 
2, There i s a tendency for example, to say tha t organizations are l i ke 
systems ra the r than tha t they are systems. 
3. See VON BERTALANFFY (1950). Ideas of the proper t ies of systems had, 
however, been developing for decades before h is work, 
4. See, for example, SIMON (1962). 
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Definition of Systems 
A system may be thought of as a group of linked elements where 
their essential systematic nature arises because of the 
linkages and not simply because the elements are aggregated 
into a set. 
This may be formally defined by considering the set of 
elements a, a^ ... a and letting this be the set A (See Fig. 
Bl). Let a be the environment of these elements. Assume 
o 
every element in the set (a , a,, a^ ... a ) is characterised 
by a set of input quantities and a set of output quantities. 
Let r.. denote the manner in which the input quantities of 
element a. depend on the output quantities of element a. which 
follows from the relationship between those quantities. 
The set of all r^. (i = 1, N; J = 1, N; J 7^  i) is R. 
Every set S = (A, R) constitutes a system. 
Elements = A = {A-^, ...Ag] 
Relationships = R = (rij) 
where i = 1, 6 
j = 1, 6 
i 7" J 
System = S = (A, R) 
FIGURE Bl SYSTEM DEFINITION 
Inherent in this definition of system are concepts of 
structure and behaviour. The elements alone do not constitute 
the system, and so, for example, a group of people or any 
other elements can never form a system unless they interact. 
Because of these relationships a system can exhibit behaviour 
which is not characteristic of its elements taken separately. 
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This is referred to as the "gestalt" quality of systems. The 
elements of the system may be anything from physical items to 
abstract concepts while the input and output quantities may be 
physical matter, energy or information (the latter may be 
regarded as an infinitely small amount of structured energy or 
matter). The elements of the system are the smallest units of 
interest at a given level of resolution and hence they may be 
regarded as "black boxes". What happens inside them is 
irrelevant and all that need be known is that they receive 
inputs and produce outputs. However, if the system is resolved 
further it may be found that these elements are themselves 
systems (i.e. subsystems). 
Natural Systems 
The real world is a system and anything which might be 
considered in practical sense will probably be a subsystem 
possessing the basic property of a system i.e. it will consist 
of a set of interrelated elements. 
The way the v/orld is studied and the models of the systems it 
contains that may be constructed to analyse any given problem 
will depend on the problem at hand. The same elements may 
frequently be looked at as part of different systems but to 
identify a real natural system it must be ensured that it has 
the characteristic of self regulation as described in 
Appendix D (see Figure B2). 
POSSIBLE "NATURAL" SELF 
REGULATING SYSTEM 
(MANY FEEDBACK LOOPS) 
NON SELF 
REGULATING 
SYSTEM 
FIGURE B2 ALTERNATE SYSTEMS 
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Systems may be classified into a number of levels with 
5 
increasingly sophisticated characteristics. The simplest is 
that of a static structure where all relationships are fixed 
and there is no apparent motion (e.g. the framework of a 
building). The next two levels are those of the simple 
dynamic system and the cybernetic system. These are similar 
in that their behaviour is predetermined and predictable but 
differ in that, for the cybernetic system, the interpretation 
and processing of information is involved while for a simple 
dynamic system (such as a clock work mechanism) this is not so, 
Next there are the simplest self maintaining open systems 
such as chemical or organic cells and then the genetic social 
level such as that of the plant. Proceeding further, animals 
may be identified which have self awareness and are capable 
of increased mobility and goal directed behaviour. This 
level includes human beings who are distinguished from other 
animals by the fact they are aware of the reasoning processes 
involved in their behaviour. At a higher level again are 
social organizations of human beings which, ignoring possible 
transcendental systems, are the highest level and most complex 
systems known to exist. It is with such systems that this 
thesis is principally concerned. 
In the real world everything is connected to everything else 
but the nature of the connections is often very weak. Ashby, 
has noted that the natural world contains few examples of 
environments that are both large and richly joined and that 
the terrestrial environment is characteristically highly 
subdivided.^ Thus not every set of objects selected from the 
real world will exhibit all the possible characteristics of 
systems and if a problem is to be analysed using systems 
concepts considerable care must be taken. Some systems will 
have a much more natural existence than others. 
Open and Closed Systems 
One of the most important characteristics of a system is the 
5 This classification is based on BOULDING (1956), "General Systems 
Theory - The Skeleton of Science" . Other views are given in 
CHADWICK (1971), pp. 40-42. 
6. ASHBY (1960), p. 205. 
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extent of its interaction with its environment. If there is no 
interaction then it is a closed system while, if there is 
interaction, it is an open system. (See Fig. B3) 
MAY IMPORT 
NEGATIVE 
ENTROPY 
FROM 
ENVIRONMENT 
TENDS TO 
MAXIMUM 
ENTROPY 
OPEN SYSTEM CLOSED SYSTEM 
FIGURE B3 OPEN AND CLOSED SYSTEMS 
I t i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o i m a g i n e a r e a l s y s t e m which i s 
a c t u a l l y c l o s e d b e c a u s e t h e r e w i l l u s u a l l y be some t y p e of 
i n p u t s and o u t p u t s . However c l o s e d s y s t e m s a r e f r e q u e n t l y 
7 
d e f i n e d f o r a n a l y s i s . 
The b e h a v i o u r of a c l o s e d s y s t e m i s c o m p l e t e l y bound by t h e 
p h y s i c a l l aws r e l a t i n g t o e n t r o p y . The Second Law o f 
Thermodyamics s t a t e s t h a t t h e e n t r o p y of a c l o s e d s y s t e m i s 
a lways i n c r e a s i n g and can n e v e r d e c r e a s e . E n t r o p y i s a 
measu re o f t h e d i s o r d e r o f t h e s y s t e m ( r e l a t e d t o t h e i m b a l a n c e 
of s t r u c t u r i n g of e n e r g y i n t h e s y s t e m ) and i s d i r e c t l y 
e q u a t a b l e w i t h t h e c o n c e p t of e n t r o p y which i s d e f i n e d i n 
i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r y a s a m e a s u r e o f u n c e r t a i n t y . The 
i m p o r t a n c e of t h i s law i s t h a t any c l o s e d s y s t e m s w i l l 
e v e n t u a l l y d e t e r i o r a t e i n t o a s t a b l e s t a t e ( i . e . a t i m e 
7. A closed system may be created from any open system (S) by including 
i t s environment (E) in a l a rger System (Si ) . The environment of a 
system i s everything which i s not included in the system. 
8. BRILLOUIN (1962) 
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independent equilibrium). Furthermore, the behaviour of a 
closed system is deterministically related to its initial 
state while this is not true for an open system. 
An open system may not deteriorate in this way because it can 
import negative entropy from its environment. The total 
entropy in the system and its environment may increase but the 
entropy in the system itself decreases. Because of this an 
open system may maintain itself in dynamic equilibrium in a 
state which does not correspond to maximum entropy and develop 
spontaneously towards conditions of greater complexity by 
growth and expansion. Engineering and the physical sciences 
generally study systems which are relatively closed and thus 
deterministic. Social and biological sciences involve 
themselves with open systems which are much more difficult 
to deal with. 
The basic characteristic of an open system is that it will 
import energy from its environment, transform this energy to 
perform work and export some output. For a stable system 
this process is usually cyclical or continuous and necessarily 
involves importation of greater quantities of negative entropy 
than are exported. Furthermore an open system will import 
information from its environment which is used to control its 
behaviour. 
The typical characteristics of organized open systems and the 
means whereby they may exhibit behaviour will be considered in 
Appendix D. 
The State of a System 
The state of a system is the instantaneous condition of the 
9. In closed systems stability can only occur by deterioration of the 
system towards a condition of maximum entropy and must be accompanied 
by the cessation of all activity. EMERY and TRIST (1960). 
10, Briefly the most in^ ortant properties are homeostatic behaviour 
based on negative fe.edbacks, equifinality, internal specialization, 
purposeful behaviour. See for exaitple KATZ and KAHN (1966). 
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system. The set of all possible states of the system is 
referred to as its phase space. All systems have structure 
(i.e. relationships between the parts), all systems are flow 
systems (i.e. there are inputs and outputs from the elements 
of the system) hence they exhibit behaviour and change in time. 
Open systems also have the possibility of externally generated 
changes (i.e. they may adapt and become different). The 
parameters by which a system may be described are inputs, 
processes, outputs, feedback controls and restrictions. 
By describing the values of these parameters the state of the 
system may be described. 
Concept of an Organized System 
Not all systems are organized but natural open systems tend to 
be. The implications of this statement are quite significant 
but some further definitions are required before it can be 
pursued. 
An organized system or organization may be defined as a system 
containing a hierarchical process of control. A hierarchy 
can be conveniently defined as a system "composed of 
interrelated subsystems each of the latter being in turn 
hierarchical in structure until we reach the lowest level of 
12 
elementary subsystem". By this definition a hierarchy does 
not necessarily have a centralised system of control but an 
organization certainly does. The diagram representing a 
hierarchy must be a finite tree branching out of a single 
original point with no loops. For an organization each element 
on the tree depends for its behaviour on its relationship with 
the element with which it is connected which is closer to the 
origin as shown in Figure B4. 
11. A more general definition of organization could exclude the requirement 
that the control process be hierarchical. However, its inclusion is 
convenient because this is, in nature, the most successful control 
"structure. 
12. SIMON (1962), p.488. The study of hierarchies is developing as a 
special field within the general systems field because of the frequency 
with which such structures occur in the real world. See WHYTE, WILSON 
and WILSON (1969) 
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CONTROL PRDCF.SS 
ORIGIN 
4\ /A //W 
SIMPLE HIERARCHY 
FIGURE 3 4 PERFECTLY ORGANIZED SYSTEM 
Natiiral open systems are most frequently developed on a 
hierarchical pattern. This follows from the fact that such 
systems evolve much more rapidly from their constituents than 
do non-hierarchical systems containing the same number of 
elements. The reason is that hierarchies can be decomposed into 
their various components without ruining their entire 
organizations while non-hierarchical systems will completely 
disappear if they are seriously disbalanced. The ability of 
the parts to carry on when a system fragments, and so survive 
to become re-organized later, is a great evolutionary 
advantage. 13 
If a system is completely controlled by a hierarchical process 
then it will be referred to as a perfectly organized system. 
Most real organized systems are imperfect in the sense that the 
parts/involved may exhibit autonomously determined behaviour. 
In such an imperfect organization complete unity of action by 
the system (i.e. co-ordination) will not be achieved by 
hierarchical processes alone. 
13, See LASZLO (1972), p. 67 and SIMON (1962) 
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The concept of an organized system and the planning and 
co-ordination processes which may be associated with it are 
considered further in Appendix D. 
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APPENDIX C - THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENT 
General 
The purpose of this appendix is to establish very briefly what 
will be meant by government for the purpose of this thesis. 
Essentially the concept will be taken as given and the following 
is meant to be an explanation rather than a justification for 
the. view taken. 
Nature of a Government 
One basic characteristic of governments is that they exert 
control of some sort over the society in which they are embedded 
As there may be many organizations which exert control over a 
society, not all of which are governments, a government will be 
defined as that organized structure having a degree of control 
over a society to which other organized controlling structures 
must defer, A further common characteristic of governments is 
that they are widely recognized as representing the society in 
which they are embedded. 
Under this definition there can only be one government in a 
society. To cover a Federal system, which is of most interest 
for this thesis, it is necessary to consider that there may be 
at least two levels of organized structures in a society, one 
level covering only part of the spatial area covered by the 
other (i,e, a State) which each exhibit the basic characteristic 
of government over a limited set of functions. 
Roles of Government 
It will be assumed that the roles of government in a society 
are essentially twofold. In the first place a government exerts 
control over various aspects of the society and its environment 
and secondly it provides collective services on behalf of the 
whole society. This limited view of the roles of government 
will be taken in order to enable a model of government 
1, The concept of function is loosely used here and is formally defined 
in Chapter 3. 
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organization to be derived which is suitable for the analysis 
of planning and co-ordination processes. 
The first of the roles of Government, control of society, may 
involve -
(a) the maintenance of a system of law to regulate the 
relationships between people and between organizations, 
... This would include the activities of police forces, the 
judiciary and penal institutions as well as some control 
of industry and other private activities (e.g. 
non-economic aspects of industry, such as safety, contract 
law etc,); 
(b) giving guidance and direction to society including 
leadership in the general sense; 
(c) control of a multiplicity of other systems. The types of 
systems which are frequently controlled include the 
development and use of natural resources, (e,g, minerals, 
water, forests), the use of land (which is a special 
natural resource), the natural physical environment, the 
economy (i,e, the system of production and distribution 
of goods and services) and various "economic" variables 
such as unemployment, income distribution, etc, and the 
social characteristics of the human population e,g, 
political attitudes, education level, public health and 
so on. 
The second role of providing collective services may include -
(a) businesses and pseudo-businesses which are often of the 
nature of natural monopolies (i,e, where general 
efficency result from a service being supplied by only 
one producer of where there is no suitable market 
mechanism), Typical examples would be energy supplies 
(-electricity and gas), transportation (roads, railways), 
postal services and telecommunications, education, water 
supplies, sewerage and waste disposal. The extent of 
governmental business operations varies considerably from 
government to government and frequently such services may 
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be partially or completely privately supplied. Thus there 
are private railway systems in the United Kingdom, private 
telecommunications in the United States of America, 
private gas supplies in Queensland, private toll roads, 
private schools and so on; * 
(b) external affairs - establishing the relationship between 
the society and other societies covered by independent 
Governments; 
(c) defence - it is usual to recognize that the operation of 
defence forces is a perogative of Government through non-
governmental armies are not unknown; 
(d) welfare services - for these there is generally no 
suitable market mechanism. 
These two roles cover many of the significant activities of 
government. 
Branches of Government 
This thesis will be largely limited to a consideration of 
planning and co-ordination processes in the executive branch 
of government. It is commonly accepted that there are three 
branches in most modern governments. These are -
(a) the legislative branch which is responsible for 
the making of laws which control the society and 
of other branches of the government; 
(b) the executive branch which is responsible for the 
provision of community services and for the 
enforcement of controls specified by the legislative 
branch; 
(c) the judicial branch which determines the interpretation 
of the law in specific cases. 
This orientation towards the executive branch will be adopted 
because, as explained in Chapter 7, in the Queensland Government 
the executive branch is dominant. 
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Orientation Towards Queensland 
Other limitations will be accepted in order to orient the 
thesis towards the Queensland Government, Most illustrations 
of the arguments in the text will be based on Queensland 
examples (if possible) even though better examples may exist 
elsewhere. Furthermore since Queensland is in a first world 
nation (i.e. one of the Western Democracies) external examples 
which are used will usually be drawn from the experience of 
other first world nations. 
In addition the discussion will largely focus on issues as they 
affect Westminister style governments because this is the basis 
of the Queensland system. In these there is a partial fusion 
betv/een the executive and the legislative branches and the 
executive branch is controlled by a Cabinet of Ministers. 
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APPENDIX D - A SYSTEMATIC DEFINITION OF PLANNING 
General 
" P l a n n i n g " i s d e f i n e d i n a l m o s t e v e r y p a p e r d e a l i n g w i t h any 
a s p e c t of t h e s \ ± » j e c t . T h i s f r e q u e n t l y i n v o l v e s l i s t i n g t h e 
d e f i n i t i o n s g i v e n by o t h e r a u t h o r s and f o l l o w i n g t h i s w i t h 
y e t a n o t h e r s t a t e m e n t of w h a t t h a t w r i t e r wou ld l i k e 
" p l a n n i n g " t o b e . The p u r p o s e of t h i s a p p e n d i x i s t o p r o d u c e 
a s y s t e m a t i c d e f i n i t i o n of p l a n n i n g which w i l l e n a b l e t h e 
v a r i o u s c o n c e p t s r e l a t e d t o i t and o f t e n i d e n t i f i e d w i t h i t , 
t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d . 
The c o n f u s i o n a b o u t " p l a n n i n g " may be i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e 
r e s u l t s o f an e x p e r i m e n t t r i e d by t h e a u t h o r i n w h i c h a 
number of p r o f e s s i o n a l s and n o n - p r o f e s s i o n a l s i n v o l v e d i n 
v a r i o u s f i e l d s of " p l a n n i n g " w e r e a s k e d w h a t i t m e a n s . The 
r e p l i e s i n c l u d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g : -
(a) " g e t t i n g o r g a n i z e d b e f o r e h a n d " ; 
(b) " t h e w i s e and e f f i c i e n t u s e and management o f r e s o u r c e s 
o v e r t i m e and s p a c e " ; 
(c) " t r y i n g t o g a i n a c o n s e n s u s on a c e r t a i n t y p e o f 
d e v e l o p m e n t " ; 
(d) " t h e opt imum u s e o f l a n d and r e s o u r c e s f o r t h e f u t u r e " ; 
(e) " t h e e s t i m a t i o n of f u t u r e n e e d s of p e o p l e i n d e f i n e d 
s o c i e t a l s i t u a t i o n s b a s e d on an e v a l u a t i o n of p r e s e n t 
and p a s t n e e d s and t h e r ecommenda t ion t o a p p r o p r i a t e 
a u t h o r i t i e s o f d e v e l o p m e n t p r o p o s a l s t h a t m e e t f u t u r e 
r e q u i r e m e n t s " ; 
(f) " t h e a v o i d a n c e o f c h a o s " . 
The l i t e r a t u r e i s no more h e l p f u l a s t h e f o l l o w i n g random 
sample i n d i c a t e s : 
(a) " P l a n n i n g i s a p r o c e s s . . . of human t h o u g h t and a c t i o n 
1, The approach to the def in i t ion of planning used here follows from 
tha t in a number of books on systematic views of planning e .g . 
CHADWICK (1971), pp. 22-35 which i t s e l f or iginated in the work of 
BOULDING (1956), "The Image" and subsequently MILLER, GALANTER and 
PRIBRAM (1960). I t d i f fers however in introducing the concept 
of ex te rna l systems control to avoid confusion between in t e rna l and 
ex te rna l processes . 
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based on that thought"; 
(b) "Planning is the design of a desired future and of 
3 
effective ways of bringing it about"; 
(c) "Planning is the conscious pursuit of goals by means of 
formulation and implementation of strategies, policies, 
4 
and programmes based on scientific and technical studies"; 
(d) "In its broadest sense planning is the allocation of 
5 
scarce resources to achieve certain goals"; 
There is nowhere any reasonable consensus on what planning is. 
A good deal of the problem can be related to the fact that 
the goals and methods of "planning" in particular situations 
may be incorporated into the definition which therefore has 
no general significance. As noted by Friedmann "Planning 
invariably appears modified by adjectives such as regional, 
city, economic or industrial. These varied usages suggest 
the existence of a certain unity of approach in all forms of 
planning endeavour. A general theory of planning has not yet 
been written, but some common elements have been identified. 
Whenever these modes of thought are applied, there is a 
6 
presumption that planning is being done." Furthermore, in 
defining planning there is a tendency to deliver a lecture on 
how a plan should be prepared rather than attempting to 
examine fundamentals. There is often an implication that 
planning should be a rational procedure and that there is 
something good or desirable about it. 
However, a consistent and useful interpretation of the various 
meanings of "planning" may be derived from an examination of 
the behaviour of an organized system. Planning may be 
identified as an extremely general process which is devoid of 
2, CHADWICK (1971), p. 24. 
3, ACKOFF (19 70), p. 1. 
4 , QUEENSLAND, CO-ORDINATOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT ( u n d a t e d ) , " R e g i o n a l 
Planning and Regional C o - o r d i n a t i o n " , p . 4 . 
5 , FULLER (1974) , p . 13 , A s i m i l a r d e f i n i t i o n was g iven by EVERSLEY 
(1973), when he s a i d t h a t " the p l a n n e r . . . i s an a l l o c a t o r of 
s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s . " , p . 5 . 
6 , FRIEDMANN a96 3) , p . 6 1 , 
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v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s and on t h i s a l l o f t h e o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
may be c o n s t r u c t e d . 
The B e h a v i o u r o f an O r g a n i z e d S y s t e m 
An o r g a n i z e d s y s t e m i s one p o s s e s s i n g an h i e r a r c h i c a l p r o c e s s 
o f c o n t r o l (See Append ix B ) . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g a c c o u n t of t h e 
b e h a v i o u r o f s u c h a s y s t e m i t i s n o t i n t e n d e d t o s e e k 
r i g o r o u s p r o o f t h a t t h e model d i s c u s s e d i s a c c u r a t e . The 
o b j e c t i v e i s o n l y t o show t h a t b e h a v i o u r may be e x p l a i n e d i n 
a p e r f e c t l y o r g a n i z e d s y s t e m by t h e u s e of a s i m p l e model 
i n v o l v i n g a p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . 
The b e h a v i o u r o f an o r g a n i z e d s y s t e m i s a s e q u e n c e o f a c t i o n s 
( e . g . change o f l o c a t i o n , o r o f some o t h e r p r o p e r t y o f t h e 
sys tem) wh ich t h e s y s t e m p e r f o r m s o v e r a p e r i o d o f t i m e . The 
s i m p l e s t e x p l a n a t i o n of b e h a v i o u r i s t h a t of c a u s e and e f f e c t 
where t h e b e h a v i o u r o f t h e s y s t e m can be a c c o u n t e d f o r s i m p l y 
i n t e r m s of a s t i m u l u s a c t i n g upon i t ( e . g . a b a l l h i t by a 
c r i c k e t b a t r e s p o n d s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e l aws of m o t i o n ) . 
However, t h e b e h a v i o u r of complex s y s t e m s may n o t a l w a y s be 
e x p l a i n e d i n s u c h t e r m s * 
S e l f r e g u l a t i o n i s a w i d e l y o b s e r v e d p r o p e r t y of s t a b l e open 
s y s t e m s and t h i s p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l c l u e t o t h e way i n wh ich 
t h e b e h a v i o u r of s u c h s y s t e m s i s c o n t r o l l e d . S e l f r e g u l a t i o n 
r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e s y s t e m be a b l e t o n e u t r a l i z e t h e d i s t u r b i n g 
e f f e c t s o f any e x t e r n a l s t i m u l u s . T h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s 
u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d t o a s h o m e o s t a s i s and r e q u i r e s t h e e x i s t e n c e 
of n e g a t i v e f e e d b a c k l o o p s w h i c h r e s t o r e t o i t s r e q u i r e d 
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v a l u e any p a r a m e t e r a f f e c t e d by an e x t e r n a l s t i m u l u s . 
T h i s may be e x p l a i n e d by a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e r e e x i s t i n an 
o r g a n i z e d s y s t e m one o r more c o n t r o l u n i t s of t h e t y p e shown i n 
F i g u r e D l . T h i s may be c a l l e d a TOTE ( T e s t - O p e r a t e - T e s t - E x i t ) 
U n i t . ^ I t w o u l d e n a b l e a c t i v i t y t o be c o n t i n u e d u n t i l a 
Homeostasis s t r i c t l y refers to processes in b io log ica l organisms but 
may be extended to other types of systems. The necess i ty for t h i s 
process to dominate in the behaviour of na tura l organized systems 
follows from the fac t t ha t open systems which lack t h i s capacity 
would be suscept ib le t o being destroyed by external s t i m u l i . 
The TOTE iinit was used by MILLER, GALANTER and PRIBRAM (1960) to 
explain animal behaviour in a psychological sense. The concepts 
developed by these authors have been modified here for use i n other 
types of systems. 
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specific test was satisfied. The concept of a TOTE unit is 
quite general because it does not limit the nature of the 
test or of the control process involved. It could be based 
in the simplest sense on the physical, chemical and genetic 
properties of the system or in complex systems on decision 
making involving information processing. 
In an hierarchical system such TOTE units could be located in 
individual elements of a system and connected in an 
hierarchical structure. Thus, providing the tests to be sat-
isfied are ignored for the moment, this model provides a 
simple explanation of the self-regulating behaviour of an 
organized system. 
In order that a sequence of operations may be performed under 
t'he control of the central TOTE unit (which is not subject 
to control from higher in the hierarchy) a predetermining 
programme or pattern of these operations must be available 
to it. Such a pattern may be called a plan. The plan defines 
for the central TOTE unit the tests which it is to perform and 
the sequence in which they are to be performed. Figure D2 
shows a hypothetical system programmed by a plan to perform 
actions A, B and C in sequence. Given an appropriate plan 
behaviour which was not simple self-regulation would be 
possible. 
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Plan Formulation in Organized Systems 
In this simple model the behaviour of an organized system can 
be controlled by a hierarchical structure of TOTE units once 
a plan is given. The next component required in the model is 
a process whereby a plan may be fonnulated and this will be 
referred to as planning. 
Planning may be defined as the process of deteinnining the 
future behaviour of an organized system. I t is a universal 
characteristic of such systems even where there is no 
possibility of a plan being stored as a programme to guide 
future behaviour. In Appendix B, systems were classified 
into a number of levels ranging from static structures up to 
social organizations. That classification is, in effect, based 
on the plan formulation procedures of the systems. 
In the simplest systems planning is simply a process of cause 
and effect e.g. a static structure such as a road bridge 
behaves simply in accordance with the forces applied to i t . 
There is no question of storing a plan or of decision making 
in the planning process. 
Many systems however exhibit goal directed behaviour which can-
not be explained this way. In such systems a plan must be 
able to be stored but at the simplest level such as that of a 
cell i t is not necessary that decision making be possible. 
Goal directed behaviour implies that the system be able to 
predetermine a future event or system state and operate in 
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such a way as to bring it about. Where such a goal is internal 
to the system then simple homeostatic self regulation is a 
sufficient explanation for behaviour. This applies at the 
level of the cell and plant. 
Any goal directed process requires that the system have some 
appreciation of itself or of its environment. The concept of 
the "image" of an organized system has been used in explaining 
9 
the behaviour of complex systems. The image is a model which 
stores information which the organization receives and defines 
the test to be satisfied by the central TOTE unit (See 
Figure D3) . 
CONTROL 
ELEMENT 
ACTIVE 
ELEMENT 
FIGURE D3 FORMULATION OF ALTERNATE PLANS 
I n s y s t e m s a t t h e c e l l and p l a n t l e v e l s t h e image s i m p l y 
s t o r e s t h e v a l u e s o f t h e i n t e r a l v a r i a b l e s w h i c h t h e TOTE 
u n i t s wou ld e n d e a v o u r t o m a i n t a i n . However , i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s 
The importance of the "image" in the determination of behaviour was 
iden t i f i ed by BOULDING (1956), "The Image". According to Boulding an image 
i s present even in systems where behaviour i s a t the s i i tp les t 
level of homeostasis. He iden t i f i ed ten d i f fe ren t types of images in 
man including images of space and time and of the re la t ionships between 
objects in h i s environment, images of an individual as a person, of a 
scale of values , of emotions and affect ions and images r e l a t ed to 
consciousness, c e r t a in ty , r e a l i t y and ind iv idua l i t y . 
I t may be argued tha t goal d i rec ted behaviour i s possible without 
knowledge of the environment. Identifying such processes as learning, 
evolut ion, adapta t ion, growth and maturation as goal d i rec ted then i t 
i s apparent t ha t perhaps a l l that i s required i s in te rac t ion with the 
environment and not a model of i t . See SOMMERHOFF (1969) . However, i t 
i s hard to v i sua l i ze processes involving short term externa l ly goal 
d i rec ted behaviour which do not involve an image. 
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where g o a l s i n v o l v e t h e systems env i ronment , t he va lues of 
e x t e r n a l system v a r i a b l e s must be s t o r e d . E x t e r n a l l y 
o r i e n t e d p u r p o s e f u l b e h a v i o u r may c o n v e n i e n t l y be d i v i d e d 
i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s . The f i r s t occur s when an o r g a n i z a t i o n 
s e l e c t s a g o a l which i s r e s t o r a t i v e i . e . where the goa l 
co r re sponds t o a p r e v i o u s c o n d i t i o n which i t has e x p e r i e n c e d 
wh i l e the second i s a " d i s p l a c e d " g o a l which does no t 
co r respond t o such a p r i o r s t a t e . The s e l e c t i o n of a d i s p l a c e d 
goa l i s n o t p o s s i b l e , e x c e p t by chance , u n l e s s the sys tem 
p o s s e s s e s t he a b i l i t y t o make non-random s e l e c t i o n s between 
a l t e r n a t i v e s i . e . t o make d e c i s i o n s . This would r e q u i r e an 
image of s u f f i c i e n t complexi ty t o h o l d more than one a l t e r n a t i \ e , 
The components of t h e model of o r g a n i z e d behav iou r which have 
been i n t r o d u c e d so f a r a re a h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e of TOTE 
u n i t s , a p l a n and an image of s u f f i c i e n t complexi ty t o ho ld 
a l t e r n a t e p l a n s . The only f u r t h e r a d d i t i o n r e q u i r e d t o t h i s 
model i s t h e a b i l i t y t o r e a s o n . This i m p l i e s an a b i l i t y t o 
make h y p o t h e t i c a l m a n i p u l a t i o n s t o the systems image and 
exp lo re t h e consequences of t h e s e as a means of improving i t s 
a b i l i t y t o s e l e c t a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
Given t h e s e components even the most complex behav iou r of 
o r g a n i z e d systems may be e x p l a i n e d . B a s i c a l l y t h i s model was 
developed from the i d e a t h a t a system responds i n such a way 
as t o n e u t r a l i z e s t i m u l i . Even d i s p l a c e d pu rpose fu l b e h a v i o u r 
i s n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s . However, i t i s no t s u g g e s t e d 
10, Externally or iented purposeful behaviour means tha t for each 
var ia t ion in the environment a speci f ic response i s required by the 
system i f the goal i s to be achieved and tha t i f any of these 
va r ia t ions ac tua l ly take place the system must r eac t appropriately 
(ibid) , This could only be achieved where the system i s able to 
continual ly monitor i t s environment and correct i t s image in terms 
of current r e a l i t i e s . 
11, Displaced purposeful behaviour may be explained as neu t ra l i z ing the 
stimulus provided by a displaced goal . Another apparently d i f f i c u l t 
behaviour to explain i s a response which precedes the stimulus which 
causes i t . This can be explained by assuming tha t the frequent 
r epe t i t i on of the stimulvis allows the system to learn to take action 
p r i o r t o i t s occurrence to counter i t s e f fec t (e .g . an animal may 
ea t not because i t i s hungry but because i t w i l l be hungry i f i t does 
no t eat) , 
Other observed c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of na tura l systems are the a b i l i t y to 
l ea rn , to grow and to evolve i n to s t a t e s of grea ter i n t e r n a l 
s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . Without pursuing t h i s i n depth, learning could be 
suggested to involve the development, reinforcement and storage of 
plans for many e v e n t u a l i t i e s . Growth i s a lso cons is tent with the idea 
(continued next page) 
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t h a t t h i s model would e x p l a i n how t h e s e components of 
o r g a n i z e d b e h a v i o u r would a c t u a l l y work i n any g iven sy s t em. 
That would r e q u i r e a s tudy of the a c t u a l p r o p e r t i e s of t he 
sys tem. 
A l l t h a t h a s been shown i s t h a t t he d e f i n i t i o n of p l ann ing 
adopted h e r e makes sense i n a g e n e r a l e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e 
behav iou r of an o r g a n i z e d sys tem. 
C o - o r d i n a t i o n 
C o - o r d i n a t i o n i s d e f i n e d , for t h e purposes of t h i s t h e s i s as 
the achievement of u n i t y of a c t i o n by the p a r t s of a sy s t em. 
I t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t i n a p e r f e c t l y o r g a n i z e d system a 
h i e r a r c h y of TOTE u n i t s cou ld comple te ly c o n t r o l the behav iou r 
of a l l p a r t s and hence ensu re complete c o - o r d i n a t i o n . This i s 
s u b j e c t t o the r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t each e lement i n the h i e r a r c h y 
has the c a p a c i t y t o p r o c e s s a l l the i n fo rma t ion r e q u i r e d t o 
c o n t r o l the b e h a v i o u r of each p a r t below i t . 
I f t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s s a t i s f i e d then h i e r a r c h i c a l c o n t r o l w i l l 
be t he predominant p r o c e s s of c o - o r d i n a t i o n i n the sys t em. 
There a re , however, f i n i t e l i m i t a t i o n s on the i n fo rma t ion 
p r o c e s s i n g c a p a c i t y of any p a r t i n a system and for t h i s 
r e a s o n , and o t h e r s , t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l c o n t r o l p r o c e s s i n an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n may b reak down. 
I m p e r f e c t l y Organized Systems 
An i m p e r f e c t l y o r g a n i z e d system i s one i n which the h i e r a r c h i -
c a l c o n t r o l s t r u c t u r e i s i nadequa t e t o c o n t r o l a l l behav iou r 
of t h e sy s t em. In such a system n o t a l l behav iou r may be 
de te rmined c e n t r a l l y and the d i s c u s s i o n of p l a n n i n g above only 
a p p l i e s t o the c o r p o r a t e behav iou r of t h e system ( i . e . 
b e h a v i o u r of t h e sys tem as a w h o l e ) . In such a system c o -
o r d i n a t i o n may be ach ieved n o t only by h i e r a r c h i c a l c o n t r o l 
b u t a l s o by non h i e r a r c h i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the p a r t s 
11, (continued from previous page). 
of neutralizing frequently recurring stimuli i . e . by incorporating them 
into the system i t se l f . Evolution into states of greater internal 
specialization does not require an assumption that the system desires to 
become be t t e r . A frequently repeated stimulus may be more efficiently 
handled i f only part of the system needs to respond to i t and systems 
which learn to do this have an evolutionary advantage over those which 
do not . 
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of the system. The relevance of planning in an imperfectly 
organized systems may be seen by considering the development 
of an organization out of an aggregate of similar systems, 
A group of organized systems between whom there are no 
relationships will each act independently and a group plan is 
not possible. However, if these systems continually interact 
group determined behaviour is possible providing each of the 
systems surrender part of the control of their own behaviour 
to a hierarchical process in the forming system. This will 
then constitute an imperfectly organized system to the extent 
that part of i ts behaviour may s t i l l be determined autonomously 
by the sub-systems i t contains. 
In such an imperfectly organized system one element might be 
identified which was tending to become the control point for 
the total system. In order to form a larger system i t 
would have to exert controls over systems in i ts environment 
( i .e . external systems control) (See Figure .D4) . 
o 
EXTERNAL SYSTEMS 
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ORGANIZING 
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FIGURE D4 ORGANIZING AN AGGREGATION OF SYSTEMS 
Planning and External Systems Control by Government 
If a government is considered as such an organizing agent in 
a larger system the conflicting concepts of government "planning' 
may be identified. Planning is the process by which the 
government determines i t s future behaviour. This behaviour 
will involve both internally and externally oriented actions. 
In general external actions would produce a completely random 
modification to i t s environment. However, if external 
activity is goal directed ( i .e . by constraining some real world 
variable) then the government is attempting to become the 
control element of a larger organized system. Such external 
systems control is an organization extending activity and, if 
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it is successful, planning may also be a relevant concept in 
the larger system. 
Social "planning", town "planning", economic "planning", 
transportation "planning" are frequently used concepts in the 
literature of the planning sciences. However, from the 
perspective of a government itself these processes are not 
planning at all but rather external systems control. Insofar 
as. both planning and external systems control usually involve 
an imperfect hierarchical control process, the operations 
involved in each are similar but in a logical sense they are 
not the same process. 
In the literature a great deal of effort has been devoted to 
identifying ideal "planning" processes without making this 
distinction and hence without identifying the system in which 
the process was to operate. In fact it is essential tliat the 
nature of the system be defined before a planning process be 
designed. In discussing planning in a human organization the 
characteristics of such an organization must be considered 
while in considering planning in an external system an entirely 
different set of considerations are important. This thesis 
is primarily concerned with government planning though external. 
systems control will be discussed in more detail in Appendix E. 
Planning is an essential component of the behaviour of an 
organized system but external systems control may not be. The 
control by an organization of those parts of its environment 
which have a great influence on it is advantageous because it 
can thereby eliminate unwanted stimuli. Thus all organizations 
may endeavour to control external systems, but they will not 
always be successful because other organizations will be 
competing with them. The most successful hvraian organizations 
in external system control are governments and this is one of 
the main reasons for their existence-
Plan Formulation in Human Organizations 
Man is capable of conscious reasoned decision making and of 
rapidly developing complex social organizations. Thus planning 
processes in human organizations may be of a higher order 
than in other organized systems. However, while a theoretical 
ideal planning process for human organizations may be 
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identified, i t may not usually be achieved in practice. 
The theoretical ideal planning process which is widely accepted 
in the literature is one which involves clear identification 
of goals, rational decision making and continuous monitoring 
of progress. (See Figure D5) The required characteristics 
of this process will be considered briefly below. 
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Definition of Goals 
The definition of goals is required to enable a purpose 
oriented plan to be prepared and to enable progress to be 
reviewed. The difficulties associated with goal formulation 
are discussed in relation to a non centralized human 
organization (specifically a government) in Chapter 6. Many 
of these would apply in any human organization except that the 
procedural difficulties identified there may be characteristic 
of non centralized government. 
The actual goals of human organizations whether formally defined 
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o r n o t , a r e more l i k e l y t o be e s s e n t i a l l y r e s t o r a t i v e t han 
d i s p l a c e d . Few o r g a n i z a t i o n s would have no goa l s because 
t h i s would imply t h a t the end s t a t e towards which i t was 
heading was randomly v a r y i n g . However, as i n a l l s y s t e m s , 
goa l s o r i e n t e d towards r e s t o r a t i o n of the s t a t u s quo a r e much 
s i m p l e r than a r e d i s p l a c e d g o a l s . R e s t o r a t i v e purposes 
produce " h o m e o s t a t i c " p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s e s such as a re shown by • 
Ca). c o n s e r v a t i v e r e a c t i o n s t o proposed changes ( i . e . the 
i n e r t i a of o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) ; 
(b) de fens ive r e a c t i o n s t o t h r e a t s ; 
(c) p o s i t i v e a c t i o n t o c o r r e c t any c o n d i t i o n which does n o t 
conform t o t he o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s image of the wor ld as i t 
used t o be e . g . maintenance ( f i l l i n g a p o t ho le i n a 
road) o r c l e a n i n g up a f t e r a d i s a s t e r . 
There i s n o t h i n g wrong wi th h o m e o s t a t i c p l a n n i n g by human 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s b e c a u s e , a f t e r a l l , i t i s the b a s i s r e q u i r e m e n t 
for any s t a b l e sys tem and i t i s p robab ly b e s t t±iat r o u t i n e day 
to day p l a n n i n g i n a human o r g a n i z a t i o n be based on t h i s . 
R a t i o n a l i t y 
R a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n making may be de f ined as d e c i s i o n making i n 
accordance w i th t h e fo l lowing r u l e s -
(a) a l l a l t e r n a t i v e s would be i d e n t i f i e d ; 
(b) t he consequences of each a l t e r n a t i v e would be i d e n t i f i e d ; 
(c) t he e f f e c t s of each a l t e r n a t i v e would be e v a l u a t e d ; 
(d) t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e which was " b e s t " would be s e l e c t e d . 
R a t i o n a l i t y r e q u i r e s t he e x i s t e n c e of c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d g o a l s 
because w i t h o u t them, t h e e v a l u a t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e s and the 
s e l e c t i o n of t h e " b e s t " would be m e a n i n g l e s s . The s t r i c t l y 
r a t i o n a l model i s wide ly h e l d t o be t he way i n which human 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s do o r shou ld make d e c i s i o n s . However, i t i s 
uncommon fo r an o r g a n i z a t i o n to even approach i t . The 
r e a s o n s a r e -
(a) t he c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l a l t e r n a t i v e s i s u s u a l l y imposs -
i b l e . The number of v a r i a b l e s and a l t e r n a t i v e s i n any 
r e a l d e c i s i o n w i l l be very l a r g e b u t human be ings a r e 
c a p a b l e of p r o c e s s i n g only a very l i m i t e d number. 
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Furthermore an organization will not consider all 
alternatives because many of them could obviously never 
be implemented. The practical alternatives which an 
organization has are usually only the incremental ones 
12 (i.e. those involving small changes to the status quo); 
(b) prediction of the consequences of alternatives is plagued 
by uncertainty because the relationships which exist in 
the system in question may be unknown and because, in a 
turbulent environment, unforeseeable changes may be 
13 initiated in the environment itself; 
(c) the construction of the.single value scale required for 
precise evaluation of the best alternative is not feasible. 
Individual humans are not solely guided by rationality and it 
is not reasonable to expect more of human organizations than 
is required of their members. In a small human organization 
the necessary analytical capacity would not be available for 
the achievement of greater rationality than an individual is 
capable of, while in a large organization, problems will be 
more complex and decision making will be dispersed. 
A Realistic Model 
The "ideal" method of planning in a human organization which 
was identified above is too demanding and it has been suggested 
that the best type of decision making which can regularly be 
expected of human beings would be one which simply pursued 
. , 14 
satisfactory solutions rather than optimal ones. 
A practical approach to planning was suggested by Etzioni as 
a middle course between the excessively demanding "ideal" 
planning process and the completely undemanding incremental 
model. """^  His "mixed scanning" model will be used throughout 
12. For a d i s c u s s i o n of i nc r e i t en t a l i sm see LINDBLOM (1965) and LINDBLOM, 
(1959) . 
13 , See Appendix E as r ega rds t u r b u l e n t env i ronments . 
14, SIMON (1956) 
15. ETZIONI (1967), His model is, in fact, a reasonable one because 
it reflects the actual behaviour of individual human being. Increment-
al behaviour is the general rule but sudden change is possible when 
real threats develop (e.g. a person walking along a road with his 
mind apparently fully occupied, will detect, and then focus his 
attention on getting out of the way of a car which is about to hit 
him) . 
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this thesis. Essentially it suggests that routine planning in 
a human organization be based on homeostasis while allowing 
incremental changes in response to stimuli which the 
organization cannot neturalize. At the same time the 
organization should conduct broad scale scanning of its 
environment to detect potential problems. 
Thus, in proposing a planning system for the Queensland 
Government, it is suggested that use be made of routine 
incremental adjustments to government activities combined 
with periodic fundamental reviews. (See Chapters 8 and 9) . 
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APPENDIX E - EXTERNAL SYSTEMS CONTROL 
(Seneral 
Governments are inevitably involved in the control of external 
systems. This means that they will endeavour to ensure that 
certain real world variables maintain a required value or do 
not deviate by more than a certain amount from that value. 
Control must be based on an input to the system to be 
influenced. Various types of such inputs are discussed below. 
Not all inputs will act to control a system because, as 
noted in Appendix D, external actions by a government may have 
a purely random or non-directed effect on its environment. 
It is only if they are directed that they constitute a means 
of controlling a system and thus virtually act to extend the 
government organization by incorporating the systembeing controlled. 
To be successful in controlling a system a sequence of inputs 
is required, directed by a negative feedback - i.e. the 
inputs should always be so directed as to restore the variable 
to its desired value. 
Theoretically a government could control any variable in its 
environment, e.g. the use of a block of land, the number of 
grains of sand on a beach, the cost of a kilogram of salt or 
the number of bushfires in a year. Obviously some variables 
are more amenable to control than others and those which 
governments have traditionally regarded as being controllable 
were identified in Appendix C. Other variables may be 
regarded as being either too expensive or of too little 
significance to control. 
Two different types of systems which a government may endeavour 
to control may be distinguished. The first of these would be 
natural boundary maintaining systems in which a government's 
involvement would complement, compete with or destroy natural 
homeostatic mechanisms. The second type of system would 
include artificial systems and others which were not boundary 
maintaining. Many of the systems which man creates (e.g. 
transport systems, water supply systems, hospital systems, etc.) 
depend on man's continued involvement to maintain them in the 
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face of entropic decay. Such systems do not necessarily 
exhibit homeostatic responses to control by government. 
Rationale for External Systems Control 
The extent to which governments attempt to control external 
systems is the siobject of debate because such systems often 
involve hmnan beings and controlling the system may involve 
restricting their freedom. It has been suggested that 
there are two reasons for government involvement in external 
systems control. The first of these is the perceived 
turbulent nature of the social, political and economic en-
vironment which government action can stabilize while the 
second relates to the widespread belief that man can improve 
his conditions of life by deliberate action. There can be 
no doubt that, in the past, governmental control has 
frequently been beneficial. 
In Appendix F it will be argued that centralized human 
organizations are one of the causes of turbulence in the 
social, political and economic environments. If a govern-
ment's external systems control is purely homeostatic (i.e. 
it acts to restore the status quo in response to any change) 
then it may have a stabilizing effect. However, if it 
deliberately pursued displaced goals (and adapts to environ-
mental changes so as to continue to pursue these goals) then 
it will also produce a simplified environment and perhaps 
worsen the problem. 
Methods of Control 
The most useful method of classifying methods of controls of 
external systems is into those which are direct and those 
which are indirect. A direct control may be considered to 
be one in which the government specifically and directly 
controls the variable in which it is interested, either by 
1. WESTERN (1977), p. 3, The author actually refers to "planning" but 
then defines it as "a form of intervention" i.e. as external systems 
control in the context of t±is thesis. 
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activities which modify its environment (e.g. building a dam 
to conserve water or maintaining roads as they wear out) or 
by explicit involvement in every transaction in which it is 
interested (e.g. by requiring approval to every proposed 
action of a particular type). An indirect control is one 
in which one variable is directly altered because of the 
expected consequential effects that this will have on the 
desired variable (which may not be accessible to direct 
control). Indirect controls could be achieved through: 
(a) The Government's role as a producer of community 
services (e.g. roads, water, health etc.). These 
services can be supplied or not supplied in such ways 
as to modify certain characteristics of the societ:y. 
For example, by providing a greater amount of education 
services, the government could increase the education 
level of a society or by building roads in certain areas 
land use patterns can be modified. Government is 
deeply involved in providing network services (e.g. 
transportation and communications, power and water 
reticulation) which are closely related to spatial 
activities and such network services provide a powerful 
means of indirect control. 
(b) The government's role as a consumer (including pseudo-
consumption through subsidies and similar incentives). 
If the profitability of an industry fell below the 
level which a government wished to maintain it could be 
supported until its profitability increased. 
(c) Taxes. The ability of the government to take selectively 
may modify the community's behaviour. 
(d) Persuasion. This could be a particularly reliable 
means of control of the government where the government 
had a special moral standing (e.g. in theocracy) 
though in many other cases the use of techniques of 
changing people's views may be a powerful means of 
control (e.g. propaganda, oratory, advertising, 
education). 
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Legislation is an obvious control technique used by govern-
ments, yet it is not possible to classify it as either 
strictly direct or indirect. It may seek to directly prescribe 
the required value of a variable (e.g. a speed limit) and is 
virtually involved in every transaction, if it sets the rules 
under which the transactions take place (with threats of 
punishment for non-compliance) but is always liable to 
avoidance and thus does not guarantee the required result as 
might other more direct forms of control. 
A distinction is often made in the literature between 
positive and negative controls (i.e. those which require a 
specification and those which forbid one, e.g. compare 
compulsory education and the prohibition of murder). However 
such a distinction is not really relevant because it is apparent 
that legislation, which is in a special category in any case, 
is the only technique of negative control available. All 
other controls are essentially positive in that they involve 
some sort of direct input to the system in question. 
It might be noted in passing that taking no action (the "null" 
alternative) may sometimes achieve a government goal but 
persistent non action can never be considered to achieve 
control of any system. 
System Responses 
The essential systemic nature of the things which governments 
wish to control has only fairly recently become widely 
recognized.^ Some of the characteristics of systems were 
discussed in Appendices B and D and in the following some 
important implications of external systems control by 
government will be raised. 
Precise control of a system requires compliance with the law 
of requisite variety.^ This requires that every independent 
variable in the system be matched by an independent variable 
2. See McLOUGHLIN (1969) and CHADWICK (1971) 
3. ASHBY (1956), 
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in the government. As the variety of any real world system 
may be very great, the variety of the government control may 
easily be significantly smaller. In practical terms this 
means that a government may control two or three variables 
in a real world system, but the system itself may have 20 
variables. Thus control of real world systems will seldom 
be precise. The value of any real world variable may be 
determined by many factors apart from the government and the 
government must recognise this competition for control from 
other himian and natural forces. 
Any attempt at total control of a naturally self regulating 
system may be dangerous because this would completely 
eliminate tlie homeostatic responses which could help to 
overcome the effect of a catastrophically bad decision (from 
ignorance or ideology) made by a government. 
Because of the general homeostatic nature of any stable real 
world system, such a system will usually tend to react to 
minimise the effect of any control if the law of requisite 
variety is not complied with. Where control is indirect 
(i.e. one variable is controlled because it is believed that 
this will influence another in the desired direction) there 
are often unexpected homeostatic responses which can drive 
the variable in question in the opposite direction to the 
one in which it is intended to go. This is described as 
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the counter intuitive nature of system responses. Because 
of this, indirect endeavours to control external systems 
must often be based on sophisticated analysis if they are to 
be successful. However, the average man may not be able 
to perform such an analysis or understand its results and may 
disbelieve its conclusions if they are counter intuitive. 
Unless external systems (particularly complex ones containing 
many feedbacks) are perceived and analysed as systems, then 
their control must be uncertain. 
Furthermore, it is not always clear just what system 
encompasses the most important relationships between any given 
4 . FORRESTER ( 1 9 6 9 ) , p p . 109-110 
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variables, especially when systems adapt and their very nature 
changes. In such cases experts v^ ill argue about what should 
be done. Thus attempts at indirect controls of complex 
stable systems will almost inevitably be frought with problems. 
In order to simplify, and thus make more manageable, the 
systems with which a government has to deal, it is usually 
found necessary to reduce the spatial and functional scale 
of problems by specialisation of control tasks. 
Secondary Controls 
Another point arising directly out of the homeostatic response 
ot stable systems is the inevitability of developing 
secondary controls (often of details) to support primary 
direct or indirect controls in an attempt to match the 
variety of the system being controlled. To take a common 
example, the use of money as a medium of control by higher 
levels of government over lower levels of government, or by 
the government over economic variables, leads to the need 
for more detailed "accounting" controls to ensure that 
persons or organisations do not optimise their own benefits 
by using the money for a purpose other than the one intended. 
The detailed secondary controls may cause considerable 
expense and even more deformation of decision making than 
the primary controls. 
Evaluation of Controls 
Systems control is always at some cost. This follows directly 
from the entropic statement of the second law of thermo-
dynamics which broadly states that the entropy (disorder) in 
any given closed system will always increase and never 
decrease. External systems control is an order creating 
process and thus must require inputs of negative entropy. 
Unless such negative entropy comes from some other source, 
it must be supplied at cost to government. Hence a govern-
ment with limited resources must accept limitations on the 
external systems control it attempts. 
Evaluating a proposed mechanism for the control of a system 
is not a trivial exercise. It is necessary to determine 
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what are the cos ts and what are to be the b e n e f i t s . As wel l 
as d i r e c t money cos ts there w i l l be s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
costs i f hioman beings are con t ro l l ed and do not wish to be . 
The l a t t e r cos t i s d i f f i c u l t t o eva lua te and may change with 
t ime. 
Another problem i s l inked t o the quest ion of time sca le and 
of the a t t e n t i o n which should be given to the long term 
agains t sho r t term s t a t e of the system. Governments are 
sometimes pressured to take shor t term views of t h e i r problems 
and when the shor t and long term requirements for the con t ro l 
of a system are to any ex t en t opposed there i s a p o t e n t i a l 
for great d i f f i c u l t i e s . This can occur when some fundamental 
change to a system i s requi red because of permanent 
environmental changes. Acting homeos ta t ica l ly , the system may 
generate pressures on the government to support i t s e x i s t i n g 
s t r u c t u r e - and t h i s the government may do, even though, taking 
a longer term view, i t s bes t approach may be to hasten the 
system change to a new s t r u c t u r e . I f extensive cont ro l of 
a system i s to be sought i t may be e s s e n t i a l to take such a 
long term view. 
5. What is seen by one generation as most stringent control may, by the 
next, be absorbed into i ts culture. There may have been strong 
resistance to the prohibition of child labour during the industrial 
revolution in Great Britain but few would now feel that this was 
restrictive. 
6, Pressure groups do not usually exist to reflect the interests of future 
generations against the interest of persons currently involved. 
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APPENDIX F - CENTRALIZATION 
General 
Centralization has a number of implications. It could refer 
to a concentration or dispersal of tasks in an organization 
or to the physical distribution of population and industry in 
a spatial area. This appendix deals only with centralization 
within a single governmLont structure (e.g. the Queensland 
Government) and not with spatial location issues. Further-
more, centralization as it might affect overlapping governments 
in a federation will not be considered. 
Even confining the discussion to centralization in a single 
hierarchy, the concept remains complex. Firstly it could 
be considered in the context of specialization where it is 
apparent that a task could be centralized spatially (for 
example) by transferring responsibility for it from a spatial 
specialist agency to a functional or process specialist. 
Secondly, the task could be centralized by removing it from 
the province of all specialist agencies and locating it 
within the executive group. 
While any task in government could be centralized the tasks 
of decision making and planning are of most significance. In 
the following, centralization is discussed in terms of 
relocation of decision making though it will be apparent that 
an actual task could be relocated at the same time as 
decision making about it. 
Centralization Through Changes to Specialization 
In Chapter 3 it is pointed out that agencies in government 
are usually specialized by f\inction, process and location. 
Removal of decision making (or an actual task) from a 
specialist agency of a particular type and relocating it 
in another type of specialist agency may be referred to as 
centralization of that particular type. Thus spatial 
centralization involves removing decision making from 
spatial specialists and its location in either process 
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or functional specialization. 
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This is illustrated in Fig. 
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FIGURE Fl SPECIALIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION 
The advan tages of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of any p a r t i c u l a r type a r e 
n a t u r a l l y t h e r e v e r s e of t h e advan tages of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of 
t h a t type which a r e d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter 3 . C e n t r a l i z a t i o n 
s imply i n v o l v i n g ad jus tmen t s t o s p e c i a l i z a t i o n w i l l n o t be 
c o n s i d e r e d f u r t h e r below. 
1. This introduces two counter-intuitive concepts of centralization 
namely functional and process centralization. In tJiose 
dimensions centralization would conventionally be thought of 
as equivalent to (rather than the reverse of) specialization. 
For example, transferring responsibility for computer operations 
from an individual functional agency to a process special is t 
would be tJiought of as both process specialization and process 
central ization. However in order to be consistent, removing 
such responsibil i ty from a functional agency and relocating 
i t in a process special is t i s functional centralization and 
process specialization. 
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General Centralization of Planning 
The second concept of centralization in a government 
organization is that decision making about a specific matter 
could be removed from all specialist agencies and relocated 
in the executive group. 
The advantage of total centrality and completely corporate 
planning is that (in an idealized organization) it could 
produce better results than would be possible if the 
organization contained two or more decision centres. With 
more than one decision centre conflicting action will be 
possible and the organization's output can never be greater 
than that which is possible from a single optimal decision. 
The "ideal" human organization in which this was true would 
be one in which all activity was based on goal oriented 
rational decision making, where internal communication and 
control were completely frictionless, where central data 
processing and control could match the variety of the real 
world and where the organization's image of itself and of its 
environment was perfect. 
The extent to which these extremely demanding conditions are 
not met m a real organization provides the scope for a non 
centralised organization to perform as well as or better than 
a completely centralized one. On the grounds of rationality 
of decision making neither a centralized nor a plural 
organization has any particular advantage as both suffer 
from the extra rational processes involved in hum.an decision 
making. Internal communication and control is not 
frictionless in a real organization and the variety of the 
real world is so great as to outstrip any hiiman attempt to 
systematize it. Thus on some matters specilized agencies 
will make better decisions than a central decision maker 
and even if an attempt were to be made to create complete 
centrality, some delegation would be essential. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of General Centralization 
Specific advantages of general centralization in a government 
are as to Hows: 
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(a) the ability of a government to rapidly change its 
organization as a corporate whole is improved. This 
may be particularly important if there is a wide 
divergence between reality and government goals or 
where there is an urgent need for rapid changes (e.g. 
to prepare for war); 
(b) decisions would be made by persons with a wide 
perspective of government goals who were in a position 
to make trade-offs between inconsistent goals. In a 
non centralized organization incJividua! decisions may be 
made in agencies which are unable to make optimum 
decisions for the government as a whole because of their 
inability to appropriate all the benefits or to incur 
2 
all the costs associated with their decisions ; 
(c) decisions will tend to be made by more competent people. 
In any organization the supply of such persons will be 
limited and their usefulness will be greatest if they 
are placed in a situation where important decisions are 
being made. 
Many difficulties are associated with a general centralization 
some of which directly detract from the above advantages. 
Firstly, for reasons which are discussed in Chapter 4, the 
actual creation of a system of centralized control is 
extremely difficult. 
Secondly, while a centralized organization should be able 
to rapidly adjust to external changes, in doing so it may 
destabilize its social environment. This point is pursued 
further, later in this Appendix. A non centralized 
organization may be slow to make extensive overall changes 
(i.e. it will be more conservative) but once a decision is 
made to start work in a new direction it will be pursued 
with greater commitment by the persons who made it than if 
2. Only a single central decision could be guaranteed to be optimal 
and the best decision by a specific agency will only coincidentally 
correspond to it. The best decision from an overall government 
point of view will usually be at least partially sub-optimal for 
the agency concerned. See CHADWICK (1971), p.305. 
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3 i t were handed down by a planning a u t h o r i t y . Furthermore 
non c e n t r a l i z e d organiza t ions w i l l make small changes ( e . g . 
by experimentat ion with new approaches wi th in one agency) 
more rap id ly than w i l l a c e n t r a l i z e d system. The l a t t e r 
may be much less f l e x i b l e . 
Thirdly , while in a decen t r a l i zed organiza t ion optimal 
decision making i s not p o s s i b l e , i t i s a lso probably a myth 
in a c e n t r a l i z e d o r g a n i z a t i o n . The information system 
required for anything approaching optimal decis ion making 
by a c e n t r a l decis ion maker would be almost impossible 
to c r e a t e . 
Fourthly, i t might be quest ioned what the more "competent" 
people who might be a t t r a c t e d to a c e n t r a l planning agency 
are competent a t . Perhaps they might be the most i n t e l l i g e n t 
group bu t , because of t h e i r l imi t ed capaci ty to absorb 
information, they may be l e s s capable than an experienced 
s p e c i a l i s t i n deciding a s p e c i f i c ques t ion . Another 
c r i t i o n for competence apa r t from i n t e l l i g e n c e could be 
holding a wide pe r spec t ive on a problem. In t h i s sense 
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n would-be s e l f perpe tua t ing because a p o t e n t i a l 
delegee who continues to be p ro tec t ed by others w i l l never 
gain a wider p e r s p e c t i v e . Furthermore, a person placed in 
a c r i t i c a l p o s i t i o n on the b a s i s of competence may l a t e r lose 
t h i s competence e i t h e r through f a i l u r e to adapt to change, or 
through a person problem such as age, overwork, alcoholism 
or family d i f f i c u l t i e s . At the be s t such an i nd iv idua l 
could then cause c o n f l i c t while a t the worst he would 
completely s t i f l e e f f e c t i v e p lanning . In a non c e n t r a l i z e d 
government, power i s d ispersed and no ind iv idua l should be 
in a p o s i t i o n to abuse h i s power or c rea te extreme problems 
i f he were incompetent . 
3. I t is probable that the professional managers of the specialized 
agencies of a government will prefer the non centralized option 
because of their own need for motivation. Centralized planning 
could st if le resourcefulness and initiative in such agencies. A 
widely held practical guideline in organization theory is that 
the persons involved in carrying out a specific task should be 
involved in planning i t . 
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General c e n t r a l i z a t i o n in government may make the dec is ion 
cent re very remote from the e x t e r n a l world and o u t s i d e r s with 
a r e a l need to pene t ra te to t h i s cen t re may have to expend 
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s i g n i f i c a n t time and e f f o r t to do so . Thus though the re 
might be i n t e r n a l economies in c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i t i s not 
c e r t a in t h a t there might not be diseconomies for a soc ie ty 
as a whole. Non c e n t r a l i z a t i o n would make channels of 
communication between dec is ion makers and the r e a l world 
s h o r t e r , s impler and l e s s l i a b l e to information over load. 
Because of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of communicating a l l r e l evan t 
information to a s ing le p o i n t , an at tempt a t c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 
may r e s u l t in dec i s ions which are not responsive to the 
r e a l s i t u a t i o n ( i . e . the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s image of i t s 
environment may be very poor ) . 
As well as c e n t r a l i z i n g planning, a government could seek to 
c e n t r a l i z e e x t e r n a l systems c o n t r o l . This faces a l o g i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t y because the re i s no unique way of def ining the 
ex te rna l systems with which a government d e a l s . The same 
elements could v a l i d l y be included in d i f f e r e n t systems. 
Central con t ro l of ex t e rna l systems would requi re the 
d e f i n i t i o n of a s i ng l e s e t of systems because m u l t i p l e , over-
lapping s e t s of systems would be very d i f f i c u l t to handle . 
Yet the same sys.terns may not be appropr ia te for a l l purposes. 
A non c e n t r a l i z e d government can i m p l i c i t l y define an 
i ncons i s t en t s e t of overlapping systems because spec i a l i zed 
agencies deal with only one or two systems which are s u i t a b l e 
for t h e i r purpose. 
General Cen t r a l i z a t i on and S t a b i l i t y 
For anyone but an ac t i ve r evo lu t iona ry , s t a b i l i t y i s a 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which should be requi red of a s o c i a l system. 
4. One of the l ess des i rable aspects usually associated with bureaucracy 
i s the r e s u l t of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . This i s tha t the persons with whom 
the publ ic deals d i r e c t l y are unable to make s ign i f i can t dec is ions . 
5. CROZIER (1964) quotes a case drawn from French publ ic administrat ion 
where there were many leve ls in an organization and decisions were 
cen t ra l ized but the information required to make them was held 
elsewhere, 
6. An a l t e r n a t i v e for a cen t ra l planning author i ty would be to regard 
the government's environment as a s ingle system. This would be 
unmanageably complex. 
F-7 
This does not mean that change is bad but that iinstable 
change (i.e. that proceeding rapidly without any obvious end 
state) is undesirable. Stability can be examined at two 
levels - in the first place as a factor within an 
organization and secondly as it concerns the organization's 
relationships with its environment. 
In an organization stability is dependent on its ability to 
respond to external changes and on the absence of internal 
instability. The latter requires -
(a) the absence of inconsistent control mechanisms. An 
organization possessing two or more independent control 
centres to which it attempts to respond will necessarily 
be unstable. Where more than one decision making centre 
is involved it is necessary that they be arranged in a 
hierarchical structure or else that the domain of each 
be established. 
(b) the absence of centrifugal tendencies which are powerful 
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enough to fragment it. This requires in general that 
the benefits to the members of the organization of main-
taining it are greater than those of breaking it up. 
A centralized organization will be stable if it is competently 
controlled and potentially unstable if its leaders make 
serious mistakes. A non centralized organization will be 
stable, providing its many decision centres fall into a 
hierarchical pattern, because of the many homeostatic 
mechanisms it will contain. 
An organization however exists in an environment of other 
organizations. General centralization of planning within 
an organization, or the consolidation of independent 
organizations, produces a "simpler" social system in the sense 
that there are fewer independent decision makers and fewer 
7. A social club consisting of persons who each disliked all of the 
others would be an example of an organization with such centrifugal 
tendencies. 
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stabilizing negative feedbacks. 
Where an organization is confronted with an environment which 
changes rapidly its best strategy may be to centralize to 
facilitate rapid response to those changes. However, if it 
is a large organization, its decision will have widespread 
repercussions and other organizations will then be confronted 
by an increasingly turbulent social and economic environment 
and will tend to react in the same way (i.e. by centraliz-
tion). Boulding has drawn attention to the major changes 
which have characterized the twentieth century in terms of 
growth in the scale of organization at both the national 
9 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l s . 
The r e s u l t i n g i n c r e a s e d i n t e r c o n n e c t e d n e s s has p roduced , i n 
some a r e a s , what Emery and T r i s t r e f e r to as t u r b u l e n t 
f i e l d s . In a t u r b u l e n t f i e l d dynamic p r o c e s s e s which c r e a t e 
s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a t i o n s for an o r g a n i z a t i o n a r i s e from t h e 
environment i t s e l f . These a u t h o r s sugges t t h a t s t a b i l i t i y 
can only be ach ieved in such an environment by t h e development 
8, This may be compared with the ecological concept of a simplif ied 
* environment. I f a complex environment i s transformed in to a 
simpler one (e .g . a complex fores t replaced by a monoculture) then 
the r e su l t i ng system i s suscept ible to t o t a l dest ruct ion by external 
changes which may have had no ef fec t on the p re -ex i s t ing complete 
environment with i t s well developed homeostatic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , 
9, BOULDING (1953). 
10, EMERY and TRIST (1965). Other types of environments were identified 
in t:heir paper as placid or disturbed reactive. A placid environ-
ment is one which is relatively unchanging. It may be further 
classified depending on whether benefits and costs are randomly dis-
tributed in the environment or are clustered. If they are random 
then an organization need give no thought to its behaviour because 
no matter what it does the result will be the same. However if the 
benefits are clustered in the environment then an organization must 
actively seek t:hem out and survival becomes critically dependent on 
what an organization'knows of its environment. In a placid environ-
ment each organization may only be of negligible size in relation to 
its environment. In a clustered environment if there are a limited 
number of similar relatively large organizations each operating in 
the same area then the environment will be disturbed reactive. 
Such an environment is changing and reacts to the actions of an 
individual organization. "Each organization does not simply take 
account of the others when they meet at random, but has also to 
consider that what it knows can also be known by the others." 
ibid, p,25 . 
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of "some relationships between dissimilar organizations whose 
fates are, basically, positively correlated. This means 
relationships that will maximize co-operation and which 
recognize that no one organization can take over the role 
of the other and become paramount". Such co-operation 
and the creation of the organizational matrix they suggest 
is, in fact, a requirement for further extension of the 
scale of organization to achieve stability. 
Ultimately there can only be two solutions to the problem 
of turbulent social and economic environments generated by 
large scale organizations. The first is the creation of 
a single over-riding organization, which would necessarily be 
a world government. The second method would be the 
deliberate decentralization of large corporate structures. 
Though the method by which such decentralization could be 
achieved is difficult to see without compulsion from 
national governments (or a global government), it is 
apparent that the determination of effective methods of 
12 
non-centralized planning would be a considerable advantage. 
It is argued in this thesis that the existence of a Co-
ordinator-General could improve the performance of certain 
types of non-centralized organizations. 
Governments occupy a unique position in a social environment 
because of their role of external systems control. Thus 
they may endeavour to control and stabilize an unstable 
social or economic environment. At the present time it is 
probably beyond the capacity of any national government 
(and certainly impossible for a state government) to achieve 
this because of the existence of large scale international 
organization. The Queensland Government (for example) 
11. Ibid, p. 29. 
12. In the author's opinion the question of system stability in an 
increasingly organized and centralized world ranks with the environ-
mental, energy and resource depletion issues in affecting the 
future of the human race. This matter, however, cannot be 
pursued further here. 
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should JDe seen as an element in a turbulent environment rather 
1 o 
than as the control point of such an environment. 
Another stability issue related to the centralization in a 
state government is significant in a federal system. A 
federal system is basically unstable because there are 
forces tending to consolidate it into a unitary state (i.e. 
desire for uniformity and increased efficiency through 
rationalisation of overlapping organizations) and forces 
tending to fragment it (i.e. desire for autonomy, specific 
economic advantages of secession etc.). Such stability 
as does exist is the result of the balance of these factors. 
The probability of stability is enhanced by the creation of 
a suitably integrated structure involving both levels of 
government. This requires the co-operation of individual 
subsections of the various governments' organizations and, 
if either a state or the federal government adopted a 
centralized structure,such co-operation would be inhibited. 
13. The contribution of a government towards the turbulence of an 
environment was discussed by EDWARDS and HARRIS (1977), 
14. MAY (1970), 
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APPENDIX G - MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN A GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 
General 
The problems which occur in the management of a government 
organization are diverse and dependent on the specific 
structure adopted. The purpose of this appendix is not to 
present a comprehensive account of this topic but rather to 
identify some of the most common issues raised in the 
literature. It is not intended that this provide a positive 
guideline as to how a government organization be managed, but 
simply to show the sorts of constraints which exist on the 
direct exercise of hierarchical authority. 
Leadership 
The first problem for the executive group is that politicians 
are often new and unskilled in the affairs of the agencies they 
are expected to direct. This may be a consequence of their 
selection to represent the community as a whole rather than on 
the basis of specialist skills. The qualities which achieve 
electoral success are not necessarily those required for 
executive competence. If a Minister lacks the drive and 
understanding required to force an agency to adopt a set of 
positive goals and to pursue them effectively then it is 
essential that the senior permanent officials involved make 
up the deficiency if the agency is to be efficient. The 
positive motivation of these officials can be extremely 
important in determining the effectiveness with which a 
government is managed. In the absence of such motivation they 
may perceive that their best strategy is to avoid energetic 
action because this simply generates work for themselves and 
their organizations. A consequence of such an attitude would 
be the development of periodic crises when action finally 
becomes unavoidable. 
Motivation 
Providing for the adequate motivation of senior (and junior) 
public officials may not be simple. Insofar as motivation is 
concerned it is widely accepted that there is a difference 
between higher and lower levels of needs and that the so 
called higher level needs are an important source of motivation 
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in the upper levels of an organization. These include the 
desire for power, for feelings of importance and for the 
professional recognition which would follow from efficiently 
carrying out their duties. 
An agency can exist without any purpose other than maintaining 
stability and achieving growth. Such an agency may pose 
a problem for a government as they may be totally or partially 
unnecessary but i ts very existence gives i t a legitimacy 
which is difficult to disprove, A related problem is covered 
by "Parkinson's Law' which suggests, in effect, that any task 
2 
will expand to f i l l the time allotted to i t . In particular 
this is a problem where human resources are not readily 
reallocated (e.g. where there is a fixed and inflexible staff 
establishment). This may lead to available persons being 
1. There a re no c o n p l e t e l y s a t i s f ac to i ry t h e o r i e s of human mo t iva t i on . 
Two of the most widely used are those a t t r i b u t e d t o Maslow and t o 
Herzberg . According t o MASLOW (1954) hiiman beings have f ive l e v e l s 
of needs for which p r o g r e s s i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n i s sought i . e . t h e 
h ighe r l e v e l needs a r e not i n p o r t a n t where the low l e v e l ones a re 
\ m s a t i s f i e d . These needs a r e : -
( i ) P h y s i o l o g i c a l - b a s i c o rgan ic needs such as 
food, w a t e r , oxygen, s l e e p e t c . ; 
( i i ) Safe ty - need for a g e n e r a l l y ordered e x i s t e n c e i n 
a s t a b l e environment , s e c u r i t y and freedom from 
s h o r t and long teinn t h r e a t s ; 
( i i i ) S o c i a l - need for a f f e c t i o n a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , 
be long ing t o a group, acceptance by p e e r s , l o v e ; 
( iv) Achievement and Esteem - need for s t a b l e f i rmly based 
s e l f - e s t e e m and for t h e esteem of o t h e r s ; 
(v) Se l f a c t u a l i s a t i o n - s e l f fu l f i lmen t and c r e a t i v i t y i n 
the g e n e r a l s ense . 
Herzbe rg ' s Dual Fac to r t heo ry (see HERZBERG (1966)) sugges t s t h a t t h e r e 
are only two l e v e l s of needs - Higher and Lower (where t he h i g h e r 
g e n e r a l l y conform t o Maslow's upper t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s and lower are 
Maslow's lower two c a t e g o r i e s ) . Herzberg sugges t s t h a t only h i g h e r 
l e v e l needs have a p o s i t i v e l y mo t iva t i ng e f f e c t . 
Some o t h e r r e s e a r c h does n o t d i r e c t l y suppor t e i t h e r of t h e s e t h e o r i e s 
as such. In s tudy ing lower and middle management employees, evidence 
has been found t h a t needs v a r i e d no t wi th s a t i s f a c t i o n of lower needs 
b u t w i t h t h e c a r e e r s t age of an i n d i v i d u a l . See HALL and NOUGAIM (1972) 
However t h e l e g i t i m a c y of t he concept of high l e v e l and low l e v e l needs 
i s f a i r l y w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d . 
2 . PARKINSON ( 1 9 5 7 ) , p , 2 . 
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allocated to meaningless work in the sections to which they are 
assigned and new resources sought for developing tasks in other 
areas. The executive group can never be certain that just 
because its organization is busy that it is productively 
occupied. 
In a managerial sense, the key issue for the executive group 
is the motivation of its senior permanent officials. If this 
is adequate many of the other managerial problems in government 
may be minimized by their efforts but if it is not achieved 
then the government must expect difficulties. However in 
seeking high level motivation there is some risk of creating an 
elite group who can frustrate policies with which they 
3 disagree. Senior public officials are expected to be 
politically neutral but either by accident or design they may 
4 
not be. Where they are politically sympathetic the 
motivation problem is partly overcome, but where they are 
unsympathetic then the government may have difficulty in 
effectively working through them. The greater the reliance 
which is placed on such permanent managers by virtue of the 
complexity and formal rationality of decision processes the 
greater is the scope for the development of this problem. 
Goal Displacement 
Goal displacement in govermnent has been defined by a number of 
writers to refer to the pursuit by an organization of goals 
5 
which are not those intended by its leaders. This may arise, 
not only through divergence of political opinion, but through 
the delegation of power to specialized agencies which is 
essential because of the complexity of the issues involved. 
"There is a tendency for agencies to neglect the main 
3, Some developing nations have foimd that the deliberate creation of an 
elite is essential if the persons required to manage the government 
are to be available. This policy probably contains the seeds of 
future problems, 
4, In the United States, for example, expert senior managers may be 
political appointees who expect their term to last no longer than that 
of the person or party who appointed them, 
5, SELZNICK (1943) and (1949) identified this as the most important 
problem for a bureaucracy. 
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organizational goals in favour of limited sub-goals - these 
sub-goals instead of being a means to an end become an end in 
themselves because of the limited perspectives and interests of 
the persons in the organizations sub-units. It has been 
suggested that the use of the tools of scientific management 
may sometimes generate problems of goal displacement especially 
7 
at the lower levels of organization. The use of measures of 
output and statistics on which an individual's performance is 
assessed may generate an attempt to maximize these statistics 
even at the expense of common sense and quality of output. 
An hierarchical organization on the Weberian model is expected 
to operate through the impersonal application of rules. In 
the application to particular cases officials have to make 
a judgement and, this may place them in a position of conflict 
because too great a compliance with rules is popularly regarded 
as bureaucratic while too great a reliance on initiative to 
realize the spirit, if not the letter of the law, is denounced 
as an abuse of power. Formal rules can only be an incomplete 
guide to behaviour and other factors will thus be important, 
Blau identifies situations in a branch of a large, centralized 
agency where formal rules were modified in ways which enhance 
the achievement of the goals of the agency (as compared with 
disfunctional modifications). Thus the application of common 
sense on a local basis may overcome the inability of formal 
rules to provide the required variety to deal with real world 
situations. However at the same time, this will break down 
hierarchical authority. 
Resistance to Change 
Related to goal displacement is the phenomenon of 
6, See BLAU and MEYER (1971). 
7, COHEN (1965) identifies goal displaceitent arising also from the 
adoption of local procedures where task specification from head office 
is inadequate, from the redefinition of specified tasks to fit other 
goals and from their amplification beyond what was intended. 
8, BLAU (1963) 
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organ iza t iona l i n e r t i a . ^ The organiza t ion may be unable t o 
change i t s goals as rap id ly as the execut ive group i t s e l f (e .g . 
when a new executive group i s e l e c t e d ) . As was noted in 
Appendix D any s t a b l e system such as a government o rgan iza t ion , 
must have homeostosis as a bas ic determinant of behaviour. I t 
w i l l not move without the app l i ca t ion of a large s t imulus and 
once moving w i l l be hard t o s t op . Thus a new executive group 
may.have grea t d i f f i c u l t y in ensuring t h a t i t s goals are 
adopted by i t s organiza t ion as compared with the goals of a 
previous government. If a government be l ieves t h a t too much 
emphasis i s being given to a poin t of view with which i t does 
not completely agree , i t may be s implest to se t up or 
s t rengthen another organiza t ion expressing an impl ic i ty 
competing viewpoint. 
Communications 
All governments contain s u b s t a n t i a l elements conforming t o the 
bureaucra t ic model of o rgan iza t ions . In such an organiza t ion 
the problem of i n t e r n a l communication can be c r i t i c a l . 
Horizontal communication ( i . e . between s imi l a r lower l eve l s in 
d i f f e ren t agencies) i s an of t quoted source of d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
Where the re i s a need for j o i n t act ion and consu l ta t ion 
between lower l eve l s of two or more agencies and there may be 
no s a t i s f a c t o r y mechanisms by which t h i s can be achieved 
because, t h e o r e t i c a l l y , a l l problems are fed up t o the heads of 
agencies before t he r e i s any consu l t a t ion . This i s not to say 
t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t consu l t a t ion may not take place in p r a c t i c e 
but the re are r e a l i n h i b i t i n g fac tors which leave many 
des i rab le communication channels c losed. The lower l eve l 
9, In t h i s c o n t e x t i n e r t i a does no t imply a lack of a c t i o n v/i thin the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . A good dea l of a c t i v i t y and i n t e r n a l adjustments may be 
r e q u i r e d j u s t t o main ta in the s t a t u s quo. "The fac t t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n s 
have b u i l t - i n p r o t e c t i v e dev ices t o main ta in s t a b i l i t y and t h a t they 
a r e n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t t o change in t h e d i r e c t i o n of some r e f o r m e r ' s 
d e s i r e s should no t obscure the r e a l i t i e s of t he dynamic i n t e r -
r e l a t i o n s h i p s of any s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e wi th i t s s o c i a l and n a t u r a l 
environment . The very e f f o r t s of t he o r g a n i z a t i o n t o main ta in a 
c o n s t a n t e x t e r n a l environment produces changes in o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
s t r u c t u r e The r e a c t i o n t o changed i n p u t s t o mute t h e i r p o s s i b l e 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y i m p l i c a t i o n s a l s o r e s u l t s in changes ." KATZ and KAHN 
(1966), p . 100. 
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members of one agency may not even know of the existence of 
other government organizations who may affect their operations, 
quite apart from understanding their role or how the various 
operations are supposed to fit together. At least some 
horizontal communication problems are inevitable where there is 
a ministerial system in a government. 
A less easily identified issue is the communication problems 
which occur along the formal hierarchical channels in an 
organization (i.e. vertical communication problems). Quite 
apart from the inability of lower levels to communicate their 
ideas and needs upwards, in the absence of effective reporting, 
it is possible that Ministers and senior permanent officials 
may not even be aware of what their organization is really 
doing. This could result in a non-controversial activity being 
performed for years after the executive group loses interest in 
it. 
Parochialism and Internal Politics 
Other management problems will arise from parochialism and 
internal politics within the government. Parochialism 
conventionally refers to the limited range of concern of people 
in a provincial area which leads to their ignoring problems 
which do not directly affect that area. However parochialism 
is not only geographic but may be based on profession or on 
organization. Organizational parochialism refers to an 
organization which is inward looking and ignores what others 
are doing and the effects of its own actions on others. It 
arises from communication problems within a bureaucratic 
hierarchy and from career systems based on promotion within a 
single hierarchy. "'"^  Furthermore, organizations often tend 
to create myths, partly as an aid to morale, that they are_^ the 
"best" and this also aids the development of parochialism. 
10 While it could be resolved in part by career systems which were 
government wide, restrictions arise because specific organizations 
may be based on particular professions and close their doors to 
persons with different backgrounds. 
11. See BLAU and MEYER (1971), 
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Because there are many ways of grouping tasks in a government 
organization, jurisdictional conflicts are inevitable. In 
general, each of a number of different agencies could handle 
any given task and each will view with suspicion the actions of 
others who could detract from their own role, importance and 
career prospects. One of man's most basic needs is security 
and only those who are completley secure can afford to 
disregard this. This means that the transfer of responsibility 
for any task may be resisted even if there is a real case for 
it according to rational criteria. 
Furthermore there will be internal rivalaries where there is 
a "plurality of goals within and between" organizations and 
"less than complete unanimity amongst the individuals and 
groups concerned as to the hierarchy of goals and the ideal 
12 
number of goals". Such internal politics based on real 
issues as well as conflict based on personal advantage will 
lead to "efforts by individuals and groups to promote outcomes 
harmonising as closely as possible with their preferred 
13 hierarchy and mix of goals". Somewhat related to internal 
politics is the question of "colonisation" where one strong 
agency (often a Treasury, Civil Service Board, Central Planning 
Agency etc.) will have members of its staff promoted to senior 
levels in other organizations. This has a co-ordinating effect 
but may also tend to generate inter-departmental jealousies. 
Corruption 
Finally, dishonesty and corruption may tend to impede 
14 government management m some circumstances. This issue need 
not for its own sake be of concern here, as much as the 
problems caused by the mechanisms for detailed supervision and 
audit which have to be established to guard against it. The 
latter may seriously inhibit government planning by focusing 
attention on virtually irrelevant details in decision-making 
processes. 
12, RIGBY (1973) , p. 3. 
13, ibid 
14, In Australia corruption in government is not accepted as normal and 
expected, and so this is not as important an issue for this thesis as. 
it could be under other circumstances. 
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APPENDIX H - BUDGETS 
General 
The control of funding is a very powerful means of control in 
a government which is very widely used because it is a less 
rigorous and demanding mechanism than complete centralization 
of planning. Any system for government planning which does 
not consider resources availability, typically represented by 
money, is bound to be much less successful than one which does. 
It is limited, however, to the control of that section of a 
government organization which derives its funding from 
centrally allocated consolidated funds and is of limited 
use for the "non budget" sector which relies on independent 
sources of funds. 
The original purpose of a budget was not the control of 
government activities, and a budget is not a necessary-
feature of government. The first budget in modern times was 
introduced in England in 16 89 under a Bill of Rights as a 
means of restricting spending (and hence taxing) by the 
executive, which at that time was the Monarch. There was no 
consideration given to how the executive would spend its 
money as this was the traditional prerogative of the Crown. 
However, since that time the techniques of budgeting have 
been developed to: 
(a) give the legislative branch of government a right and 
means of reviewing the activities of the executive 
branch; 
(b) give extensive control over the government organization 
to the executive group; 
(c) enable persons responsible for budgeting to take a strong 
co-ordinating role in a government organization; 
(d) enable it to be linked directly into the planning 
processes of the government (through planning programming 
budgeting type approaches); 
1. BURKHEAD (1956) 
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(e) enable the budget to be used as a tool for controlling 
various external systems. According to the traditional 
economic view a budget has three roles, namely allocation 
of resources, production of an equitable distribution of 
3 
2 income and economic stabilization. A fourth role 
suggested by some writers is promotion of economic growth ,-
Budget Styles 
The budget as a document is not important rather it is the 
system of preparing and administering the budget which is 
relevant. 
There are numerous approaches to budgeting and every practical 
budget is a mixture of various theoretical styles. Every budget 
has to serve a number of inconsistent purposes including the 
facilitation of -
(a) formal government planning; 
(b) budget execution - i.e. it must give the information 
needed by administrators; 
(c) accountability and auditing; 
(d) analysis of the budgets effects (e.g. the government 
budget will usually interact with the general economy 
and other external systems). 
The classification of items in a budget is important because 
it determines the way in which decisions are made. The 
traditional budget was the object of expenditure or line 
item type where the budget was classified by inputs or items 
to be purchased. This is oriented towards administration, 
accounting, and auditing. It is however, inadequate for the 
evaluation of government outputs which should be the primary 
concern of the executive group. There is no direct relation-
ship between inputs and outputs (because the same inputs may 
be used to produce many different outputs). 
Modern developments in budgeting tend to be oriented towards 
planning and analysis of the effects of budgets. Examples 
2. MUSGRAVE (1959) 
3. BURKHEAD and MILNER (1971) 
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of these developments include programme budgeting, which 
focuses on the purpose of government programmes instead of 
on items of expenditure, and performance budgeting, which 
relates the budget to measures of output rather than to 
input. Finally planning programme budget (P.P.B.) approaches 
may be identified which attempt to create a unified procedure 
to relate planning directly to the budget, often with the 
use of systems analysis as a decision making tool (P,P,B.S,), 
The planning programme budget approach is the most complex 
and can be related to the concept of rational decision making 
described in Appendix D as compared with incremental decision 
making. As a formal approach it originated in the U.S. 
Defence Forces where it was most successful and was trans-
ferred to other parts of the U.S. Federal administration with 
indifferent results. Like rational decision making it is 
possibly the ideal but appears too demanding a model to be 
applied in all cases in practice. In some situations 
formulating a budget based on the P.P.B (or P.P.B.S.) approach 
is nearly impossible and the physical volume of budgetary 
5 
material which may be produced could make it useless anyway. 
A particular problem which this method faces is the need for 
complex technical analysis when there may be too few people 
capable of carrying them out and even greater difficulty in 
grafting such analysts into the agency for whom they are 
supposed to be working. 
There is no single accepted P.P.B. methodology and dozens of 
procedure manuals have been produced describing how it should 
be done. The fundamental concept is only of linking 
budgeting formally into the planning process and as far as 
how this can be done is concerned, all that can be learned 
from the literature is how various governments have gone 
about it and how successful they have been. 
The method of planning advanced for the Queensland Government 
in this thesis is a form of a P.P.B. approach revolving around 
4 . P , P , B . Systems f r equen t ly emphasis zero based budge t ing . 
5 , McKEAN a n d ANSHEN (1968) 
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capital works. 
Capital Budgets 
A capital expenditure item may be broadly defined as an 
expenditure which will produce benefits extending beyond the 
year in which it is incurred. It is obvious that in almost 
any government activity there will be a capital component 
(e.g. in providing the building from which some particular 
service is supplied) while other activities may consist 
almost entirely of capital works (e.g. road construction). 
The capital aspects of a budget are frequently separated 
7 
from the remainder of the budget for a number of reasons: 
(a) separation identifies expenditures that may need 
specialized review and analysis. This review may 
require a particular expertize or it may provide for 
outside participation not available in the ordinary 
budgetary mechanism; 
(b) capital budgeting linked with long range public works 
planning can effectively serve as an instrument for 
orderly resource development and maintenance. This 
aids financial planning and serves to stabilize 
expenditure over a period of years; 
(c) a capital budget could be used to show changes in the 
nett asset position of a government if an extremely 
sophisticated system of national accounts were 
developed; 
(d) separation will focus attention on items for which loan 
funds may be used. In some governments v/here public 
authorisation of loan raising is required it may be 
difficult to justify to taxpayers that loans are 
necessary. 
However, for the purpose of this thesis the most important 
benefit of separation of capital works into a special 
6 . S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , DEAN (1951) o r KORBITZ (1976) 
7 . BURKHEAD (1955) 
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programme will be shown to be the potential that this offers 
to examine spatial relationships in term.s of capital 
proposals. 
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APPENDIX I - THE QUEENSLAND CONTEXT 
General 
The purpose of this appendix is to outline some of the 
characteristics of Queensland which, in the author's opinion, 
should affect the approach taken to planning and administration 
by the State Government. This is necessarily brief and partly 
subjective. For a general factual account of Queensland there 
is'probably no better reference document than the "Queensland 
Year Book" published annually by the Queensland office of the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. Figure II is a map of the 
State showing most important urban centres and local government 
boundaries. 
Geography and Demography < 
Queensland is a large state (1.7 million sq km) with a relatively 
small population (2.04 million in the 19 76 census). There is 
only one region which can be considered to be fairly densely 
occupied and this is the Moreton Area surrounding the capital, 
Brisbane. 
In the rest of the state the general pattern is one of small 
cities and towns (none apart from Brisbane exceed 100,000 in 
population) separated by large distances. The state is highly 
urbanized with only 19.8% of the population residing in rural 
areas in 19 76. Rural populations are moderate on the areas 
adjacent to the east coast but sparce elsewhere. 
The dispersal of population into relatively isolated centres 
means that major piiblic investments will often only produce 
extremely localized benefits. Thus competition rather than 
co-operation tend to dominate the relationships between 
individual centres. 
Another consequence of the relatively sparce population in most 
of the state is that there is a lack of human resources to 
intensively control the environment. Furthermore, in many areas 
human interaction and the pressue of absolute numbers has been 
fairly low and produced only a relatively small need for 
formalized detailed spatial co-ordination. 
1. Source: AUSTRALIA, BUREAU OF STATISTICS (1978), p. 27 
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Economic Hierarchy 
The dominant urban centre in the state is Brisbane but its 
relative importance is less than the capital cities in most 
2 
other Australian States. This is probably a consequence of 
the fact that Brisbane is within the field of influence of 
3 
Sydney (and Melbourne). In addition^ in the early development 
of the states railway system,east-west lines were constructed 
before a north-south coastal connection was established. Hence, 
in the north of the state, inland areas are more dependent on 
adjacent coastal cities than on Brisbane. 
The state may be considered to fall into three broad divisions 
as shown in Figure II in each of which is a major regional 
centre which provides many high level services (i.e. Townsville, 
Rockhampton, and Toowoomba). 
Economically Queensland is dependent on natural resource based 
export industries principally mining, agriculture and pastoral 
industry. In general the processing and transportation of 
resource based products is confined within these divisions 
producing strong internal connections. Natural resources tend 
to be abundant in relation to the needs of the population with 
the result that the state is affluent and furthermore has 
experienced quite rapid recent population growth through 
immigration. 
Climatic Influences 
Climate has had a very important influence on the demographic 
and economic structure of the state. Queensland lies between 
10° and 29° south of the equator and has a subtropical climate. 
In winter it falls into the southern subtropical anticyclonic 
belt, where the predominantly high pressure influences restrict 
rainfall. In summer it experiences monsoonal influences 
(particularly in the north of the state) and is also frequently 
affected by cyclones which form over the warm oceans adjacent 
2, In 1976 it contained only 43.8% of the state's total population (ibid). 
3. CLARK (1970), p. 54, 
•tlif 
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to the north east coast. Regular rainfall is confined to the 
areas between the east coast and the Great Dividing Range and 
this is where most of the population are located. In the 
extreme west and south west of the state the arid conditions 
render the country unfit for any non extractive intensive 
land use. 
Apart from its influence on population distribution climate 
also has two specific effects on government activity -
(a) The need to deal with major climatically induced 
disasters (cylcones and floods) without a great deal 
of material outside assistance generates a requirement 
for regional self dependence; 
(b) The provision of water supplies is one of the dominant 
issues which the government must face. The irregularity 
of rainfall and its intensity make the establishment of 
effective and cheap water supply schemes very difficult 
because of the large storages required. 
Transportation 
Another important issue for the state is the provision of 
interurban transportation networks (e.g. roads and railways). 
Because of the low population density, travel demands and 
available resources per kilometre to be traversed have been less 
than required to provide services to the same standard as 
enjoyed in the more densely populated Australian regions. 
Regionalism 
The decentralised structure of the state and the high costs in 
money and time of moving between centres have lead to the 
development of real barriers to communication between different 
regions. As it affects the relationship between north and 
western Queensland and the capital, Brisbane, this has often 
produced feelings of neglect in the people living in the 
isolated areas. Arising from this, a movement for the creation 
of a new state in north Queensland has had periodic support for 
many years, and parochial issues have often been seen in terms 
of "them" (the Queen Street Government) and "us". The state has 
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an effective telecommunication system and the problem is not so 
much of communication of data but of communication of trust. 
It is probably only because of the external pressures which bear 
from the national capital and from the financial and industrial 
centres of Melbourne and Sydney that the internal barriers are 
supressed. 
Resulting from this regionalism has been a need for spatially 
specialized agencies operating at a small scale. It has not 
tended to actually produce regional co-operation on important 
issues as, often, the only issue on which agreement can be 
reached is opposition to outside interference. 
Parochialism 
Queensland has no strong financial centre and very limited 
manufacturing industry which exports to other parts of 
Australia and overseas. It is a branch office state because a 
substantial proportion of the private companies operating in it 
are not headquartered in Queensland. Most of those that are, 
are based in Brisbane, so that the provincial cities even more 
than Brisbane are branch office centres. 
Furthermore, in very few competitive fields of endeavour, 
whether sporting, professional or business are Queenslanders 
who stay in Queensland, often seen to be successful on the 
national scene and this produces a degree of sensitivity and 
a parochial "them" and "us" syndrome. 
Perhaps for this reason the state has a long history of going 
its own way - either leading or trailing other parts of 
Australia or perhaps permanently refusing to conform. This 
real or fancied parochialism, combined at times with real 
differences of policy, has resulted in many stresses in the 
relationship between the State and Federal governments. 
4. NORTHERN REGION STUDY POLICY COMMITTEE (1973), p. 159. 
5. See LUNN H. (1975) 
6. As noted by McDERMOTT (1975) these stresses have at times severely 
impeded the connective processes of co-ordination which would have 
been expected to have taken place between Commonwealth and State 
Governments. WILTSHIRE (1977), p. ix described the relationship 
between the Queensland and Federal governments as almost that between 
"hostile foreign powers". 
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Political Values 
The political history of Queensland is not important for the 
purpose of this thesis. However two general comments may be 
made about the general attitudes of Queenslanders to government. 
In the first place Queenslanders have, for many decades, been 
conservative and appeared to favour the status quo against 
7 
change. This applies to almost all important groups in the 
state. One reason for this can be found in the state's position 
as a nett importer of ideas and technology in many fields 
which is a consequence of its small population and a lack of 
pressures for technological leadership. As a consequence it is 
suggested that government planning systems should be oriented 
towards the progressive rather than the radical solution to 
problems. 
Secondly, Queenslanders (like all Australians) appear to have 
little interest in questions relating to government and its 
o 
reform. A great deal of reliance is placed on the activities 
9 
of the public sector. However the public seems unwilling to go 
beyond a periodic criticism of general bureaucratic inefficiency. 
This is evidenced by the difficulty experienced in raising 
debate on constitutional reform above the emotional level. 
Probably the reason for this lack of interest is the public's 
low level of understanding of the processes involved and the 
compalcency of affluence. 
While specific political issues have been ignored in this thesis 
it is relevant to note that there are three dominant political 
parties in the state and that,at the time of writing, the 
government is controlled by a coalition of two of them. The 
major opposition party is the Labor Party, while the parties in 
coalition are the National-Country Party and the Liberal Party. 
The coalition has been in government continuously since 19 57 
and has, at times, suffered internal stresses between its 
constituent parties. 
7. CRIBB (1975) 
8. HUGHES (1970), "Queensland", p. 239, 
9. SPANN and CURNOW (1975), p. 4. 
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APPENDIX J - QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT BUDGET 
General 
The budget has a major ro le in the Queensland Government's 
ove ra l l planning process but the techniques used are not 
sys temat ica l ly descr ibed in any recen t ly published document. 
Certain conclusions may however be drawn from a s e r i e s of 
papers by Mr. L. Hielscher who in 19 78 was permanent head of 
the Treasury Department. 
The p r i n c i p a l budgeting agency i s the Treasury whose "prime 
concern . . . . i s the balancing of the budget - to ensure t h a t 
we don ' t run out of funds i n providing the se rv ices t h a t our 
Government's want to f inance" . The reasons for t h i s are 
"the consequent ia l re t renchments , cur ta i lment of p ro jec t s 
and s ta lemat ing of development" which would r e s u l t from 
2 
"going broke" . "The S ta te has no incent ive whatsoever to 
budget for a su rp lu s , due to the chronic shortage of funds 
tha t are ava i l ab l e t o i t . . . " and cannot budget for a 
d e f i c i t because "the S ta te Treasury does not have access to 
the p r i n t i n g press or o the r monetary device to finance a 
3 d e f i c i t " . 
The Treasury ' s approach i s influenced by the balancing of the 
budget as above and a l so by the concept of offensive and 
defensive c o n t r o l . "In i t s defensive ro le the Treasury can 
be thought of as the custodian of the purse ensuring t h a t 
a l l monies due to the Government are received and co r r ec t ly 
spent" while in i t s offensive ro le "the Treasury may be 
regarded as the f i n a n c i a l adviser to the Government". 
In the S t a t e ' s budgeting system three d i f f e r en t types of funds 
may be i d e n t i f i e d namely -
{m} Trust and Spec ia l Funds; 
1, HIELSCHER (1972), p. 2 
2, Ibid, p, 3 
3, Ibid, pp, 4-5 
4, HIELSCHER (1965), p. 2. 
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CW Consolidated Reveniie Funds; 
(e) Loan Funds. 
Trust and Specia l Funds 
In the 19 76/77 S ta te Budget there were some 146 ind iv idua l 5 
spec ia l t r u s t funds. "Each fund has i t s ind iv idua l source of 
revenue. Expenditure i s r e s t r i c t e d t o the spec i f i c ob jec t of 
the t r u s t . . . " I t i s not in these funds t h a t the main t h r u s t 
of S ta te budgeting l i e s because, generally, i f they are not 
se l f - suppor t ing from s p e c i f i c s t a t e taxes or charges they 
simply used to process funds suppl ied by the Commonwealth, 
Loan Fund or Consolidated Revenue. 
Consolidated Revenue 
The main ro le of Treasury in budgeting r e l a t e s to the a l l o c a t i o n 
of Consolidated Revenue funds. The annual budget prepara t ion 
process s t a r t s in May when departmental budget requests are 
prepared and continues u n t i l September when the budget i s 
usual ly brought down. This i s wel l i n t o the f inanc ia l year 
and allows l i t t l e time for completely new a c t i v i t i e s to be 
undertaken during the f i n a n c i a l year i f preparatory work i s 
4 
requ i red . This i s probably a consequence of the need to 
include Commonwealth s p e c i a l purpose funds which are unknown 
u n t i l the Commonwealth Budget i s brought down in August (and 
may even involve subsequent nego t i a t ion before f i n a l i z a t i o n ) , 
The budget process may be described as follows: 
Departments are requested by c i r c u l a r l e t t e r to submit d ra f t 
es t imates of t h e i r requirements for the next yea r . Each 
department prepares es t imates for s a l a r i e s and for contingency 
i tems. The sa l a ry es t imate i s prepared in g rea t d e t a i l and 
checked with the Publ ic Service Board."^ "The whole department 's 
requirements are then reviewed by a committee of Departmental 
Sect ion Heads in conference with the Departmental Min i s t e r . 
5. QUEENSLAND (1976) 
6. HIELSCHER (1965), p. 5 
7. Ibid, pp. 10-11. 
8. Ibid, p, 11 
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Finally "they are submitted to the Treasury with all relevant 
supporting details together with arguments supporting increased 
funds required for current services and new services. Many of 
the new proposals have already been submitted and have received 
9 Cabinet approval for their implementation." These submissions 
may not actually be received by Treasury until early July 
(i .e. after the start of the financial year to which they 
refer) . 
Within the Treasury the process is to "collate the lot and 
add them all up to see what the position would be if we could 
allow departments to proceed into the coming year as they would 
wish". Invariably total expenditure requested exceeds the 
total estimated receipts. To close the gap the first step is 
to revise upwards any conservative income estimates by 
departments. Next is the task of cutting back requirements. 
However "there is very little scope for pruning. Quite a large 
slice of it, probably 90 per cent is virtually untouchable" 
(e.g. servicing the public debt, providing for wages and salar-
ies, meeting payments set down in statutes). "With these 
fixed commitments taken out of available revenues, very little 
is left to play with. This available balance is further 
reduced by special provisions required for previously * 
determined and publicly announced government policy - such as 
12 
election promises". Finally Treasury extracts for special 
consideration the new projects planned by departments. 
"After the expenditure estimates have been taken to what is 
considered the irreducible minimum, the position is reported 
to Cabinet. With the whole budget situation before it Cabinet 
can confirm or amend, the reductions already made by Treasury -
consider the long and short lists of additional projects that 
the Treasury has culled from departmental submissions - and 
consider the alternatives that Treasury has recommended for 
balancing the budget"."""^  The alternatives are usually ^  
9, Ib id 
10. HIELSCHER (1968), p . H 
11, Ib id , p . 12 
12, Ib id 
13. Ib id 
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(a) defer extension of services; 
(b) cut existing services; 
(c) increase taxes and charges - a suggested list being 
previously prepared by Treasury; 
(d) budget for a deficit, 
"Once Cabinet has finally decided on the budget, the departments 
are notified of their allocations. They then resubmit their 
14 
estimates to the Treasury to conform to the new figures." 
It will be seen that the budget preparation process is not 
sophisticated. For example -
(a) the approach is fundamentally incremental. Frequent 
reference is made in the papers by Hielscher to the "as 
you were" concept as a base for the annual budget. After 
extracting all special items the base figure is increment-
ed by a fixed percentage. While forward planning is 
15 
recommended at the department level, this must be 
incorporated within the incremental budget; 
(b) the budget is prepared in the traditional way with no 
apparent use of the tools of scientific decision making 
(e.g. specification of goals, quantification of needs, 
definition of alternatives, use of models and systems 
analysis). More attention is given to financial and 
budgeting control than is given to resource allocation. 
The former task is probably very effectively carried out; 
(c) the budget is of a line item type. It is not oriented 
towards the functions of government and is not seen as a 
17 
tool of economic systems control. Considerable 
emphasis is apparently placed on correlating staff 
establishments with financial requirements; 
14, Ib id , p , 14 
15, Ib id , p , 4 
16, In 1976/77 there were only five posi t ions for economics in the Treasury 
and a l l were extremely junior o f f i c e r s . Source QUEENSLAND (1976), 
p , 16, However, senior off icers did presumably have economic 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , 
17, HIELSCHER (1972), p , 4 notes tha t "The State does co-operate fully 
with the Commonwealth in the implementation of the Commonwealth's 
economic po l icy" . In other words economic systems control i s purely 
a matter for Commonwealth j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
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laj there is apparently far too little time involved in the 
budget process for any reasonable reviews to be 
undertaken. 
It might be argued that unsophisticated methods are appropriate 
in an Australian state government which, because of its 
traditional dependence on Commonwealth finance, has few 
options apart from spending its available funds. However, given 
the size of the Queensland Government organization some 
improvements would certainly seem to be feasible. 
Loan Funds 
A d i f f e r e n t s e t of procedures are used for Loan Funds. "The 
Co-ordinator-General of Publ ic Works i s the S ta te instrument-
a l i t y t h a t c o l l e c t s the expenditure requests of the loan 
spending departments and takes the place of Treasury as the 
a r b i t e r in the d i s t r i b u t i o n of ava i l ab le funds to each 
18 
department of the S t a t e . " "Having e s t a b l i s h e d the l i s t of 
recommended works for the year in accordance with the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of Loan Funds, the Co-ordinator-General r epor t s 
to a Committee of Minis te rs and the Government Loan Works 
^ .,19 Programme for the year i s approved. 
The c a p i t a l works programming procedures used by the 
Co-ordinator-General are discussed in Appendix L. 
18. HIELSCHER (1965), p . 14 
19. Ib id , p . 15 
K-1 
APPENDIX K - AN OUTLINE OF THE ROLE OF THE CO-ORDINATOR-GENERAL 
IN QUEENSLAND 
General 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide an overview of the 
past activities of the Co-ordinator-General. This is 
necessarily inadequate because of its brevity but a full 
review is outside the scope of this thesis. 
The Co-ordinator-General in Queensland is a very senior 
officer who reports directly to the Premier. He has 
few specific functions of his own and exists primarily for 
the role he fulfills within the overall governm.ent organization. 
His role has few external implications as far as the pioblic is 
concerned though it does have external implications as regards 
the Commonwealth Government and private corporations wishing to 
deal with the government as a whole. At the time of writing he 
theoretically has responsibility for, amongst other things, the 
production of a programme of capital works, environmental 
co-ordination, and regional "planning". 
The Co-ordinator-General is established as a corporation sole 
under"The State and Regional Planning and Development, Public 
Works Organization and Environmental Control Act 1971-1974" 
which is described below. He is the permanent head of a 
department which, with less than 120 employees, is the smallest 
in the Queensland Government. 
Legislation 
The legislation under which the Co-ordinator-General operates at 
the present time is the "State and Regional Planning and 
Development, Public Works Organization and Environmental Control 
Act 1971-74". This is a revised version of an Act first passed 
in 19 38 which created the Co-ordinator-General as a corporation 
sole, and gave him certain powers such as preparing a programme 
of works, obtaining the co-operation of Queensland Government 
Agencies, access to information and the right to construct works 
^ 2 
and to acquire land. 
1, QUEENSLAND, PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD (1976), p. 1. 
2. QUEENSLAND, "State Development Public Works and Organization Act 
1938-1970", 
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The 19 71 Act provided for -
(a) the existence of a Co-ordinator-General as a corporation 
sole; 
(b) a requirement for all government departments, local bodies 
or any corporation set up under any act of the Queensland 
Parliament to co-operate with him and to supply him with 
information held on almost any subject; 
(c) the preparation of a programme of works for any part of the 
State and for any time period. The definition of works is 
so wide that it could probably be construed to include 
almost anything which any government agency may do. There 
are further provisions in the Act for enforcement of the 
programme of works once accepted by the Governor in Council 
including the possibility of compelling local bodies to 
carry out specific works; 
(d) the creation of an Environmental Control Council under the 
chairmanship of the Co-ordinator-General; 
(e) the establishment, if accepted by the Governor-in-Council, 
of Regional Co-ordination Councils; 
(f) the declaration, by the Governor in Council, of Development 
Areas in which the Co-ordinator-General had power to plan 
and carry out a programme of development; 
(g) the capacity of the Co-ordinator-General to construct 
works; 
(h) the establishment of Project Boards to undertake specific 
projects; 
(i) the power to resume land; 
(k) other powers relating to raising money, entering contracts 
and constructing works. 
While this Act appears to provide very extensive powers to 
ensure co-ordination within the government, the Co-ordinator-
General has few which he is able to exercise in his own right 
because most are subject to confirmation by the Minister or 
the Governor-in-Council. Most of the very extensive powers 
which the government is able to exercise through the 
Co-ordinator-General were introduced in 19 38 and,though the 
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revision of the legislation in 1971 caused comment, the 
Co-ordinator-General's restrained usage of his powers for a 
period of almost forty years has made them non-controversial. 
Such powers as the Co-ordinator-General does have are positive 
rather than negative. Thus the Co-ordinator-General may be 
able to direct that certain activity take place but he is unable, 
in general, to negate proposed actions. Furthermore, because 
his powers are general rather than specific, he must "call a 
halt when serious resistance from other Departments is met". 
Modifications made to the legislation in 1973 and 1974 were 
principally concerned with procedural matters and are not of 
concern here. 
4 
History Prior to 19 70 
Insofar as this thesis is concerned the activities of the 
Co-ordinator-General's Department since 19 70 are most relevant. 
However, to put this in perspective it is necessary to look as 
far back as the 19 30's at the origin of the role of the 
Co-ordinator-General. Wheeler has described the early history 
of the Co-ordinator-General and concluded that the establishment 
of this position was a genuine attempt to rationalize public 
works.^ It was also a definite attempt to create a mechanism 
for better co-ordination within the Queensland Government and 
as such represented more than a simple response to 
unsatisfactory methods of allocating unemployment relief fiinds 
during the depression. 
The activities of the Co-ordinator-General's Department during 
the first thirty years of its existence may be categorized in 
three different types. The first was the preparation of 
capital works programmes, the second the execution of major 
civil engineering projects and the third may be referred to as 
general co-ordination. The latter involved the Co-ordinator-
General 's leadership and involvement in numerous ad hoc 
3. WHEELER (1974), p. 94 
4. A short account of this is given in "Regional Planning and Regional 
Co-ordination" an undated booklet published by the CO-ORDINATOR-GENERAL'S 
DEPARTMENT, pp. 12-13. 
5. WHEELER, (1974), This view was also expressed by McDERMOTT (1975). 
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committees, and in investigation and research projects with 
wide implications. Progressively, during the period prior to 
19 70, project construction increased in importance relative to 
the other two tasks. The reason for this was probably that the 
genuine co-ordinative tasks were more difficult and involved 
the organization in conflict situations while, because the 
Co-ordinator-General had control over the government's capital 
resources, the creation of a major public works role was very 
simple. 
History - After 1970 
In 1969 a new Co-ordinator-General was appointed, A number 
of changes were then made within his Department involving a 
reduction in the emphasis on capital construction and an 
experimental branching into areas of co-ordination and regional 
planning by the creation of a variety of formal structures. 
The nature of these transformations is apparent from the Annual 
Reports of the Co-ordinator-General from 19 70 to 19 77. The 
structure of these reports varied substantially for year to 
year as the new roles in relation to "planning", environmental 
control and regionalization were being worked out. 
The first step was the modification in 19 70 of the "State 
Development and Piiblic Works Organization Act of 1938-1968" 
to include provision for the creation of an Environmental 
Control Council. Next, in 1971, accompanied by much internal 
reorganization, came the revised legislation "State and 
Regional Planning and Development, Public Works Organization 
and Environmental Control Act 1971". Following these 
developments the annual reports of the Co-ordinator-General's 
Department show modifications to the types of activities 
previously undertaken. Engineering construction was almost 
entirely eliminated, works programmes continued to be produced 
and involvements in general co-ordinating activities were 
undertaken (e.g. committees and major investigations). In 
addition to this a great deal of involvement in activities 
broadly classed as regional and environmental may be identified. 
Mr. C.N. Barton (later Sir Charles Barton) who was previously 
Commissioner for Main Roads. 
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The nominal rationale of these activities are described 
7 
extensively elsewhere and will not be repeated here. Some 
of the proposed methods of operation which were described in 
g 
these places were never brought into practice. 
The Environmental activities revolved around the creation of an 
advisory Environmental Control Council chaired by the 
Co-ordinator-General on which twenty state government agencies 
were represented. The Council met fairly frequently between 
9 
1971 and 1976. It established a number of working committees 
dealing with specific issues such as land use, noise, waste 
disposal etc. and defined a procedure to be used for 
Environmental Impact Studies. Its activity appears to have 
lapsed from 19 76 and the Council is not mentioned in the 
Co-ordinator-General's Annual Report for 19 77. 
A detailed consideration of the development of regional 
approaches in the Queensland Government is outside the scope of 
this thesis. Many groups, including the Commonwealth Govern-
ment, had important roles in forming and influencing the 
approach taken to regions. Briefly however it may be noted that 
late in 19 72 a set of 11 regions were proposed by the Co-
ordinator-General's Department. After discussions and piiblic 
comment a revised set of 10 regions as shown in Figure II were 
declared by the Governor in Council in October 1973. 
7 . S e e QUEENSLAND, CO-ORDINATOR-GENE RAL"S DEPARTMENT ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 
a n d QUEENSLAND, CO-ORDINATOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT, " R e g i o n a l P l a n n i n g 
and Regional C o - o r d i n a t i o n " (undated) and "S ta t e of Regional P l a n n i n g , 
Pv±>lic Works Organ iza t ion and Environmental Contro l i n Queensland" 
( a l s o \ancjated) 
8. This i s n o t lonreasonable for an o r g a n i z a t i o n exper iment ing wi th a 
number of new approaches . 
9 . The Environmental Cont ro l Coioncil met on 15 occas ions between May 1971 
and A p r i l 1976. Source : Co-orc i ina to r -Genera l ' s Department. 
An average of three meetings per year represents a hive of activity 
for a group of its size and composition. 
1 0 . QUEENSLAND CO-ORDINATOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 
p p . 1 1 - 1 2 , 
1 1 . A b r i e f account i s given by YOUNG (1975), 
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By December 1973 a Co-ordination Council had been appointed for 
each region consisting of one representative of each local 
authority in the area and a Regional Co-ordinator (an officer 
of the Co-ordinator-General's Department) as Chairman. The 
Councils met between one and four times per year and established 
numerous working committees for specific matters. The 
activities of the Councils involved supervision of regional 
resource surveys and "planning" studies, the allocation of 
funds under the Area Improvement Programme (in some cases) and 
a general consideration of regional issues. The Councils were 
formally dissolved in July 1977. 
Comments on Environmental Issues 
The basis for the Environmental Control concept seems to have 
been that greater emphasis on control of the natural environment 
was required. To avoid the necessity for a special Department 
of the Environment, an Environmental Control Council, taking a 
committee form, was set up to co-ordinate the work of 
individual agencies with whom basic responsibility for the 
management of the environment v;ould renainr 
Chapter 6.3 of this thesis identifies the environmental effects 
of any given activity as its effects on systems other than the 
principal system which the activity was intended to affect. 
This problem is very much more general than the conventional 
one which assumes that the "environment" is limited to natural 
physical systems (and is concerned only with ecology and 
pollution etc.). In this sense the approach to environment 
through an Environmental Control Council would be valid though 
it is doi±)tful if that Council really saw its role in terms 
of co-ordinating the approach to externalities in general rather 
than just to the natural physical environment. However, the 
success or failure of the Environmental Control Council must be 
judged not in terms of the number of meetings held or other 
activities it undertook but in terms of the extent to which 
specific agencies adopted sets of values which gave greater 
weight to "environmental" factors. This occurred to a certain 
12, SCHU"BERT (1973), pp. 6-7. 
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extent but whether the process can be considered to be complete 
at the time of writing is open to doubt. 
13 Comments on Regional Issues 
There is little doubt that the establishment of Regional 
Co-ordination Councils was a deliberate attempt to create a 
regional framework for planning in Queensland. This 
objective apparently extended beyond the possible role of 
Regional Co-ordinators and Regional Co-ordination Council in 
promoting integration of government activity and extended into 
the production of strategic 'plans'. In that context they do 
not appear to have been successful since even though strategic 
•planning' studies were undertaken in a number of regions, such 
•plans' as were produced could not be implemented. 
The scheme was seen as an alternative to the conventional 
methods of regional "planning" involving state or regional 
authorities concentrating specifically on land use control. 
Land use control was specifically to be left in the 
16 jurisdiction of local authorities. However, ignoring the 
attempt to produce regional strategic 'plans', these regional 
arrangements were a reasonable approach. 
13, A useful account of Regional Co-ordination in Queensland is given 
by WILTSHIRE (1976) . 
14, QUEENSLAND, CO-ORDINATOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT (undated), "Regional 
Planning and Regional Co-ordination", pp. 6-7. 
15, ibid, p. 12, The problems suggested for conventional approaches 
are -
(a) the lack of relationship between planning proposals and financial 
capability; 
(b) a fragmentary rather than a systems approach; 
(c) the tendency to create another tier of government; 
(d) overemphasis on physical "planning"; 
(e) communication problems between central, regional and local bodies; 
(f) shortages of skilled staff; 
(g) proliferation of new organizations, 
16, BARTON (1973), p, 2, 
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In Chapter 5.7 the difficulties associated with conventional 
approaches to regional "planning" in a government structured 
on the basis of functional or process specialization are 
identified. By the definitions adopted in this paper regional 
planning is not a meaningful term \inless operational agencies 
exist at a regional level. Formal decision making processes not 
oriented towards the actual planning processes of the agencies 
of a government (usually related to their budgets) must be 
either weak or confusing. If they cut weakly across agency 
planning they will be ineffective while if they cut across them 
strongly they may tend to drive the whole system into a state of 
of confusion where any rational activity becomes difficult. 
The above argument provides a rationalization for the approach 
taken to regional co-ordination. A region could be seen as a 
spatial unit for solving problems of interest to a number of 
agencies, for a reticulist role and for the formulation of 
spatial strategies. 
Regional Co-ordinators, who were appointed for each region, 
should have been capable of contributing significantly to 
18 
spatial problem solving through their reticulist roles. 
Individual human beings are far better integrators of 
information than are computers or formal organizational systems, 
providing they deal only with key issues and are not overloaded 
with data. 
In the author's opinion the central interest of the Regional 
Co-ordinators and Regional Co-ordination Councils should have 
been -
(a) the extent to which co-ordination was, or was not, being 
achieved in the normal relationships of agencies in the 
region; 
17. The concept of a spatial strategy is dealt with in Chapter 8, 
18. Wiltshire suggested that Regional Co-ordinators would be able to 
operate with reasonable success because they were appointed at a very 
high salary level which gave them the status required for dealing with 
State Departmental Officers in regional offices and in Brisbane. 
Furthermore he suggested that by acting as a communication channel 
between the region and Brisbane the Regional Co-ordinators became well 
informed and could rely on knowledge to give them status rather than 
formal position. See WILTSHIRE (1976), p. 136. 
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(b) the initiation of action in relation to any observed 
problem. Such problems could theoretically have been 
solved using the Regional Co-ordination Council (or 
regional purpose committees established under its 
authorization) as a forum. Alternately where authorative 
solutions were required, the Regional Co-ordinator could 
carry the problem back to the Co-ordinator-General who 
could take action at head of department or cabinet level. 
There were a number of apparent problems in the operation of 
Regional Co-ordination Councils which restricted their ability 
to fulfil the type of role identified above: 
(a) The Councils probably did not appreciate the type of 
roles t"ney could fulfil or the limitations to which they 
19 
were subject. The members of the councils perhaps 
expected too much and were unwilling to be confined to the 
role expected of them. 
(b) Apart from Regional Co-ordinators the councils consisted 
only of political representatives at the local government 
level. This limited their range of concern largely to 
matters of interest to local authorities. The limited 
involvement of departments in their activities was a major 
deficiency especially as many of the problems which are 
identifiable as "regional" are under the jurisdiction of 
state departments rather than local authorities. 
(c) Because of their composition the councils tended to act as 
political pressures groups.^° Their members looked on the 
councils as a direct form of commionication with the 
government (as was undoubtedly intended) but used this as 
19. YOUNG (1975), p, 100 
20 McDERMOTT (1975) argued that tlie interests of connective planning 
would have been better served if the needs of local authorities 
had been better catered for. The present author disagrees and suggests 
that the interests of local authorities were too well catered for. 
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a method of a t t a c k i n g the government .21 The p o l i t i c a l 
c h a r a c t e r of t he c o u n c i l s was worsened by the Commonwealth 
Government 's p r a c t i c e i n 1974/75 and 19 75/76 of making 
funds a v a i l a b l e t o some Councils fo r d i s t r i b u t i o n under t h e 
Area Improvement Programme. This was o r i e n t e d towards 
making t h e r e g i o n s i n t o a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t s and n o t 
22 
s imple c o - o r d i n a t i o n forums. 
(d) The p r o c e e d i n g s of the Counc i l s were u n n e c e s s a r i l y fo rmal . 
These were based on l o c a l government meet ing p r o c e d u r e . 
(e) T h e r e was a l a c k o f f e e d b a c k b e t w e e n t h e R e g i o n a l C o i m c i l s 
and l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . The R e g i o n a l C o u n c i l l o r s p r o b a b l y 
g a i n e d a d e g r e e of p e r s o n a l s t a t u s from t h e i r i n v o l v e m e n t 
i n r e g i o n a l i s s u e s and may n o t a l w a y s h a v e b e e n t r u l y 
23 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e i r l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . 
C e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t i e s a l s o a r o s e i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e r o l e s of 
R e g i o n a l C o - o r d i n a t o r s . Fo r e x a m p l e : -
(a) Only t h r e e were appo in t ed t o cover t h e e n t i r e a r e a of 
Queensland and t h i s n a t u r a l l y l i m i t e d t h e i r involvement i n 
r e t i c u l i s t r o l e s on s p e c i f i c i s s u e s ; 
(b) The p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r of t he Counc i l s p l a c e d them in a 
d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n because - ( i ) as o f f i c e r s of a 
depa r tmen t they were s u b j e c t t o r e s t r i c t i o n s in r e l a t i o n 
t o s u p p o r t i n g t h e p o l i c i e s of t h e s t a t e government , w h i l e 
( i i ) as Chairmen of t h e Regiona l C o - o r d i n a t i o n Counc i l s 
t hey were e x p e c t e d to r e p r e s e n t t h e views of t he Counc i l s 
p o s s i b l y oppos ing government p o l i c y . 
21. The p o l i t i c a l character of the Councils may have had the benef i t of 
sa t i s fy ing sel f determination asp i ra t ions in tlie regions. Evidence of 
t h i s may be the dormance of the North Queensland New State Movem.ent 
during the years the Regional Co-ordination Councils ex i s ted . As 
indica ted by LUNN J . (1977) t h i s has since re-emerged. 
22. However, i f Regional Co-ordination Councils were to adopt adminis t ra t ive 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e i r own they would necessar i ly cease to be a 
means of co-ordination and become simply one of the many agencies whose 
work had to be co-ordinated by some other means. 
23. For example, the Moreton Regional Co-ordination Council was prepared to 
approve the establishment of a Moreton Water Authority but a spearate 
meeting of other representa t ives of the same loca l a u t h o r i t i e s re jec ted 
i t . See COURIER MAIL (1977), 
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The need t o " s p l i t h a i r s " about t h e n a t u r e of t h e i r r o l e s 
d i s t r a c t e d them from the i s s u e s which, i t i s s u g g e s t e d above, 
they shou ld have p u r s u e d . 
Conclus ion Regarding Regional C o - o r d i n a t i o n 
The problem which a f f e c t e d t h e Regiona l C o - o r d i n a t i o n a r r a n g e -
ments was t h a t two i n c o n s i s t e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s cou ld n o t be 
r e s o l v e d in t h e c o n t e x t of a s i n g l e body. The f o r m a l i t y and 
p o l t i c i a l c h a r a c t e r of t he Counc i l s was n e c e s s a r y i f t hey were 
t o have a c l a im t o l e g i t i m a t e l y be a b l e t o r e p r e s e n t t h e 
r e g i o n in t h e app rova l of a r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g y . However, t o be 
e f f e c t i v e i n non p o l i t i c a l problem s o l v i n g a much l o o s e r and 
l e s s formal a r rangement would be r e q u i r e d . 
Because i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c o u n c i l 
which i s a t t h e same t ime capab le of g e t t i n g down t o d e t a i l e d 
i s s u e s , i t would be d e s i r a b l e ( i f Regiona l C o - o r d i n a t i o n 
Counc i l s were r e c o n s t i t u t e d ) f o r t h e s e r o l e s t o be s e p a r a t e . 
This works w e l l i n government g e n e r a l l y where d i s t i n c t i o n s 
between p o l i t i a n s and c a r e e r a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a r e made and shou ld 
work a t t he r e g i o n a l l e v e l j u s t as w e l l . Thus a Reg iona l 
P o l i c y Counci l cou ld be e s t a b l i s h e d as a formal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
24 . 
group t o l e g i t i m a t e a r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g y . Such a Counc i l 
cou ld be s u p p o r t e d b u t no t l e a d by a Regiona l C o - o r d i n a t o r . 
In a d d i t i o n a Regiona l C o - o r d i n a t i o n Counc i l cou ld be 
c o n s t i t u t e d of non p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and c h a i r e d by a 
Reg iona l C o - o r d i n a t o r . I t s r o l e would be i n f o r m a l problem 
s o l v i n g and a i d i n g t h e p r o d u c t i o n of r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g i e s . 
Even w i t h such m o d i f i c a t i o n s t h e c o n c l u s i o n drawn i n Chap te r 5.7 
r e m a i n s . In any government o r g a n i z e d on t h e b a s i s of f u n c t i o n a l 
and p r o c e s s s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , s p a t i a l c o - o r d i n a t i o n w i l l remain a 
24, In Chapter 8, where the concept of a regional strategy is discussed, 
i t i s argued that i t should primarily be seen as a reflection of the 
goals of the executive group. However to achieve as much alignment 
as possible with the actual plans of agencies in a region some such 
validation would be required. A better way of establishing a Regional 
Policy Council rather than appointment of representatives of local 
authorit ies would be their election by a l l persons elected to local 
authorit ies in the region ( i . e . by limited sufferage). Thus they 
would be general regional representatives rather than specific 
representatives of local authori t ies . 
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largely insoliible problem. Even where spatial co-ordination 
is promoted by such a dominant central agency as a 
Co-ordinator-General's Department, it may fail unless its 
importance is understood by the executive group and by the 
leaders of powerful functional and process specialist agencies, 
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APPENDIX L - PUBLIC WORKS ORGANIZATION IN QUEENSLAND 
The purpose of this Appendix is to present a brief account of 
the way in which pioblic works are undertaken in Queensland and 
of the procedures followed for development of the Capital 
Works Programme. 
Agencies Involved 
The carrying out of public works is the responsibility of a 
number of government departments and of many local bodies. The 
Departments primarily involved are:-
Works Department - acts as a construction agent for many 
others and is mainly involved in building construction 
work. 
Main Roads Department - responsible for declared Main Roads. 
Irrigation and Water Supply Commission - responsible for 
rural as well as some urban and industrial water 
resources development. 
Harbours and Marine - acts as an agent for Harbour Boards in 
harbour works and also involved in Beach Protection and 
Small Crafts facilities development. 
Land Administration Commission - land development on a small 
scale. 
Department of Commercial and Industrial Development -
construction of industrial estates. 
Railways Department - construction of public railway 
facilities and acts as an agent for the development of 
mineral export lines with private finance. 
Co-ordinator-General's Department - involved at the time 
of writing in a major regional water resource 
project. 
Local Government Department - acts as an agent of 
various local authorities notably for urban water supply 
and sewerage projects. 
* - • !• Ii I 
1, This is based on CRAIG (1975), "Capital Works Programming in Queensland", 
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State Electricity Commission - construction of major power 
stations. 
Forestry Department - reafforestation. 
These various agencies often only act as principals in the 
project design and in the letting of contracts but in a number 
of cases departments operate fairly sizable day labour forces 
as well (e.g. Main Roads, Forestry, Works, Irrigation and 
Water Supply Commission, and Railways). 
Capital Works Programming 
The determination of the programme of capital works to be 
undertaken in Queensland is theoretically the responsibility of 
the Co-ordinator-General under the "State and Regional 
Planning and Development, Public Works Organization and 
Environmental Control Act 1971-1974" of which Clause 22(1) 
states -
"The Co-ordinator-General may, of his own motion and 
shall, at the direction of the Minister, plan in 
respect of a particular period 
(a) a programme of works for the State or for any 
part of the State or for any area over which 
the state claims jurisdiction; 
(b) the orderly carrying over that period or during 
any portion or portions of that period of the 
whole or any part of the works included in the 
programme II 
The existence of such a statement in legislation is not 
sufficient to enable the Co-ordinator-General to have a 
meaningful role in capital works programming. It is necessary 
also that the determination of funding be involved so that 
practical constraints on the programme to be undertaken can 
exist. 
Thus the capital works programme relates mainly to the 
allocation of the State's Loan Funds and of "Semi-governmental" 
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Debenture Loans both of which are allocated to Queensland by 
the Loan Council.^ While the co-ordinated programme of works 
notionally involves all state capital works its effectiveness 
is largely limited to those programmes funded from these 
sources. The increasing extent to which capital works are 
financed from Consolidated Revenue, Commonwealth and other 
4 
sources acts to limit the extent of its coverage. There are 
two systems within the Co-ordinator-General's Department to 
deal with the works programmes, one for State Departments 
(largely involving State Loan Funds) and one local bodies 
(largely involving Debenture Loan Funds). These systems are 
described below. 
2. The S t a t e Loan funds a v a i l a b l e a re c o n t r o l l e d by the Loan Council under 
F i n a n c i a l Agreement of 192 7 which has the force of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n 
under Sec t ion 105A. The t o t a l borrowings p e r m i t t e d fo r a l l "Semi-
governmental" a u t h o r i t i e s for Loan Council purposes i nc lude a l l 
debenture borrowings by a u t h o r i t i e s which borrow more than a s p e c i f i e d 
amount i n a given y e a r . This l i m i t was $800,000 p e r year i n 1976/77. 
The Semi-governmental borrowing programme i s based on the so c a l l e d 
"Gentlemen's Agreement" which a rose out of a P r e m i e r ' s Conference i n 
1935 b u t has never been l e g a l l y formal i sed o r p u b l i s h e d . 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e programme for l o c a l bod ies i s i n c r e a s e d by t h e 
requi rement of Clause 27 (1) of t h e " S t a t e and Regional P lann ing and 
Development, P u b l i c Works Organ iza t ion and Environmental Cont ro l Act 
1971-1974" whicdi s t a t e s -
"Every a p p l i c a t i o n t h a t monies be p a i d from the Treasury of 
Queensland i n r e s p e c t of works or proposed works of a l o c a l 
body o r t h a t t he T r e a s u r e r , on beha l f of t he Government of 
Queensland, gua ran tee the amount o r any p a r t of t h e amount of 
a loan made o r t o be made i n r e s p e c t of works or proposed works 
of a l o c a l body s h a l l be submi t ted t o t h e Co-o rd ina to r -Gene ra l 
t o g e t h e r wi th such p a r t i c u l a r s r e l e v a n t t h e r e t o as he c o n s i d e r s 
n e c e s s a r y , " 
A l l Debenture Loan borrowings by l o c a l bod ies a r e guaran teed by t h e 
S t a t e Government, t h u s the works programme ga ins a degree of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over l o c a l bod ies which a r e not i n the Semi-governmental 
group. Furthermore t he S t a t e Government s u b s i d i z e s many of t h e works 
under taken by l o c a l bod ie s so t h a t t he l a t t e r have a p o s i t i v e i n c e n t i v e 
t o c o - o p e r a t e through the works programme. 
4 . Between 1968/69 and 1976/77 a v a i l a b l e S t a t e Loan Funds i n c r e a s e d by 
a f a c t o r of 2.4 wh i l e o t h e r sources ( i n c l u d i n g Commonwealth S p e c i a l 
programmes) i n c r e a s e d 3.5 t imes and Conso l ida ted Revenue by a f a c t o r 
o f 1 0 . 1 . S o u r c e : QUEENSLAND, CO-ORDINATOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT, ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
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Local Body Works Programme 
The information flows involved in the production of the annual 
local body works programme are illustrated in Figure LI. In 
December each year, the Co-ordinator-General's Department makes 
a request to each local body in the state which undertakes 
capital works, for a works programme for the succeeding 
financial year. The submission is in terms of new and 
continuing projects for which new fiinds are required and 
details of how they are to be financed, the priority of the 
project and the stage reached in project planning. 
On receiving the programme submissions they are broken down by 
class of project,groups of which are then submitted to State 
Government Departments for comments on their practicability, 
desirability, urgency and so on (e.g. Health Department would 
comment on Hospital Board works. Harbours and Marine Department 
on Harbour Boards and beach protection works and Main Roads 
Department on roadworks etc). 
From the submissions received the Co-ordinator-General's 
Department prepares a consolidated programme with various 
functional and other summaries. The total programme is then 
compared with estimated available resources which may flow from 
the Loan Council and cuts are made in the programme on a 
generally incremental basis with substantial guidance from the 
various State Departments. 
In about April a submission is prepared for the Loan Council 
consisting of information on all projects on which funds are to 
be sought. Prior to submission of this programme to Loan 
Council it is submitted for approval to a group of state 
ministers. This group is referred to as the State Works 
Development Council. 
In May an interim programme is produced for the release of 
limited approvals to local bodies where for reasons of 
continuity, loan raising may be required early in the financial 
year before the main programme can be released. This amounts 
to about 20% of the final programme. 
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The Loan Council meets, usually in June, and fixes total 
borrowings available to all semi-governmental bodies. Following 
this, final decisions are made on the works programme and this 
is submitted to the Treasury as a recommendation. After 
addition of loan terms and conditions, the Treasurer releases 
the borrowing programme to local bodies. It is unusual for the 
Treasurer to modify the Co-ordinator-General's recommendations. 
There is a considerable amount of further processing of the 
programme throughout the year including monthly reporting of 
progress by local bodies. 
A five year rolling forward programme for semi-governmental 
5 
local bodies was commenced in the 19 74/75 financial year. 
This meant the production of a target programme which 
involves the State government in no actual commitment of 
resources but simply indicates to local bodies the probable 
level of their capital resources. 
Finally it may be noted that administrative activity associated 
with the local body works programme is complex but that "the 
procedures involved in decision making ... are not technically 
advanced (i.e. they are based on common sense rather than 
mathematical analysis)". Because the State Government's 
capital works subsidy scheme is based on actual expenditures 
a great deal of detailed control must be exerted over 
individual projects. The programme is allocated on a project 
by project basis but in general "local bodies are entitled to 
reallocate the total funds they are allowed on any approved 
7 basis" . 
Works Programmes for State Government Departments 
Until 19 76/77 the procedure for producing the Governmental 
Works Programme was similar but simpler than for local bodies 
(in that much less detailed control of projects was involved in 
the case of departments). Each department was requested in 
January each year for a statement of its intended programme for 
5. QUEENSLAND, CO-ORDINATOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT, (1976), P. 8. 
6. CRAIG (1975), "Capital Works Programming in Queensland", p. 16. 
7. ibid, p. 17. 
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the succeeding financial year. Submissions took the form of 
either a schedule of proposed works or as an overall statement 
of desired departmental receipts and expenditures. These were 
consolidated into a works programme by the Co-ordinator-
General 's Department, and State Loan Fund requirements are 
extracted. On a generally incremental basis (usually after 
discussions with departments), the Co-ordinator-General arrived 
at an apportionment of the anticipated State Loan Funds - Loans 
and subsidies to local bodies being first deducted from the 
available resources. This was submitted to the State Works 
Development Council and then consolidated into a submission to 
the Loan Council. Following the Loan Council meeting in June, 
final cuts were made to the programme and this was si±imitted to 
the State Works Development Council and Treasury for their 
approval. The allocations were then released to departments 
along with such special conditions which the Co-ordinator-
General determined. The actual final programme for each 
department was devised by the department itself from within . 
its allocation. 
From the 19 76/77 financial year five year target forward 
programmes were sought from State Departments in conjunction 
with the annual programme though in other respects the system 
remained as above. 
Comments 
The general approach to the works programme by the Co-ordinator-
General 's Department is not one of centralized decision making. 
Emphasis is given to the allocation of funds between authorities 
and between programmes with limited specification of how it is 
to be spent. This implies that actual co-ordination between 
specific projects must be limited. Furthermore there is no 
evidence to suggest that the Co-ordinator-General has available 
to him sufficient information to carry out any extensive 
analysis of the relative capital needs of different sectors. 
Greater attention is given to local body works programmes than 
to state departmental programmes and this is not particularly 
logical because local body decisions involve a high degree of 
"consumer choice". However, for two reasons greater control 
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has been exerted over local body projects under the works 
programme than is exerted over those of state departments. 
Firstly, this is required by the State Subsidy Scheme under 
which subsidies are paid on the basis of actual expenditure 
on specific projects. Secondly there are fewer autonomous 
funding sources for local bodies and so detailed control is 
more feasible. 
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APPENDIX M - CORPORATE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS 
Corporate planning means central planning for an organization 
as a whole. If corporate planning is pursued at the agency 
level in a government, the procedures which may be used and the 
internal structure adopted must still allow for the necessary 
linkages between it and other agencies. Thus a planning 
system which was ideal and highly efficient for one agency's 
own purposes but prohibited it from effectively relating to 
other agencies would not be satisfactory. 
The purpose of this appendix is to outline constraints on 
agency corporate planning which are required to enable them to 
operate successfully in a co-ordinative government structure. 
If a management consultant was employed to examine a specific 
agency, some of these points would be readily recognized 
because of the need to relate its planning to that of the rest 
of the government. However, it is useful to examine them in a 
general context. 
In the first place, where an agency requires extensive linkages 
with other agencies, corporate planning should involve more 
central co-ordination than actual central control within the 
agency. Secondly, its plans should be oriented towards the 
final outputs of government if at all possible. Thirdly, 
the corporate plan should be formalized while finally, it 
should be concerned with a significant period in the future 
(in general more than a single financial year). These points 
are discussed below. 
Management Style 
Corporate management of an agency can involve two different 
approaches. In the first, planning is primarily seen as the 
responsibility of a single central group in the agency (perhaps 
its manager) while, in the other, objectives are determined 
centrally but in their actual achievement the central role is 
only to co-ordinate the various sections of the agency. The 
former approach is appropriate where an agency has only very 
simple relationships with other agencies (i.e. they are few in 
number or similar in nature) while an agency requiring complex 
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co-operative relationships with other agencies must tend to use 
a management by objectives style. Furthermore similar agencies 
should not be so rigidly bureaucratised that communications 
across their boundaries is inhibited at all but the top levels. 
Identification of Relevant Outputs 
It is important that the internal arrangement in an agency be 
such that the final outputs of government be emphasized rather 
than limited sub goals. As for the government itself each 
agency may contain groups specialized on the basis of outputs, 
process and location. If an agency operates hy co-ordinating 
the planning of individual groups within it, on which groups 
should the co-ordinated planning be based? The requirements for 
different agencies would vary but, as a general principle, process 
specialist groups should not produce the basic plans though they 
may have to co-ordinate them. Sxib plans prepared by process 
specialist group would tend to have a process emphasis which is 
not particularly useful in evaluating the outputs of an agency. 
Unless an agency is itself only concerned with a process and 
not with a functional of government it will not be impossible 
to base its sub plans on government functions. For a purely 
process specialist agency its plan may not satisfactorily be 
related to the output of government no matter what is done. 
The best approach in that case would be to treat the process 
as the output of that agency and orient the plan towards it. 
The formal corporate plan of an agency should be broken down 
into programmes. A programme may be considered to be a set of 
activities of an agency connected with a related set of outputs 
or functions of the agency. 
Formality of Plans 
It is highly desirable that an agency's corporate plan should 
be formalized to the extent of being documented. The principal 
advantage would be that there could be no misunderstanding of 
the plan (either by the agency or by the government executive). 
Agencies would be able to relate to the plans of each other and 
major inconsistencies between plans and strategies would be 
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able to be identified. Furthermore, if required, the public 
would be able to be made aware of proposed future government 
action by the release of such plans. Finally the 
dociimentation of such a plan would guarantee that a reasonable 
attempt at corporate planning had been made by an agency. In 
its absence it would be easy for an agency to pay lip service 
to the concept of corporate planning, but ignore it in practice 
To justify the production of a formal plan it is apparent 
that each agency must be of a reasonable size. In order to 
clarify what is understood by a formal agency corporate plan 
Table Ml illustrates the possible content of such a plan. 
Time Scale 
Agency corporate planning should involve consideration of a 
significant period in the future. Apart from i ts effect on the 
efficiency of the agency, the main justification for a 
forward plan is that i t is necessary to enable sensible 
comparisons to be made between agency plans. If agencies plan 
only for their current activity period (e.g. one financial 
year) then any inconsistencies detected through formal 
interagency co-ordination are unlikely to be resolved because 
i t may be too late to make changes. 
The development of plans would be a major undertaking and 
consequently the advantages and costs need to be weighed. It 
is quite feasible for a government agency, lacking the stimulus 
of possible death by bankruptcy, to operate on a short term 
planning basis (e.g. day to day, or year to year) without any 
purpose except spending i ts budget and answering i ts mail. In 
such an agency a lot of time and effort will be consumed in 
"firefighting" (i .e. trying to sort out problems which have 
already occurred) whereas if effort were devoted to foirward 
2 planning many of the problems would not arise. The basic 
1. See Chapter 8 for the concept of a s t r a t egy . Minor inconsis tencies 
between plans and s t r a t e g i e s would not be able to be detected by any 
formal means, 
2. Using a medical analogy " f i re f igh t ing" may be said to be l ike t r e a t i n g 
a p a t i e n t for the symptoms of h i s disease - while forward planning i s 
l i k e t ry ing to cure the disease i t s e l f . 
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TABLE Ml - HYPOTHETICAL CONTENT OF AGENCY CORPORATE PLAN 
1. GOALS - general statement of agencies'purposes 
2. OBJECTIVES - specific statement of agencies' purpose 
3. PROGRAMMES ARISING OUT OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES - A 
description of all programmes of activities carried out 
by the agency and for each programme:-
3.1 GENERAL CONCEPT OF AGENCIES FUTURE ACTIVITIES 
(a) CURRENT ACTIVITY PERIOD (YEAR 1) - Brief 
Information on Current Activity 
(b) PROGRAMMING PERIOD (e.g. YEAR 2-5) - Details of 
proposed programme 
(c) INTERMEDIATE FUTURE (e.g. YEAR 6-20) - broad 
concepts 
3.2 REVIEW OF PROGRESS - Review of achievement in recent 
past of goals and objectives by the programme. 
3.2 JUSTIFICATION OF PROGRAMME PROPOSAL DURING 
PROGRAMMING PERIOD - Costs, expected effects (direct 
benefits, external effects). Details of the 
programme (e.g. specific projects) might have to be 
identified for this. 
3.4 CONSISTENCY WITH RELEVANT STRATEGIES - Identify 
inconsistencies with strategies which could require 
changes to the latter. Deal with both functional 
and regional strategies. 
3.5 MAJOR NEW PROJECTS - Information on major new 
projects considered for inclusion in the programme 
and a justification for their inclusion 
4. CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT 
Notes (a) The corporate plan would be based on programmes. 
(b) The emphasis of the corporate plan would be on the 
programming period not the current financial year. 
(c) The concept of strategies is advanced in Chapter 8, 
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a d v a n t a g e o f any f o r w a r d p l a n n i n g s y s t e m i s an i n c r e a s e i n t h e 
e f f i c i e n c y of t h e a g e n c y . P l a n n i n g i s an e s s e n t i a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of any o r g a n i z a t i o n and o n c e e s t a b l i s h e d a 
s y s t e m of f o r w a r d p l a n n i n g i s p r o b a b l y no more e x p e n s i v e ( even 
i f more demanding) t o m a i n t a i n t h a n i s s h o r t t e r m p l a n n i n g e v e n 
i g n o r i n g t h e p r o b a b l e c o s t s a v i n g s t h r o u g h m i n i m i z a t i o n o f 
" f i r e f i g h t i n g " , 
I t may be a s k e d h o w e v e r , how r e l e v a n t f o r w a r d p l a n n i n g i s i n a 
s i t u a t i o n w h e r e t h e r e a r e u n c o n t r o l l a b l e e n v i r o n m e n t a l 
i n f l u e n c e s w h i c h can h a v e a m a j o r i m p a c t on an a g e n c y ' s p l a n s -
e . g . w h e r e g o v e r n m e n t d e c i s i o n s on a p a r t i c u l a r m a t t e r may 
v a c i l l a t e o r w h e r e ma jo r r e s o u r c e s r e q u i r e d t o u n d e r t a k e a 
3 
programme may b e p r o v i d e d o r w i t h d r a w n a t t h e l a s t m i n u t e . 
T h e r e a r e , h o w e v e r , two r e a s o n s f o r a t t e m p t i n g f o r w a r d 
p l a n n i n g e v e n w h e r e s u c h c o n s t r a i n t s e x i s t . The f i r s t i s 
p o l i t i c a l i n t h a t an o r g a n i z a t i o n which does n o t p l a n a h e a d 
w i l l be r e a d i l y o u t m a n o e u v r e d by i t s c o m p e t i t o r s who d o , w h i l e 
t h e s e c o n d i s t h a t f a i l u r e t o do s o s i m p l y compounds w i t h 
i n t e r n a l u n c e r t a i n t y t h e e x t e r n a l u n c e r t a i n t i e s w h i c h t h e 
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o r g a n i z a t i o n f a c e s . 
T h e r e may be d i s a d v a n t a g e s t o a g o v e r n m e n t e x e c u t i v e i n f o r w a r d 
p l a n n i n g by i t s a g e n c i e s i n t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t may n o t w i s h t o 
be r e s t r i c t e d b e c a u s e t h i s r e d u c e s i t s a b i l i t y t o b a r g a i n f o r 
e l e c t o r a l s u p p o r t . Where a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y can t r u t h f u l l y 
c l a i m t h a t i t i s n o t r e a l l y aware of i t s a c t u a l c a p a c i t y t o 
i m p l e m e n t a p o l i c y t h e n e l e c t i o n p r o m i s e s may be more g e n e r o u s 
t h a n a p r o p e r a n a l y s i s of t h e f a c t s m i g h t a l l o w . F u r t h e r m o r e 
power i n a p o l i t i c a l s e n s e i s c o n t r o l of u n c e r t a i n t y . Power 
w i l l a p p e a r t o b e l o s t when t h e u n c e r t a i n t y (and h e n c e t h e 
d e c i s i o n m a k e r s a b i l i t y t o make a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n s ) i s r e d u c e d . 
T h i s l o s s wou ld be l a r g e l y i l l u s o r y b e c a u s e , w h i l e t h e c a p a c i t y 
3, The extensive use of specia l purpose funding by the Commonwealth can 
make forward planning by a Sta te Government v i r t u a l l y i r r e l e v a n t . 
4, However, in the l imi t ing case of completely random environmental 
behaviour, the ideal approach i s simply to do the bes t poss ible a t a 
given point in time ra ther than endeavouring to p red ic t outcomes and 
adopt longer term p lans , SCHUTZENBERGER (1954), p . 211. Where the 
environment i s not completely random an extremely f lex ib le medium term 
plan i s superior to a purely shor t term approach. 
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to make decisions with immediate outcomes will be reduced, the 
capacity for decisions with future outcomes is increased. 
Unfortunately however there is less immediate publicity value 
in such power. An additional problem is that, if forward 
planning can lead to a reduction in "firefighting" there will 
be, in some agencies, employees who will feel that their jobs 
were justified only by such activity and they may, for personal 
reasons feel, constrained to oppose it. 
If a public organization is to attempt corporate forward 
planning (which implies determining activity for more than the 
current activity period) then it must decide on appropriate 
time scales. This will depend on the functions or processes 
with which the organization is dealing. The time period must 
be long enough so that there is a reasonable chance of 
fulfilment of objectives but not so long that advance decisions 
are certain to become irrelevant. 
As different considerations will become irrelevant over 
different periods, this should be the guideline in determining 
planning periods. Ift Table Ml it is suggested that different 
details and different concepts should receive varied 
consideration in terms of time scales. It is useful to 
classify an organizations future time horizons into four 
classes as follows:-
(a) current activity period - the immediate future during which 
present activities are most unlikely to change. In 
practical terms this period could be the current 
financial year; 
(b) programming period - the period of 3 to 8 years for which 
it is necessary to define proposed activities so that 
prerequisite action may be taken in the current activity 
period; 
(c) intermediate future - beyond the programming period and 
possibly extending up to 10 or 20 years in the future for 
which time only broad concepts of activity are relevant; 
(d) long term future - say up to 100 or 200 years in the 
future for which an organization could only sensibly be 
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interested in very important predicted problems resulting 
either from their own proposed activities or from other 
causes. 
The more stable an organization's environment the longer the 
programming period and intermediate future can be (the former 
in particular is highly dependent on environmental stability). 
Whether the forward planning periods of all government agencies 
should be the same is debatable. The current activity period 
(if used as a basis of budgeting) must obviously be the same 
but, if a rolling forward programme is utilised, there is 
probably little reason to insist on common programming and 
intermediate future periods. 
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APPENDIX N - POSSIBLE CAPITAL WORKS PROGRAMMING PROCEDURE 
The d e t a i l s of a c a p i t a l works p rogramming s y s t e m w o u l d be 
v e r y complex and w i l l o n l y be b r o a d l y o u t l i n e d h e r e . 
A n n u a l C y c l e 
The programme c y c l e f o r d e p a r t m e n t a l and l o c a l body w h i c h 
c o u l d be u s e d i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n F i g . N l . T h i s wou ld i n v o l v e 
a s e q u e n c e o f e v e n t s commencing i n S e p t e m b e r and c o n c l u d i n g 
a y e a r l a t e r i n t h e S e p t e m b e r o f t h e f i r s t f i n a n c i a l y e a r o f 
t h e p rog ramme, a t w h i c h s t a g e t h e n e x t y e a r ' s programme would 
be commenced. T h u s , i n f a c t , t h e programming p r o c e s s wou ld 
be c o n t i n u o u s . 
D e f i n i n g Y e a r 1 a s t h e c u r r e n t f i n a n c i a l y e a r , a g e n c i e s w o u l d , 
f o l l o w i n g a r e q u e s t i n S e p t e m b e r , n o m i n a t e t h e i r r e q u i r e m e n t s 
f o r Yea r 2 t o Yea r 6 ( w i t h t h e Y e a r s 2 t o 5 b e i n g a r e v i s i o n of 
r e q u i r e m e n t s s t a t e d p r e v i o u s l y ) . I n s u p p o r t of t h i s r e q u e s t 
f o r r e s o u r c e s w o u l d be t h e i r c o r p o r a t e p l a n f o r Yea r 1 t o 
5 w h i c h s h o u l d r e c e n t l y h a v e b e e n p r o d u c e d as p a r t of t h e 
a g e n c i e s ' i n t e r n a l b u d g e t p r o c e d u r e f o r Year 1 . 
L o c a l B o d i e s 
On r e c e i v i n g s u b m i s s i o n s from l o c a l b o d i e s a R e g i o n a l Co-
o r d i n a t o r w o u l d t a k e t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n : -
(a) a r r a n g e f o r comments t o be o b t a i n e d from l o c a l o f f i c e r s o f 
r e l e v a n t S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t s on t h e c o n s i s t e n c y of r e l e v a n t 
p a r t s of t h e l o c a l b o d i e s c o r p o r a t e p l a n and t h e 
d e p a r t m e n t s ' f u n c t i o n a l s t r a t e g i e s ; 
(b) e x a m i n e t h e c o n s i s t e n c y o f t h e c o r p o r a t e p l a n and t h e 
s p a t i a l s t r a t e g y ; 
(c) c r i t i c a l l y a p p r a i s e s e l e c t e d p r o j e c t s and programmes s o 
t h a t a l e a d c o u l d be t a k e n i n d i s c u s s i o n of programmes a t 
t h e R e g i o n a l P u b l i c Works C o m m i t t e e . 
1. The adminis t rat ive work connected with the loca l body programme could 
be the r e spons ib i l i t y of Regional Co-ordinators, i f they ex is ted , as 
a means of increas ing t h e i r de ta i l ed involvement in the region. 
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This Committee would meet in February to advise the Regional 
Co-ordinator as regards c a p i t a l works a l l o c a t i o n s for the 
r eg ion . At t h i s Committee d iscuss ion would be focussed on 
s e l e c t e d programmes in the r eg ion . The Committee would a l so 
be expected to produce recommendations on s u i t a b l e programme 
ana ly s i s and review s tud i e s for the region and iden t i fy s p e c i f i c 
p r o j e c t s (due to commence in Year 3 or onwards) where there 
appeared t o be a need for review. 
The Committee's conclusions on these i s sues could be submitted 
t o the Regional Co-ordinat ion Council, i f one exis ted , for 
review p r i o r to t ransmission to the Co-ordinator-General . 
S t a t e Departments 
For S t a t e Departments' programmes the review process would be 
undertaken between November and January and would involve: 
(a) a r eg iona l breakdown of programme forward proposals for 
submission to Regional Capi ta l Works Committees; 
(b) a review of nee.ds and an examination of consistency with 
r eg iona l and funct iona l s t r a t e g i e s . 
Loan Council 
In March the Regional Co-ordinators would meet with the 
Co-ordinator-General and determine recommended a l l oca t i ons of 
debenture loan funds to l oca l bodies and S ta te Loan Funds to 
S t a t e Departments. After approval by the Government Executive 
t h i s would be used as a bas i s for submission to the Loan 
Council and for the r e l ea se to loca l bodies (by the Treasury) 
of an in t e r im programme. This would enable l oca l borrowing 
for a s u b s t a n t i a l percentage of t h e i r probable subsequent 
a l l o c a t i o n s . 
Immediately before Loan Council met in June, each Regional 
Publ ic Works Committee would again meet to consider -
(a) i n t e r i m r e s u l t s of any reg iona l programme ana lys i s and 
review s t u d i e s ; 
(b) r e s u l t s of any o the r previous recommendations; 
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(c) an indication of the programme sent to the Loan Council 
on behalf of the region. Any major dissatisfactions 
with the proposed allocations could be expressed at 
this time; 
(d) suggestions for modifications to the regional strategy 
resulting from actual organizational plans. 
At.the same time the State Capital Works Committee would meet 
to consider parallel matters. Immediately following Loan 
Council, final allocations would be determined and released 
to all agencies who would be asked to notify the details of 
their final Year 2 programme from within the total allocation 
made available to them. 
By about September the actual final programme would be 
submitted to the Governor in Council for declaration as the 
States Capital Works Programme. The programme so declared 
would include target allocations for Years 3 to 6. 
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APPENDIX 0 - A NON CENTRALIZED DECISION HIERARCHY 
FOR CAPITAL WORKS" ~~ 
General 
Capital works are the responsibility of many functionally 
specialised departments as well as many local bodies and it 
is essential to identify the hierarchy of decision making which 
might be involved. Process specialist departments have no 
significant role in capital works with the sole important 
exception of the Works Department which operates as a 
construction agency for numerous other departments. 
Requirements 
Logically each agency having a functional or spatial 
responsibility could be regarded as the best expert in 
determining the relative priorities within that function or 
spatial area. However, there is a problem in this because of 
the overlap and duplication of functional and spatial 
jurisdictions. If responsibility for a function is to reside 
in a department level, for example, a high degree of control 
over that function is required. In the extreme a department 
would, from within given resources, be able to do anything it 
liked and also control the parallel activities of local bodies. 
However, the control of local bodies cannot be too severe or 
else any logical reason for their existence is destroyed. 
Similarly local bodies would require control over departments 
if they are to co-ordinate a function within a spatial area. 
However, because functional departments tend to be dominant 
over local bodies in a conventionally organized government, 
this is not likely to occur. 
Finally a central co-ordinating agency requires the ability 
to adjust priorities as between various functional and 
spatial interests* 
Solution 
A reasonable hierarchy for decision making about capital works 
is as follows: 
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(a) Functional Departments (subject to their ministers) could 
be considered to be the best experts in deciding relative 
priorities within their own functional areas providing 
they are able to show evidence of considering 
externalities and spatial interests. They should be able 
to influence the parallel activities of local bodies but 
not be able to unilaterally control them; 
(b) Local bodies could be considered to be the best experts in 
deciding relative priorities of the works they actually 
undertake, especially where there is a degree of 
"consumer choice" in the decision (e.g. a local authority, 
controlled by elected representatives of a local 
community, who themselves pay for the works they undertake, 
has a very good argument for "consumer choice"); 
(c) In assessing relative priorities in their own fields all 
agencies should be required to consider external effects 
in a standard way. 
(d) The relative priorities within their own fields set by 
individual agencies should not be questioned by the 
Co-ordinator-General except in certain special cases: 
(i) where there is a conflict between spatial and 
functional strategies - or a conflict between a 
corporate plan and a strategy; 
(ii) where there is a likelihood of undervaluation of 
externalities; 
(iii) where it is recognized that the organization of the 
government is not adequate to handle a particular 
problem. 
Furthermore, if a Regional Co-ordination Council existed 
there would be a good case for arguing that agency 
priorities be questioned on its recommendation, on the 
grounds that some such weighting is necessary to counter-
balance the natural dominance of the departmental 
agencies; 
(e) The Co-ordinator-General could assess and achieve a 
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balance in the allocation of available capital funds 
between the competing demands of individual programmes 
